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ABSTRACT
MERCY, JUSTICE, AND POLITICS: JOHN PAUL II
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Kevin E. Miller, B.S., M.A.
Marquette University, 2011

Pope John Paul II’s 1995 Evangelium Vitae teaches that capital punishment ought
not be used “except ... when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.”
Several interpretations of this teaching have been proposed. Through a close reading of
the encyclical in itself, in light of John Paul’s other writings on the human person and
morality, especially the 1980 Dives in Misericordia, and also in the context of such
important influences upon him as Thomas Aquinas and Henri de Lubac, I dispute, on the
one hand, the interpretation according to which John Paul is pointing toward possible
acceptance of the view that capital punishment is, as intentional killing, intrinsically evil.
This interpretation rests upon a reading of Aquinas that fails to see the valid logic of his
limited defense of capital punishment, and on a reading of John Paul that exaggerates his
departure from Aquinas. I also reject, on the other hand, the interpretation of John Paul’s
teaching as a purely prudential judgment about what is best only in the circumstance of an
unhealthy moral culture. This interpretation is incompatible with the logic of Evangelium
Vitae, which concerns what is necessary both to build and then also to maintain a healthy
culture, and is further disproved by demonstrating at length that John Paul’s teaching
appeals to mercy as a moral principle always essential for full respect for human dignity
insofar as this includes the capacity for conversion, and for the realization of true justice
by human persons by nature “restless” apart from a supernatural relationship with God.
This appeal is grounded primarily in Christian revelation, but the beginning of an
appreciation of the value of mercy is also accessible through natural-law reasoning, based
especially on our recognition of creation as already pure gift, requiring us to give
ourselves to others in love beyond justice.

To my wife Kim, with love and gratitude
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PREFACE

This dissertation brings together several major interests that I developed over a
period of many years. Probably from the moment that I learned at a fairly young age that
capital punishment (still) exists in the United States and elsewhere, I wondered whether it
is right or wrong. My position on the issue swung back and forth during my early
adulthood. When Pope John Paul II’s Evangelium Vitae was released, a couple of years
into my time as a theology graduate student, I had come to think that the use of capital
punishment for grave crimes was probably morally acceptable and perhaps even
preferable. But I was still not entirely comfortable with this view; I defended it when the
topic came up in conversations, but I was by no means an activist. Upon reading John
Paul’s teaching that capital punishment ought, for the most part, not be used, I very
quickly realized that this was the view with which my conscience could be at peace, even
though it would take me much further study and thought to grasp the basis for this view
(assuming that I have now successfully grasped at least some of that basis).
At some point during my high-school years, I came upon St. Thomas Aquinas’
Summa Theologiae, and having been told that in this book he proves the existence of
God, I found and read that portion. As I was also coming to wonder, during that time a
few years before the Cold War ended, about the morality of war, I also looked for and
read Aquinas’ treatment of this topic. Later, probably in college, I became aware that
Aquinas argues that there is something called ‘natural law,’ and I became interested in
what he means by this. Such experiences as these led me to seek opportunities to study
Aquinas’ thought more closely and carefully.
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Also during my college years, I learned that John Paul II was, and had long been, a
very prolific author. Various friends and acquaintances encouraged me to read his work,
which I found (and still find) both challenging and stimulating. When I began to study
John Paul’s moral thought in particular, I saw connections between Aquinas’ thought and
John Paul’s. I likewise began to develop an interest in the contemporary discussions of
such topics within fundamental moral thought as action theory and natural-law theory.
When I was a college senior, Henri Cardinal de Lubac’s interpretation of Aquinas
on the topic of the relationship between nature and grace was brought to my attention, and
then began my efforts at understanding what de Lubac means and whether he is right.
Learning about the “Communio” school of thought, and the journal Communio, to both of
which de Lubac contributed prominently, led me to the writings of David L. Schindler,
which in turn alerted me to the relationship between de Lubac’s thought and John Paul’s,
and to the importance of that relationship for an interpretation of other elements of John
Paul’s fundamental moral thought (besides, e.g., natural law), and of his applied moral
and social thought.
In the course of my study of John Paul’s teaching on capital punishment, I came to
see this teaching as a very significant intersection between his thought, Aquinas’, and de
Lubac’s; as a key manifestation of some central elements of his fundamental moral
thought; as well as, of course, as a teaching of practical importance in our society.
During the writing of this dissertation, I became a member of the Dominican
Laity. I have often asked that my work would be helped by the intercession of my various
Dominican patrons, as well as of John Paul II since his death. To borrow from several of
the mottos of the Order of Preachers, I pray that in my study of John Paul’s thought, I will
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have successfully contemplated and handed on the fruits of contemplation, for the service
of truth, to praise, to bless, and to preach. To borrow from John Paul himself, I pray that I
will have helped to proclaim the Gospel of life, for the building of a culture of life and
love.

1
INTRODUCTION

To the extent that Pope John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae can be
characterized as being about particular practical moral issues, it is obviously especially
about the issues of abortion and euthanasia. Its mentions of capital punishment are
comparatively few and brief. Most notably, John Paul spends several paragraphs offering
a brief analysis of the problem, stating a conclusion that society “ought not go to the
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words,
when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society,” and quoting the original
(1992) Catechism of the Catholic Church in support of his position.1 Elsewhere in the
encyclical, we find a likely allusion to the issue in the course of a reflection on the story
of Cain and Abel;2 a statement that the movement against the death penalty is a sign of
hope in our culture;3 and an explanation that the Old Testament provisions for capital
punishment do not yet reflect a fully refined sense of the value of life.4
From the day the encyclical was released, however, its apparent rejection of
capital punishment for nearly all practical purposes received considerable ecclesiastical
and popular attention along with its categorical rejection of abortion. Then-Cardinal
Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, highlighted
John Paul’s treatment of the issue at the March 30, 1995, press conference releasing the
1. EV 56.
2. EV 9.
3. EV 27. For an influential American anti–capital punishment text, see Bedeau,
ed., The Death Penalty in America.
4. EV 40.
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encyclical, calling it “a real development” and “important doctrinal progress.”5 The New
York Times’s main article on the encyclical’s release had as its subhead: “In Strongest
Terms, [Pope] Assails Abortion and Capital Punishment.”6 An accompanying article
quoted some critics as well as some supporters of the teaching on abortion, but only
supporters of the teaching on capital punishment. The article included this: “Among those
welcoming the encyclical as ‘one of the most important’ statements of John Paul II’s
papacy was Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago, who ... developed the theme of the
‘consistent ethic of life’—linking abortion with other issues like euthanasia and the death
penalty, war and poverty.” It continued: “Many Catholic officials and theologians said
yesterday that this approach was embodied in the encyclical, although some regretted that
the phrase itself was not used.”7
Catholic leaders in the United States have in the years since continued to refer to
Evangelium Vitae’s teaching on capital punishment. The United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, in their 2005 statement A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death (the
first major Conference statement on capital punishment since 1980), quote Evangelium
Vitae and in other ways draw from it (for instance, by speaking, as John Paul does, of
God’s protection of Cain’s life).8 Just this year (2011), both the Illinois Catholic bishops9
5. “On File,” Origins 24 (1995), 690.
6. Bohlen, “Pope Offers ‘Gospel of Life,’” A1.
7. Steinfels, “U.S. Responds on Established Lines,” A1, A13. See for background,
regarding Bernardin’s proposal and the discussion that it generated, Bernardin,
“Consistent Ethic of Life,” and Pakaluk, “A Cardinal Error.”
8. USCCB, A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death, esp. 4, 10–15.
9. Catholic Conference of Illinois, “Abolition of the Death Penalty.”
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and the Arizona bishops10 have referred or alluded (by using such language as “culture of
life” and “culture of death”) to John Paul’s encyclical in statements on the death penalty.
This dissertation inquires into the possible theological principle underlying John
Paul’s rejection of at least most uses of capital punishment, even for those who have
committed very grave crimes. The question of whether John Paul has in mind such a
principle, and, if so, what it might be, has already received some attention in the scholarly
literature as well as in the popular press and in other ecclesiastical statements. Several
interpretations of the teaching have been proposed by theologians who have devoted
significant study to Evangelium Vitae on this topic. On the one hand, some scholars,
working within the philosophical/theological framework developed by Germain Grisez
and John Finnis, have developed a detailed and formidable argument that John Paul’s
thought points in the direction of a rejection of capital punishment as intrinsically evil.11
This detailed argument requires a similarly thorough analysis and response, which I shall
offer in chapter 1. I shall argue that the Grisezan reading of Evangelium Vitae is
mistaken, that there are cogent reasons to regard capital punishment as potentially morally
licit in some cases, and that John Paul does not reject these reasons, and even suggests
that they remain valid.
Others, in contrast, have contended that John Paul’s apparent reservation of
capital punishment to a particular and narrow range of cases, those in which there is no
other way to prevent someone who has committed grave crimes from endangering society

10. Arizona Catholic Conference, “Arizona Catholic Conference Bishops’
Statement.”
11. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing”; Brugger, Capital Punishment.
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by committing future crimes, is not a matter of principle at all, but rather a prudential
judgment regarding what is likely to be most beneficial rather than harmful in societies in
which the sense of a real order of justice has been, in one way or another, lost. According
to this interpretation, capital punishment might, in other, better cultural contexts, be a
good way in which “to defend society” from grave injustice. George Weigel and Avery
Dulles have briefly proposed this reading.12 Steven Long has argued for it at greater
length. He contends, in summary, that Aquinas persuasively defends capital punishment
as at least permissible even in cases in which a convict can be prevented from committing
future crimes. Long further regards any reading of Evangelium Vitae that would be at
odds with his reading of Aquinas as both theologically (because of the intrinsic value of
Aquinas’ arguments) and doctrinally (because of their extrinsic weight as witness to the
Catholic tradition regarding the meaning and requirements of justice) problematic (as will
be noted in chapter 1, John Paul does in fact also regard Aquinas as very important in the
Catholic tradition).13
This interpretation seems unlikely for several reasons that can be indicated
relatively briefly here, though the first few of them will require further elaboration in the
subsequent chapters of this dissertation (which will therefore include brief references to
Long and the others to indicate where my interpretation especially contrasts with theirs).
The first reason is that Aquinas can reasonably be read as offering a significantly
narrower defense of capital punishment than Long proposes or than is otherwise generally

12. Weigel, “Evangelium Vitae on Capital Punishment,” 224–26; idem, Witness to
Hope, 758; Dulles, “Catholicism and Capital Punishment,” 33, 35.
13. Long, “Evangelium Vitae.”
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assumed. I shall in fact offer an alternative reading of Aquinas in the course of chapter 1,
in the context of my explanation of and response to the Grisezan argument. The second,
related, reason is that even if John Paul is teaching that there must be a principled
rejection of capital punishment except in cases of something like social self-defense, it
does not follow that he thinks that capital punishment has nothing to do with a higher
order of justice. This, too, will become clear in chapter 1. In short, even if John Paul II is
offering a principled rejection of the unnecessary use of capital punishment, this would
not mean that his departure from Aquinas is as great as Long thinks it is.
The third reason is that when John Paul introduces his norm14 regarding capital
punishment, he says: “The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal
justice ever more in line with human dignity.” This sounds like a reference to a matter of
moral principle. And it provides the context for his enumeration of the purposes of
punishment, and his conclusion: “It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the
nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and
ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute
necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.”
There are similar references to “personal dignity,” and (as noted above) to “the value of
life,” elsewhere in the encyclical, in connection with, respectively, mention of God’s
protection of Cain’s life, and of the contrast between the Old Testament provisions for
capital punishment and the message of the Sermon on the Mount.15 Hence, the conclusion
that capital punishment ought not be used except when necessary seems to be grounded in
14. EV 56.
15. EV 9, 40.
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moral principle, even though the further statement, “Today however, as a result of steady
improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not
practically non-existent,” is obviously a prudential judgment. Of course, this observation
about the reference to “human dignity” raises the question of what specific moral
principle John Paul has in mind as necessary, along with justice, for respect for human
dignity. To substantiate and explain my contention that John Paul has a moral principle in
mind, it will be necessary to answer this question. In a word, I shall contend that John
Paul has in mind mercy as necessary for respect for human dignity. Chapter 2 will
develop this point by examining closely what Evangelium Vitae, read in the context of
other writings of John Paul, indicates about the meaning and importance of mercy in
relation to human dignity. Chapter 3 will provide further elaboration by considering John
Paul’s thought regarding the need for mercy even in order to achieve justice.
The fourth reason is John Paul’s statement earlier in the encyclical, in the context
of a list of “signs of hope” in our culture, also mentioned above: “[T]here is evidence of a
growing public opposition to the death penalty ... Modern society in fact has the means of
effectively suppressing crime by rendering criminals harmless without definitively
denying them the chance to reform.”16 This statement is important because Long and
others argue that John Paul’s use of the expression “to defend society” in his norm does
not explicitly limit this “defense” to defense against future crimes by the convicted
criminal. The earlier statement, however, about “rendering criminals harmless,” does
seem clearly to limit capital punishment to cases of that very specific and narrow kind of
defense. But is this further limitation a prudential judgment, about what is required in our
16. EV 27.
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“culture of death” but would not be required in a healthy “culture of life,” that should not
be read into or otherwise conflated with the (as I have argued) principled but (as Long
and others argue) broader norm? I contend that the attempt to draw such a sharp
distinction between what is happening in the two passages is a mistake. Granting (with
Long) that John Paul II should be read in the context of the Catholic theological tradition,
it is also quite proper to regard his own various texts and passages within texts as
mutually illuminating insofar as this is possible.17
Furthermore, it is necessary to attend closely to what John Paul is saying when he
speaks of the movement against capital punishment as a sign of hope in our culture of
death, in order to see whether this really has the character of a prudential judgment. When
John Paul speaks of these signs of hope, he has in mind “signs which point to [Christ’s]
victory,” the victory achieved by Christ’s shedding of his blood, the victory that
“implores mercy,” the victory that reveals and makes possible our vocation to make
loving gifts of ourselves to others.18 If the movement to abolish capital punishment is a
sign of this victory, then, it would seem, this must be because it is a sign of this love and
mercy, which would seem to be a matter of principle.
When John Paul lists the various signs of hope, he begins by including mentions
of the following: married couples willing generously and responsibly to accept children as
a gift; families willing to help others in need; institutions offering support to mothers in
difficulty; groups of volunteers giving hospitality to those alone and in distress; medical
scientists and practitioners developing and offering treatments and relief to those in need;
17. Cf. also Bradley, 162–63.
18. EV 25–26.
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movements against laws permitting abortion and euthanasia; and other “daily gestures of
openness, sacrifice and unselfish care.” He then speaks of opposition to war and to
capital punishment. Finally, he adds references to “the growing attention being paid to the
quality of life and to ecology,” and to the development of bioethics.19 When one looks at
all of the “signs of hope” on this list other than opposition to war and capital punishment,
one finds references to actions and movements that are clearly good in principle, not only
as a prudential matter in the context of a culture of death (even if the more specific forms
that some of them, like opposition to abortion, might take will depend on cultural
context). John Paul surely does not mean to say that once a culture of life has been
achieved, these types of generosity and of protection for human life will no longer be
appropriate. It seems unlikely that his mention of opposition to capital punishment (and
war) is meant to be so different from his mentions of other “signs of hope,” as seems to
be presupposed by the claim that while capital punishment might be imprudent in a
culture of death, it would become prudent and even necessary in a culture of life.
As further confirmation of this reading of the reference to capital punishment in
the “signs of hope” passage, we may compare how John Paul speaks of capital
punishment in a later document.20 In a number headed “The culture of death and a society
dominated by the powerful,” John Paul writes, quoting the Catechism which in turn
quotes the norm from Evangelium Vitae, concerning “the unnecessary recourse to the
death penalty when other ‘bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against
an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons. Today, given the means
19. EV 26–27.
20. John Paul II, Ecclesia in America 63.
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at the State’s disposal to deal with crime and control those who commit it, ... the cases
where it is absolutely necessary to do away with an offender “are now very rare, even
non-existent practically.”’” The mentions of the need “to defend ... against an aggressor”
and “to protect ... the safety of persons” seem rather clearly to be references to the need to
render a criminal unable to commit future crimes. While it might be possible to read the
latter as referring also to deterrence of others, and to read “to protect public order” as
referring also to making manifest the order of justice, these possibilities seem foreclosed
by the way in which John Paul here combines these expressions with the reference to “the
means at the State’s disposal to deal with crime and control those who commit it.” Here,
then, as in the “signs of hope” passage in Evangelium Vitae, John Paul is saying that
capital punishment ought not be used unless protection against future crimes by the
aggressor requires it. Furthermore, he says that “this model of society”—in which there is
“unnecessary recourse to the death penalty,” that is, its use apart from the sort of necessity
to which John Paul refers—“bears the stamp of the culture of death, and is therefore in
opposition to the Gospel message.” It is, then, not that the culture of death makes the
unnecessary use of the death penalty imprudent. It is, rather, that the unnecessary use of
the death penalty contributes to the culture of death.
Fifth and finally, as already noted, Ratzinger referred to John Paul’s teaching
regarding the death penalty as a “development” and as “doctrinal progress.” It is of course
possible to have such development beyond and even contradicting Aquinas, especially
(though not necessarily only) when (as will, again, be pointed out in chapter 1) the
differences between Aquinas’ position and the newly developed position are not
especially sharp, and when (as will be clarified in chapters 2 and 3) there are grounds
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within Aquinas himself (his theology of mercy and his possible theology of nature-grace)
for the further development. This is all the more true when one considers that Aquinas,
despite his importance, is not the Church’s official magisterium (and that the
magisterium, while previously affirming a right to use capital punishment, has not denied
that there could be even principled limits to that right—and that even the affirmations of
the right are not infallible).21
This appeal to Ratzinger’s statement should be accompanied by mention of a
letter that he sent later in 1995 in response to a request for clarification. In the letter,
Ratzinger says that John Paul “has not altered the doctrinal principles which pertain to
this issue as they are presented in the Catechism, but has simply deepened the application
of such principles in the context of present-day historical circumstances,” namely, the
development of other means of social self-defense. Thus in the preparation of the editio
typica of the Catechism, there would be “an aggiornamento of the text in the light of the
papal teaching,” but “without any modification of the relevant doctrinal principles,” and
“consonant ... with the substance of the text as it presently stands.”22 This subsequent
clarification might seem to undercut one’s ability to use Ratzinger’s original statement as
part of an argument that Evangelium Vitae includes something more than a purely
prudential judgment regarding capital punishment.
However, it should be noted that Ratzinger’s response refers specifically to
development of doctrinal principles beyond those in the original Catechism. It is in fact

21. See the reviews of the history of Catholic thought/teaching in, e.g., Megivern,
The Death Penalty, chaps. 1–7; Brugger, Capital Punishment, chaps. 3–7.
22. Weigel, “Evangelium Vitae on Capital Punishment,” 226–27.
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not surprising that Ratzinger takes Evangelium Vitae to be consistent with those
principles, since John Paul concludes his treatment of capital punishment by stating: “In
any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains
valid: ‘If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to
protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such
means ...’”23 Consequently, the modifications made in the preparation of the editio typica
are not radical. There remains in the revised Catechism a reference to the right to use
capital punishment. The statements regarding the limits of that right are phrased more
strongly than in the original edition, but, as noted by John Paul, such statements were not
simply missing from that edition. Finally, the revised Catechism adds a quotation of John
Paul’s statement expressing his prudential judgment that cases of necessity are now rare.24
Still, Ratzinger’s response does not foreclose the possibility that the original Catechism
already developed earlier doctrinal principles in its statement about the limits of the right
to use capital punishment, that John Paul’s encyclical makes that development more
explicit and authoritative in addition to attempting to clarify its contemporary prudential
application, and that Ratzinger’s original statement was an affirmation of both of these
kinds of “development,” principled as well as prudential.
To repeat, chapter 1 will argue that John Paul does not simply reject all capital
punishment as intrinsically evil. Chapters 2 and 3 will explain at length that his rejection
of capital punishment when unnecessary for public safety is nonetheless grounded in a
23. EV 56.
24. Cf. the English translation of the original Catechism: Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994) 2266–67, and the revised CCC
(1997) 2266–67.
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moral principle, namely, the need for mercy as a response to human dignity and as a
condition for justice. This however will raise a further question. John Paul’s
understanding of mercy and its importance is a distinctively theological understanding.
He draws from revelation in explaining mercy and its importance. But is the need to
reject unnecessary use of capital punishment a truth that is made known only by the
implications of revelation, or is it, to at least some significant extent, accessible to reason
as well? The importance of this question seems obvious since the decision to reject or to
use capital punishment in particular kinds of cases is a decision that must be made by the
political community. Even political communities—Western nations, American states—
that include many Catholics and/or other Christians are nonetheless generally
significantly pluralistic, and for this reason, and for others also, including reasons of
principle, it would likely be difficult to persuade such communities as wholes to act
solely on the basis of what some Christians take to be revealed truths. Chapter 4 will
therefore conclude this dissertation by considering this question. I shall argue that
although full appreciation of John Paul’s teaching regarding capital punishment requires
substantial help from revelation, there are also reasons to think that John Paul would
regard the truth of this teaching as something that human reason without revelation can at
least begin to grasp. I shall indicate a possible way in which to see natural-law reasoning,
especially as understood and employed by John Paul, as pointing in the direction of an
embrace of mercy and therefore a rejection of unnecessary use of capital punishment.
In addition to the scholarly treatments of John Paul on capital punishment that I
have mentioned thus far, namely, on the one hand the Grisezan interpretation of the
teaching as pointing toward rejection of all capital punishment as intrinsically evil, and on
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the other hand the interpretation of Long and others that sees the rejection of most uses of
capital punishment as something prudentially valuable only in the context of a “culture of
death,” there is a third treatment, one that is quite close to my own. Thomas Rourke
appeals to a distinctively Christian, or more precisely Christological, anthropology,
specifically that of Henri de Lubac, to argue in turn for an understanding of the human
person as intrinsically open to relation with others in community, and hence as needing to
preserve this openness by showing mercy rather than, on the grounds of justice,
essentially casting others out of the community. 25 My chapter 3 will also draw from de
Lubac, in order to explicate John Paul’s contention that justice without mercy ceases even
to be justice.
Much of this dissertation is an expansion of several earlier essays that I have
written, one focusing primarily on John Paul’s theology of mercy and its relation to
justice, with de Lubac as background, as a key to understanding John Paul’s teaching on
capital punishment;26 another on the relationship between Aquinas’ and John Paul’s
teachings, and more generally on what natural-law reasoning can tell us about capital
punishment;27 and a third on the importance of de Lubac’s anthropology for contemporary
Catholic social teaching more broadly.28
As indicated by the reference above to Ecclesia in America, the encyclical
Evangelium Vitae does not provide John Paul’s only treatment of the issue of capital
25. Rourke, “The Death Penalty.”
26. Miller, “The Role of Mercy.”
27. Miller, “Capital Punishment.”
28. Miller, “The Gift and Mission of Love.”
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punishment.29 However, as I have shown, Evangelium Vitae’s treatment of the issue has
attracted special scholarly and other attention. Furthermore, it is in the encyclical that
John Paul most fully indicates the underlying theological basis for his practical
conclusion regarding capital punishment, as this dissertation will substantiate. Hence, the
treatment in Evangelium Vitae is especially worthy of study as a theological project.
Finally, papal statements in an encyclical would seem, other things being equal, to be of
greater authority than statements in, for example, a post-synodal apostolic exhortation or
a homily. Indeed, this too is likely a reason for the attention that the teaching on capital
punishment in Evangelium Vitae has received. And this too makes the teaching as stated
and contextualized in the encyclical especially worthy of a close reading.
This, of course, could raise the question of the level of authority of Evangelium
Vitae’s teaching on capital punishment. The main source for the contemporary
magisterium’s self-understanding regarding its levels of authority is the Second Vatican
Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church;30 there has been further elaboration in
subsequent Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith documents on the vocation of the
theologian31 and on the Profession of Faith.32 In summary, there are several ways in which
the ordinary or extraordinary magisterium can teach infallibly regarding faith and morals,

29. See also, e.g., John Paul II, “Urbi et Orbi Christmas 1998”; idem, “Homily:
St. Louis”; note also John Paul’s interventions in more than one American capital case,
including that of Darrell Mease in Missouri: NPR, “Murderer Reaps Benefits of Religious
Conversion.”
30. Vatican II, Lumen Gentium 25.
31. CDF, Donum Veritatis.
32. CDF, “Doctrinal Commentary.”
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including regarding matters not formally revealed but connected by historical or logical
necessity with revelation. Most notably for a study of Evangelium Vitae, this can happen
when the pope and all the bishops teach that something is “definitively to be held.” Such
a teaching is to be received with the assent of faith.33 The pope can also teach noninfallibly, in which case the teaching is to be received with “religious submission of mind
and will,” “according to his manifest mind and will,” which “may be known either from
the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from
his manner of speaking.”34 With regard to “interventions in the prudential order,” with
their “complexity,” “it would be contrary to the truth, if, proceeding from some particular
cases, one were to conclude that the Church’s Magisterium can be habitually mistaken in
its prudential judgments.” In any case, there are, according to the CDF, appropriate (and
inappropriate) ways in which the theologian can address possible problems with
teachings.35
How does Evangelium Vitae stand in relation to these categories and norms? One
must of course recognize first that this encyclical is long and that it treats various issues
in various ways; thus, it is necessary to specify the particular passage into the authority of
33. CDF, “Doctrinal Commentary” 5–9. There has been considerable scholarly
controversy regarding the conditions for infallibility, the response to infallible teaching,
and the like. See, e.g., the exchange that took place in 1993–94: Sullivan, “The
‘Secondary Object’ of Infallibility”; Grisez, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility”;
Sullivan, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility: A Reply”; Grisez, “Response to
Francis Sullivan’s Reply.” Or, a decade later: Welch, “The Infallibility of the Ordinary
Universal Magisterium”; Gaillardetz, “The Ordinary Universal Magisterium”; Welch,
“Reply to Richard Gaillardetz”; Sullivan, “Reply to Lawrence J. Welch.”
34. Vatican II, Lumen Gentium 25. For discussion of assent to non-infallible
teaching, see Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:849–54.
35. CDF, Donum Veritatis 24–31.
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which one is inquiring. The most obviously authoritative passages are those in which
John Paul teaches that the intentional killing of the innocent,36 abortion,37 and euthanasia38
are morally evil. Francis Sullivan suggests reasons for regarding these as infallible
teachings, and responds to some possible objections to that conclusion, though he himself
concludes with a reservation of his own regarding whether there is the theological
consensus needed, in his view, to say that it is “clearly established” that the teachings are
infallible.39 The CDF, however, specifically indicates that the teaching on euthanasia is
infallible;40 this would seem to imply that the other two are also.
John Paul’s phrasing of his teaching regarding capital punishment would, by
contrast, seem not to be such as to indicate an infallible teaching. There is no solemn
invocation of papal authority or reference to communion with the Church’s bishops. Still,
the teaching that capital punishment ought not be used unless there is no other way to
protect society would seem to be one that John Paul intends as a fairly weighty exercise
of his non-infallible ordinary magisterium. Again, Vatican II’s Lumen Gentium (echoed
by later CDF documents) refers to the need to seek the pope’s mind and will “from the
character of the documents” in which a teaching is presented. John Paul chooses an
encyclical—not the weightiest type of document, but by no means the least weighty either
36. EV 57.
37. EV 62.
38. EV 65.
39. Sullivan, “The Doctrinal Weight of Evangelium Vitae,” esp. 564. See also an
expanded version of the article: idem, “Infallible Teaching on Moral Issues?”; also
Rausch, “A Response”; Orsy, “A Response to Fr. Sullivan.”
40. CDF, “Doctrinal Commentary” 11.
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—for his main presentation of his teaching on capital punishment. The Dogmatic
Constitution likewise refers to “frequent repetition.” John Paul has briefly repeated his
teaching on capital punishment on multiple occasions. Finally, Lumen Gentium refers to
the pope’s “manner of speaking.” In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul introduces his norm
regarding capital punishment with the words “It is clear that ...”41 In this and other ways,
in this encyclical and on other occasions, John Paul has presented his teaching with what
might be called an emphatic manner of speaking. One can conclude that his “mind and
will” are that this teaching should be received with a rather strong (even if not necessarily
the strongest possible) “religious assent” (even though this is not yet itself the assent of
faith). Even the further prudential judgment that cases of the relevant necessity for the use
of capital punishment are extremely rare seems to be one that has some magisterial
authority and requires some real deference, if the CDF’s instruction regarding magisterial
interventions in prudential matters is correct.
As I have noted, from the day that Evangelium Vitae was issued, it has been
interpreted as reflecting something like the “consistent ethic of life” approach. Even if the
teaching on capital punishment does not have as much weight as does the teaching on
abortion, the inclusion of both in the encyclical on issues of respect for human life does
invite consideration of what connection might exist between these issues. On the one
hand, as I have indicated, I shall show in chapter 1 that John Paul does not point in the
direction of a rejection of capital punishment as being intrinsically evil as is the
intentional killing of the innocent. But on the other hand, as the subsequent chapters will
show, when John Paul considers what is necessary in order to establish and maintain a
41. EV 56.

18
‘culture of life’ in which abortion and euthanasia and the like will be rejected (and loving
care for all innocent persons will instead be practiced), he finds that—as a matter of
theological principle—it is necessary to practice merciful respect for the lives of
murderers. On a deep level, then, there is, in John Paul’s mind, a need for something that
might be called a “consistent ethic of life.”
There has now, for more than a century, been a tradition of Catholic concern for
‘human rights.’ Throughout his encyclical initiating modern Catholic social teaching, Leo
XIII speaks of various rights, including but not limited to economic rights.42 John XXIII’s
Pacem in Terris includes an extended treatment of the topic of human rights.43 The
Second Vatican Council teaches a right to religious freedom.44 The Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace includes a chapter on “The Human Person and Human Rights” early in
its Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church.45 Evangelium Vitae places itself
within this tradition; John Paul II uses the expression “right to life” numerous times in the
text, as he speaks very often of “rights” elsewhere as well.46 At the same time, however,
this tradition has not been without Catholic critics from more than one philosophical/
theological perspective.47 John Paul II himself, in Evangelium Vitae, addresses the
42. Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum.
43. John XXIII, Pacem in Terris 11–27.
44. Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae.
45. CSD, chap. 3.
46. From the beginning of his pontificate; see e.g. his first encyclical: RH 17.
Among later writings, see Laborem Exercens 16–23; CA passim.
47. E.g., Fortin, Human Rights, Virtue, and the Common Good; Rowland, Culture
and the Thomist Tradition, 148–57; Lamont, “Conscience, Freedom, Rights,” 198–235.
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problematic (mis)understanding of “rights” in modern thought and culture.48 Benedict
XVI, in his social encyclical, likewise both uses and criticizes the modern language of
rights.49 It might be suggested that John Paul’s treatment of capital punishment in
Evangelium Vitae is another indication of the limits of the language of rights. On the one
hand, there is a ‘right to life,’ if one understands the word ‘rights’ correctly (in relation to
such other categories as ‘justice’ or ‘duty’); on the other, the word is not sufficient to
capture what must be kept in mind in order to show full respect for human life. Those
guilty of crimes like murder do not necessarily have a ‘right to life’ in the same sense as
do the innocent; yet their lives must, insofar as this is possible, be respected.
This dissertation, although primarily in the field of theology, is meant to
incorporate political science also as an allied discipline. It does not, however, concern
itself with such themes as institutions or public opinion—themes taken up by political
science understood as a social-scientific discipline (as is perhaps typical). Instead, I am
interacting with that subdiscipline that can be called political philosophy. This is the
approach to political science that Aristotle seems to have in mind when he links ethics
very closely with political science,50 and of politics as a partnership in the use of logos to
seek the right and good.51 This is likewise the approach that such twentieth-century

48. EV 18–20.
49. CV 43. In addition to John Paul and Benedict, see Glendon, Rights Talk.
50. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.ii.
51. Aristotle, Politics I.i.
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thinkers as Leo Strauss52 and Eric Voegelin,53 critics of positivism, have sought to restore
to prominence. Hence, this dissertation will explicitly address (although of course far
from exhaustively) such underlying questions as the relationship between individual
person and political community (in chapter 1) and the respective roles that reason and
faith might play in a political community that acts, insofar as possible, in a way that
promotes (and does not hinder) human fulfillment (in chapters 2–3 and especially 4), as
well as the obvious practical question of whether the political community ought or ought
not employ capital punishment. All of these can be regarded as questions that fall within
that subdiscipline of political science that is political philosophy.
With political science thus conceived, the possibility of a dialogue between it and
theology, as complementary disciplines, should be clear. In one respect, the relationship
between the two could be likened to that between philosophical ethics and moral
theology. The difficulty with this analogy is that it is not clear that theology, as a
discipline that begins with supernatural revelation and faith, will or should have the same
role in the life of the political community as such as it can and perhaps should in the life
of the individual person or of some other human communities (like family and various
voluntary associations). And yet there seems to be a need for dialogue between the
disciplines, since a conception of politics that simply rejects such a dialogue would
already be a theologically non-neutral conception of politics. The problem might be
resolved to some extent if theology itself provided reasons for refraining from imposing

52. See, e.g., Strauss, Natural Right and History; idem, What Is Political
Philosophy?
53. See, e.g., Voegelin, The New Science of Politics.
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faith upon politics, and to an even greater extent if reason could already point in the
direction of the same requirements for human fulfillment that are more fully indicated by
faith. As indicated above, my final chapter will suggest that John Paul rightly thinks that
the latter condition in fact obtains.54

54. For further discussion of this problem and of Catholic teaching in relation to
it, see Schindler, Heart of the World, chap. 1. Also Perry, “Religious Morality and
Political Choice,” and, in contrast, Griffin, “Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian
Liberals.”
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CHAPTER I
JUSTICE, CHARITY, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Importance of Grisezan Critique of Aquinas for Study of John Paul II

The purpose of this chapter is to offer an appropriately thoughtful response to
detailed and significant scholarly arguments that John Paul II’s moral thought, in
Evangelium Vitae and elsewhere, points in the direction of a categorical rejection of all
intentional killing (killing as an end or as a chosen means)1 as intrinsically evil, and—for
this precise reason—of most or all capital punishment as morally evil; and thereby to
prepare the way for a reading, in the subsequent chapters, of John Paul as offering a
different kind of principled (not merely prudential) reason to reject its use for nearly all
practical purposes and to work for its abolition in our society. Among prominent
exponents of the interpretation of John Paul as implying that all intentional killing is
intrinsically evil are Gerard Bradley2 and E. Christian Brugger.3 Bradley and Brugger
interpret John Paul II through the lens of the “New Natural Law Theory” developed by,
especially, Germain Grisez and John Finnis.4 Grisez’s and Finnis’s thought regarding
1. For a detailed study of Aquinas’ use of terms that are important in
contemporary action theory, see especially Pilsner, Specification of Actions. For further
discussion including explanation (and defense) of John Paul II’s understanding
(expressed especially in Veritatis Splendor), see Kaczor, Proportionalism. For still
further depth regarding the meaning of ‘intentional,’ see Cavanaugh, Double-Effect
Reasoning.
2. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing.”
3. Brugger, Capital Punishment.
4. Megivern, Death Penalty, 413, also contends that John Paul rules out capital
punishment entirely, in principle, but without appealing to the Grisez-Finnis theory.
Prejean, “A Response,” on the other hand, recognizes, and regrets (see also her Dead Man
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natural law and its application takes as its starting point their reading of Thomas
Aquinas,5 although they also intentionally go beyond or disagree with Aquinas in their
moral theory6 and—as with regard to capital punishment, as will be seen—sometimes
also disagree with him regarding the application of natural-law reasoning. Brugger’s
statement regarding the importance of Aquinas on the topic of capital punishment in
particular is striking but seems plausible:
When Catholic scholars have asked how [capital punishment and killing in just
war] can be lawful ..., the most influential response in the tradition has been that
of Aquinas. ... [A]ll post-Aquinas arguments for the lawfulness of capital
punishment are footnotes to the Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 64. It is no
exaggeration to say that the rational plausibility of the traditional philosophical
position depends in large measure on the viability of Aquinas’ reasoning.7
If, as will be argued here, John Paul’s thought does not compel the conclusion that
capital punishment is intrinsically evil, and perhaps even points in the opposite direction,
then neither does it offer its own explicitly argued justification for the position that capital
punishment is not intrinsically evil, or respond explicitly to objections to the view that
capital punishment is not intrinsically evil. The interpretation and assessment of John
Paul’s view, then, cannot easily avoid consideration of the merit of Aquinas’.
Furthermore, Aquinas is an important source of John Paul’s moral thought. One can see
arguments for the value of Aquinas’ thought, and reliance upon it, in some of John Paul’s

Walking), that John Paul does not absolutely reject capital punishment.
5. Grisez, “First Principle of Practical Reason”; Finnis, Aquinas.
6. For their fully-developed thought, see especially Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus;
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. See also Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis, “Practical
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends.”
7. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 165.
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pre-papal writings.8 One likewise finds references to Aquinas in such papal writings as
Veritatis Splendor (especially) and Evangelium Vitae. Another papal writing, Fides et
Ratio, includes nuanced but strong statements of the importance of Aquinas’ thought for
the Catholic Church.9
Perhaps many in our culture, including some Catholics, would attempt to offer a
different kind of justification for capital punishment, namely, one rooted in the socialcontract theory developed by such thinkers as Hobbes and Locke. First, however, if, as
will be suggested in chapter 3, an approach to morality and politics that relies solely on
the classical understanding of Thomistic natural-law reasoning is vulnerable to
Nietzsche’s objections, then this is also true a fortiori of an approach that relies primarily
on Hobbes and Locke. Second, it is especially clear from what John Paul says about
politics in Evangelium Vitae that the modern social-contract approach is not a relevant
interpretive key to his social teaching.10
For these reasons, then, assessment of the Bradley-Brugger reading of John Paul II
must begin with a summary of the Grisez-Finnis reading of Aquinas’s moral theory and

8. E.g., Karol Wojty»a, “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism”; idem, “On the
Directive or Subservient Role of Reason”; idem, “On the Metaphysical and
Phenomenological Basis”; idem, “Problem of the Theory of Morality.”
9. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio 43–44, 57–58, 78.
10. For the relationship between Hobbes and Locke, see esp. Strauss, Natural
Right and History, chap. 5. For discussion of the problems with this theory in itself and in
relation to John Paul’s thought, see Miller, “The Politics of a Culture of Life.” For John
Paul’s rather explicit critique of this approach, see EV 20.
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of Aquinas’s treatment of capital punishment.11 Their treatment of John Paul himself can
then follow, after which we may proceed in turn to evaluations of and responses to their
reading/criticisms of Aquinas and their interpretation of John Paul.

Theoretical Basis of Grisezan Critique of Aquinas on Capital Punishment

According to the Grisez-Finnis theory, Aquinas, in his treatment of the number of
precepts of the natural law,12 rightly recognizes an irreducible diversity of ‘basic goods’
that are constitutive of the nature of the human person—as distinguished from extrinsic
goods ‘for’ the person—and that serve as ends for minimally practically reasonable
human action. These goods, according to Grisez and Finnis, include such qualities as
“justice and friendship,” qualities that might typically be regarded as moral virtues.13
Grisez’s formulation of the list of goods14 in fact includes these together (as one good).15
Finnis’s list16 is slightly different; it includes “sociability (friendship).” In briefly
describing this good, however, Finnis speaks of “that sociability which in its weakest

11. This is, of course, not meant to suggest that the history of pre–Evangelium
Vitae Catholic—more broadly, Judeo-Christian—thought regarding capital punishment is
limited to what is found in Aquinas. For extensive and intensive surveys of the tradition,
see Crowe, “Theology and Capital Punishment”; Megivern, Death Penalty; Brugger,
Capital Punishment, chaps. 3–6.
12. STh I-II.94.2.
13. On friendship and virtue, see STh II-II.23.3 ad 1.
14. Grisez’s 1983 formulation of the list of basic goods, with discussion, is found
in Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:121–25.
15. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:123, 124.
16. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 85–90.
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form is realized by a minimum of peace and harmony amongst men, and which ranges
through the forms of human community to its strongest form in the flowering of full
friendship.”17 It seems plausible that even minimal “peace and harmony” would require
each and all giving others their due, that is, justice. And Finnis continues by explaining
that “friendship involves acting for the sake of one’s friend’s purposes, one’s friend’s
well-being.” This would seem to presuppose, minimally, giving one’s friend her due, that
is, justice.
Grisez and Finnis do not, however, seem to have in mind moral virtues when they
speak in this context of “justice and friendship.” William May, a frequent collaborator of
Grisez and Finnis and for the very most part a defender of their theory, recognizes—and
criticizes—their general unwillingness to consider moral virtue(s) among the basic goods
(May suggests that some, but not all, of Finnis’s writings do regard “practical
reasonableness or virtue,” apparently virtue in general, as a basic good).18 In the context
of his list of basic goods, Grisez seems to define justice as “harmony,” that is, in a way
that is independent of consideration of what it is objectively good for one to render to
another as her due. Grisez eventually clarifies that “virtues do not provide a normative
source distinct from propositional principles”19 (the nature of which will be indicated
next).

17. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 88.
18. May, “Contemporary Perspectives,” 152–54.
19. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:193.
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Furthermore, the goods are not limited to such qualities as justice and friendship.
Among the others, according to both Grisez’s and Finnis’s lists, is life itself.20 And all of
the goods are morally relevant. Moral goodness, the Grisez-Finnis theory continues,
requires adherence to the following principle: “In voluntarily acting for human goods and
avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only
those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human
fulfillment”; indeed, this requirement is the ‘First Principle of Morality’21 (to be
distinguished from the ‘First Principle of Practical Reason,’ that good is to be done and
pursued, and evil avoided, with ‘good’ specified by the basic goods).22 A number of
‘modes of responsibility’ specify what sorts of willing are and are not compatible with
integral human fulfillment (these are the “propositional principles” mentioned above).
Among these are the following: “One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one
instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede
some other instance of an intelligible good,”23 or “[O]ne should not choose to do any act
which of itself does nothing but damage or impede a realization or participation of any
one or more of the basic forms of human good.”24 Therefore, according to the Grisez20. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:123, 124; Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights, 86–87.
21. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:184–89. Where there are, for the purposes of
this discussion of their moral theory, no more than minor differences between Grisez’s
and Finnis’s formulations, I shall usually focus on Grisez’s.
22. Grisez, “First Principle of Practical Reason”; idem, Way of the Lord Jesus,
1:178–83.
23. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:189–92, 205–28, esp. 216–22.
24. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 118–25, esp. 118.
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Finnis theory, the intentional taking of human life, one of the basic goods, is never
morally good; rather, it is always intrinsically evil and hence impermissible as end or
means. Even the killing that takes place in a just war probably must not be chosen as
such, even as a means.25 Already in Grisez’s explanation of this mode of responsibility, in
his account of his moral theory, he indicates his view that capital punishment is at odds
with full acceptance of this mode.26

Application of Critique to Aquinas on Capital Punishment

Grisez,27 Finnis in his more recent thought28 (his earlier position will be described
below), and Brugger29 bring this understanding to their reading of Aquinas on capital
punishment. Additionally, when they do so, they focus especially on Aquinas’ response to
an objection.30 The objection is that “it is not lawful ... to do that which is evil in itself,”
and “to kill a man is evil in itself.” Thus, and it would seem plausibly, they take
Aquinas’s response—
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away
from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for
himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of
according as he is useful to others. ... Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a
25. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:904–6; similarly, Finnis, Aquinas, 285–87.
26. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:218–21.
27. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:891–94; see also his earlier treatment of this
issue in idem, “Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” esp. 66–71.
28. Finnis, Aquinas, 279–84.
29. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 108–11, 165–79.
30. STh II-II.64.2 ad 3.
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man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has
sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is
more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i. 1 and Ethic. vii. 6).
—as something like a complete argument that capital punishment is not intrinsically evil,
in view of its context as a response to the claim that capital punishment would, as killing,
be intrinsically evil.
Moreover, they find problems with this argument. They question whether it makes
sense to speak of the loss of human dignity and hence of the loss of the inviolability of
such basic goods as life. Grisez says that Aquinas “fallaciously argues”;31 Finnis says that
“Aquinas’ argument ... clearly fails.”32 Bradley refers to the view “that the criminal
forfeits his right to life by his bad actions, that he descends to the moral status of the
beast,” and comments: “I doubt whether anyone ever considered this assertion an
argument, as opposed to a loose way of stating a conclusion in favor of capital
punishment.”33 Brugger especially develops this point. He argues that Aquinas might
mean either of two possible things in speaking of human dignity here. One possibility is
that “the intrinsic goodness of human rational nature is the subject of human dignity.”
But, Brugger objects, “[S]ince one’s rational nature cannot be lost, neither can one’s
dignity. Human dignity in this sense is predicated of human nature and therefore is not
relative to one’s moral state; one cannot ‘fall away’ from human dignity so conceived.”
The other possibility is that Aquinas has in mind the dignity of the human person qua
imago Dei. However, Brugger explains, “Aquinas is clear that there is only one principal
31. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:893 n. 107.
32. Finnis, Aquinas, 282.
33. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 158.
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sense in which the image of God subsists in the human person, and that is by reason of
human rational nature”—which “cannot be lost through sin,” even though something that
Brugger calls one of the “proper functions of that image,” namely, the way of being in
God’s image that “corresponds to those who are just, inasmuch as the just know and love
God, albeit imperfectly” in this life, can be termed “alienable”—is lost by someone who
is not just but rather a sinner.34
They argue, furthermore, that Aquinas is inconsistent, in view of several
affirmations that he makes elsewhere. The first is found in his explanation of why suicide
is never morally lawful: “because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that
everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can.
Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every
man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the
natural law and to charity.”35 Brugger, referring back to Aquinas’ treatment of the
principles of the natural law, takes Aquinas’ point regarding suicide to reflect “the
rational recognition of the fundamental goodness of human life.”36 Summarizing the
Grisez-Finnis theory of goods and moral reasoning, Brugger argues, “We love in
ourselves and in others the basic good of human life; we love, if you will, the good nature
that God has created.” As it is evil to kill oneself, so it is evil to kill another who shares
one’s human nature—even a sinner.37
34. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 174–75.
35. STh II-II.64.5.
36. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 166.
37. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 169.
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The second is that we are, in fact, to continue to love sinners with charity:
“According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness, on the
fellowship of which charity is based, as stated above [II-II.25.3; II-II.23.1, 5], wherefore
we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature”;38 “If we consider a
man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we
ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him.”39
These texts might seem to contradict Aquinas’ statement: “By sinning man departs from
the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood.”40
The third is that a sinner sentenced to death, although she could not justly use
violence to resist the imposition of the sentence, nevertheless is not morally obliged to
cooperate in that execution in every conceivable way, such as by fleeing if this is possible
without the use of violence against the condemned’s captors, or by doing other things
generally necessary to maintain one’s life.41 This, Finnis points out, seems to imply that
the sinner retains at least some of the rights that come from her human dignity.42
Finally, they suggest that the argument, if it works at all, “proves too much,” since
more people are sinners—even mortal sinners—than ought, in Aquinas’ own explicit

38. STh II-II.25.6.
39. STh II-II.64.6.
40. STh 64.2 ad 3. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:893 n. 107; Finnis, Aquinas,
282; and Brugger, Capital Punishment, 175, all cite STh II-II.25.6 in support of their
argument for a contradiction in Aquinas; Brugger, Capital Punishment, 169, also cites IIII.64.6.
41. STh II-II.69.4 ad 2.
42. Finnis, Aquinas, 282.
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view, to be subject to capital punishment. As Finnis says, Aquinas “himself permits
capital punishment only for very grave wrongdoing.”43 Brugger, again, expands on this
problem. He notes that Aquinas does not teach that capital punishment ought to be used
in response to every mortal sin, but should only be used when the sin is especially grave
and when the sinner is likely to pose a future danger. Brugger argues that the first
condition (gravity) seems arbitrary, and that it would be difficult for human beings to
make the distinctions entailed by either condition. He concludes: “These difficulties are
effectively insurmountable.”44
Although the Grisez-Finnis school’s treatment of Aquinas’ response to the
objection that capital punishment is intrinsically evil, is probably the most important
element of their analysis of Aquinas on the topic of capital punishment—insofar as they
think that Aquinas’ response fails (and that there is no other adequate response)—it is
necessary, to complete the summary of their argument, to look briefly also at their
handling of the body of the same article. Aquinas’s answer to the question posted in the
article, “Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?,” includes the following:45
Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every
part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the
health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being
decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and
advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the
whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and
infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and
advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good.

43. Finnis, Aquinas, 282.
44. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 176–77.
45. II-II.64.2.
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Grisez,46 Finnis,47 and Brugger all reject this reasoning, concluding that even if
capital punishment were other than intrinsically evil, Aquinas would still not have
provided an adequate explanation of the right of political authorities to impose it. Brugger
takes this point up, regarding the relationship between the human person and the political
community, most substantively in explicit relation to the problem of the death penalty.
Brugger notes, in short, that “the existence of a member makes sense apart from the
community in a way that the existence of a limb ... does not apart from the body.” He
adds that Aquinas himself seems to indicate in his commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics (I.I.5) that in a unity such as the political community “a part ... can have operations
which are not the operations of the whole.”48 Hence, Brugger takes issue with the pushing
of the part-whole analogy to justify state use of capital punishment, calling it “false (and
dangerous).”49

Further Application of Critique of Aquinas in Interpretation of John Paul II’s Thought

When Bradley and Brugger turn to John Paul, they read him as proposing,
especially in Evangelium Vitae, with some contextual help from Veritatis Splendor, that

46. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:893 n. 107. Cf. also ibid., 2:848: “Aristotle’s
notion of the state as a quasi-organic whole of which citizens are parts must be criticized”
in light of, e.g., GS; also ibid., 2:850: “[I]t plainly cannot be government’s proper end to
promote virtue in general.”
47. Finnis, Aquinas, 281. Cf. also his detailed reading of Aquinas’ political theory
in “Public Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas,” in which he
takes Aquinas to support Grisez’s view of the limits of political authority.
48. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 170.
49. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 176.
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human life—even the life of one guilty of a most serious crime—is always an inviolable
good. Bradley recognizes a possible difficulty: “The norm articulated in EV usually
includes the term ‘innocent’” (citing nos. 53 and 57).50 He then adds, however, that John
Paul’s articulation of the moral norm forbidding euthanasia does not include the term
“innocent,” and that “[t]he commandment is most often stated simply as ‘You shall not
kill.’”51 Brugger makes a similar argument. He cites a number of texts from Evangelium
Vitae that refer to (all) human life as inviolable, inalienable, and so on. He concludes that
although John Paul does not intend to teach that capital punishment is intrinsically evil,
“the encyclical neither asserts nor implies that intentional killing in any form is or can be
morally legitimate, and ... its language repeatedly implies the opposite”; therefore, “its
intent may be to leave open the possibility” of a future Church teaching that all
intentional killing, including capital punishment, is intrinsically evil.52
Brugger also adds another, and again similar, argument regarding John Paul’s
words in Veritatis Splendor, issued just over nineteen months before Evangelium Vitae.
Brugger quotes John Paul in VS as speaking of, among other things, “the duty of absolute
respect for human life [citing no. 50, emphasis Brugger’s].”53 He argues that “the logic of
Veritatis Splendor’s account of the foundations of morality” leads to this duty of absolute
respect for human life, and adds that although “[t]he encyclical’s formulation of the
relevant exceptionless moral norm is traditional,” with its inclusion of the word
50. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 159.
51. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 159–60.
52. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 26.
53. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 29.
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“innocent,” still it “says nowhere that the killing of the guilty is morally licit, nor, in light
of its own moral logic, does it account for why the norm is formulated as it is. The death
penalty is not mentioned.”54
Furthermore, Bradley takes one of John Paul’s statements in Evangelium Vitae as
a contradiction and rejection of a key premise in Aquinas’ defense of capital punishment.
Commenting on the biblical story of Cain and Abel, and specifically on God’s protection
of Cain’s life, John Paul says:55
And yet God, who is always merciful even when he punishes, “put a mark on
Cain, lest any who came upon him should kill him” (Gen 4:15). He thus gave him
a distinctive sign, not to condemn him to the hatred of others, but to protect and
defend him from those wishing to kill him, even out of a desire to avenge Abel’s
death. Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to
guarantee this.
This would seem to contrast sharply with Aquinas’ position—“By sinning man ... falls
away from the dignity of his manhood.”56 Thus, Bradley writes that Aquinas’ means of
distinguishing capital punishment from other, immoral, intentional killing, “is now
foreclosed by Church teaching.”57 Bradley also appeals to Veritatis Splendor, to make a
related point. He begins his essay by contending that both Veritatis Splendor and
Evangelium Vitae deny the division between “public” and “private” moral realms, the

54. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 30.
55. EV 9.
56. STh II-II.64.2 ad 3.
57. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 158. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 26–27,
also cites this text. Kaczor, The Edge of Life, 147, likewise sees a contradiction, though
his argument is generally critical of Brugger’s.
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notion that with regard to the prohibition of intrinsic evil there might be any “privileges
or exceptions.”58
What, then, of John Paul’s teaching that while capital punishment ought not be
inflicted on most murderers, there might be an exception in the “rare, if not practically
non-existent” case in which there is no other way to safeguard society from further
serious crimes by the convict?59 In light of his critique in Veritatis Splendor60 of
proportionalism and related methodologies,61 and despite the claims of some
commentators who interpret Evangelium Vitae’s apparent openness in principle to capital
punishment as proportionalist,62 it seems most unlikely that John Paul would
simultaneously regard capital punishment as intrinsically evil, and be open to its use even
in merely hypothetical cases. Bradley and Brugger both suggest that Evangelium Vitae
(and the Catechism of the Catholic Church)63 treat capital punishment as closely
analogous to private killing in self-defense—that is, as killing that, according to much of
the Thomistic tradition and to continuing Catholic teaching, would have to be praeter
intentionem to be morally licit.64
58. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 155.
59. EV 56.
60. VS 71–83.
61. See Kaczor, Proportionalism.
62. McCormick, “The Gospel of Life,” 16–17; Langan, “Situating the Teaching,”
222.
63. CCC 2265–67.
64. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 156, 160–61; Brugger, Capital Punishment,
12–25.
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Bradley thus raises the possibility that the conditions that John Paul places on the
morally licit use of capital punishment—that there be no other way to defend against
further murders (or the like) by the convict—are the conditions for praeter
intentionem killing.65 Here he draws partly from a position once suggested by Finnis.
According to Finnis’s original argument regarding capital punishment, punishment—
capital or otherwise—involves a deprivation, even of a ‘basic good,’ which deprivation is
“intended neither for its own sake nor as a means to any further good state of affairs.
Rather, it is intended precisely itself as a good, namely the good of restoring the order of
justice.” Therefore, “capital punishment need not be regarded as doing evil that good may
come of it.”66 To Finnis’s proposal, Bradley adds that if death is not “the uniquely suited
punishment for any crime,” then capital punishment would involve the ‘nonintentional’
imposition of death only in the case of a criminal who would otherwise remain
dangerous.67
Finnis, however, later abandoned his proposal, noting, for instance, that “at the
end of the day, Aquinas himself rejects [the] conclusion that imposing and carrying out
capital punishment involves no intent to kill.”68 And Brugger takes the Bradley argument
a step further by drawing from Finnis’s eventual conclusion, noting that even when done
solely under the circumstances John Paul describes and solely with a defensive (remote)
intention, it is unlikely that one could reasonably interpret capital punishment as anything
65. Bradley, 164–65, 168.
66. Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics, 129–30.
67. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 168–69.
68. Finnis, Aquinas, 280.

38
other than intentional killing.69 Brugger points out that in capital punishment, death “is
the measure of the punishment chosen. ... [T]he plan of action very clearly includes the
criminal’s death. ... The intent to kill cannot be separated from capital punishment,
whatever other intentions accompany it.”70 Brugger thus concludes that John Paul’s
teaching should be taken as pointing toward the immorality of all capital punishment in
principle.

Response to Critique: Natural-Law Moral Reasoning and Virtue

Although the members of the Grisez school are influential and make a formidable
case for their position, I shall now argue that their interpretation of Aquinas and John
Paul II on capital punishment is significantly flawed. I think that the flaws begin with
their natural-law theory (both insofar as it aspires to be grounded in Aquinas, and insofar
as it admits to going beyond Aquinas). I want to note in particular that there seems to be a
problem with their understanding of how to do moral reasoning about acts that will affect
other human persons. Again, for Grisez et al., the ‘basic goods’ are key in such moral
reasoning. But what does respect for these goods in another person have to do with my
own openness to ‘integral human fulfillment’ of myself?
One possible answer would be along the following lines. If I will contrary to the
good of, for example, your life, then I am willing contrary to my own fulfillment, since
life is also a good of myself, an aspect of my own fulfillment. It does seem clear that
something like Grisez’s ‘goods,’ including life, play some sort of important role in
69. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 34–37.
70. Brugger, Capital Punishment, 37.
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Aquinas’ understanding of natural law, and properly so. It is not clear, however, that in
relating these goods to the principles of practical and/or moral reasoning, Aquinas means
to say—or that one can cogently say—that willing against their instantiations in others
necessarily entails willing against one’s own fulfillment, and hence acting contrary to
one’s own moral goodness. After all, your life (for instance) is yours, and mine is mine. It
is not immediately clear, granting Grisez’s understanding of life as a ‘basic good of the
human person,’ that my life and yours have enough in common with each other to make
this sort of argument against intentional killing work. To the extent that this is Grisez’s
argument, then the charge (more typically made on other grounds) that Grisez is more
Kantian than Thomist—a charge Grisez and his colleagues argue is false71—nevertheless
might take on a certain plausibility, since one might be reminded of Kant’s “universal
law” formulation of his categorical imperative.72 At any rate, such an argument seems too
abstract to work.
In his developed moral theory, Grisez adds a helpful consideration, namely, the
role of community. Thus, he says that “there are seven categories of basic human goods
which perfect persons and contribute to their fulfillment both as individuals and
communities.”73 It would seem that if we are fulfilled “both as individuals and
communities,” then one’s own openness to fulfillment will require respect for the goods
constitutive of other members of one’s community. Similarly, Grisez writes: “Integral

71. For reference to this charge and a response by another of Grisez’s colleagues,
see George, “Recent Criticism,” 1409.
72. Kant, Grounding, 30.
73. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:124.
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human fulfillment means a single system in which all the human goods would contribute
to the fulfillment of the entire human community.”74 If integral human fulfillment must by
definition be communal—if community is part of our fulfillment—then, again, it will be
necessary for me to respect the goods constitutive of other persons as well.
But this refinement of the theory may still not be sufficient. We must ask the
question: What is a human community in the full and proper and fulfilling sense? What
precise sorts of relationships must exist among people in order to have community in this
sense? Suppose that those who have charge over the common good of a political
community impose capital punishment on a murderer. Clearly, something is being done
that is an attack on a very ‘basic good’ indeed ‘of’ the malefactor. But is it really obvious
and certain that this act is necessarily at odds with the openness to fulfillment-incommunity on the part of those in whose name the punishment of death is carried out?
It is perhaps more helpful to attend to what might be a suggestion on Aquinas’
part that the ‘good’ of virtue plays a key role in reasoning about how to treat others. There
has obviously been a resurgence of interest in ‘virtue theory,’ including Aquinas on
virtue, in recent decades, perhaps beginning especially with Alasdair MacIntyre,75 and
continuing with Jean Porter,76 Pamela Hall,77 Robert Gahl,78 James Keenan,79 Martin
74. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:222.
75. MacIntyre, After Virtue.
76. Porter, Recovery of Virtue.
77. Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law.
78. Gahl, Practical Reason, 173.
79. Keenan, Virtues for Ordinary Christians.
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Rhonheimer,80 and many others, not all of whom are in anything like full agreement with
one other regarding other controverted points today in Thomistic moral theory (e.g., the
relationship between speculative and practical reason, i.e., the normative significance, or
lack thereof, of speculative knowledge of “nature,” or of a natural hierarchy of goods) or
its application (e.g., in sexual morality).
Already in his treatment of the diversity of precepts of natural law, Aquinas links
the human person’s rational nature to her social nature—to the fact that she is inclined to
live with others and that doing so is a good of the human person: “Thirdly, there is in man
an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to
him: thus man has a natural inclination ... to live in society.”81 And in the very next
article, Aquinas asks “Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?”82 He
concludes that they are, if “considered as virtuous” (rather than “in themselves”), since
the human person is rational and to act rationally is to act virtuously. An immediate
advantage of seeing virtue and the virtues, like justice, as key principles in moral
reasoning about acts affecting others would be that this enables us to “bridge” (more
effectively than Grisez’s theory does, I suggest) the good of others and one’s own good. If
I know that acting against such-and-such a good of yours would be contrary to reason and
hence to virtue, then it becomes apparent why acting against that good would also be
contrary to my own good and fulfillment.

80. Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, 307–50; idem, Perspective
of the Acting Person, passim.
81. STh I-II.94.2.
82. STh I-II.94.3.
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We should note, furthermore, that Aquinas structures his treatment of the morality
of particular actions—that is, he structures the Secunda Secundae—not around a list of
‘basic goods,’ but rather around a list of virtues: the three theological and four cardinal
virtues. Hittinger expands on this point, referring to specific texts in the Summa
Theologiae (especially the prologue to the Secunda Secundae: “the entirety of morality
can be reduced [reducta] to the subject of virtues”) that indicate that Aquinas’ is a
morality of virtues, even more so than of the principles of natural law.83

Virtue and Punishment in Aquinas

Of special note for the topic of capital punishment, Aquinas introduces the topic
of punishment in general in the Prima Secundae. He speaks of punishment as restoring
the “order” against which sin offends, including the social order that is overseen by
human beings; he adds reference in this context to punishment as “just.”84 Several articles
later he refers more explicitly to punishment as due when one has transgressed the order
of justice, and as restoring equality of justice.85 The topic of punishment is then taken up
again in the Secunda Secundae toward the beginning of the treatise on justice.86 Having
explained that ‘restitution’ is an act of commutative justice, Aquinas asks “Whether it
suffices to restore the exact amount taken?” He answers that this does not, in the end,

83. Hittinger, “Natural Law and Virtue,” 66 n. 3.
84. STh I-II.87.1 and ad 2.
85. STh II-II.87.6 and ad 3.
86. STh II-II.62.3.
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suffice. He explains that when one does an injustice to another, one sins, and the sin itself
(and not only the further damage caused) must be remedied, by punishment.
It is at least possible that when Aquinas goes on, several questions later, to discuss
specific punishments, this general understanding, of what sort of thing punishment is and
why it is reasonable and licit, is being presupposed and needs to be kept in mind in order
to make sense of Aquinas’ further arguments. In fact, although Aquinas does not
explicitly invoke this general understanding of just punishment in the article on capital
punishment, he does explicitly invoke it in his discussions of some other kinds of
punishment, punishment by striking87 and by imprisonment.88 In addressing punishment
by striking, Aquinas explains that “it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of
punishment in the cause of justice.” This “cause of justice,” then, seems to control the
morality of punishment, at least the sort of punishment under consideration, punishment
by striking, and probably punishment in general. Likewise, he concludes that “it is
unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order
of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.” Again,
the key principle seems to be ‘the order of justice.’
We should note also that in the body of the article on imprisonment, Aquinas
suggests a likeness between deprivation of full bodily freedom by imprisonment—as well
as of bodily integrity by maiming, and also of pleasure or rest of the senses by the
infliction of painful blows—and total deprivation of bodily life by death. This suggestion
is echoed in Aquinas’ discussion of the virtue of fortitude, where he refers to death as the
87. STh II-II.65.2.
88. STh II-II.65.3.
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greatest—but not the only—bodily evil.89 Each of several distinct kinds of punishment,
then, evidently takes away a bodily ‘good of the person,’ if only partially in some of these
kinds. The difference between, say, imprisonment and capital punishment is, for Aquinas,
to some extent something like a difference of degree, rather than simply of kind. Yet, they
can all be permissible, first of all in light of the ‘order of justice.’
It is most sensible, then, to (re)read what the Grisez-Finnis school takes to be
Aquinas’ main defense of capital punishment (as other than intrinsically evil)90 in this
same light. That is, it is sensible to read the argument as something other than an attempt
to do the initial work, or all the work, of overcoming an objection that capital punishment
is intrinsically evil. It is sensible to read the argument as presupposing that when just—
when it “fits the crime,” as we might say—capital punishment is already, precisely as just,
potentially morally licit.
What, then, does the argument accomplish? Aquinas’ replies should always be
read in the dialogical context of the objections.91 Now, the third objection does refer to
what “is evil in itself.” But it states, more specifically, that “to kill a man is evil in itself,
since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and we wish our friends to live and
to exist, according to Ethic. ix. 4.” The reference to “charity” is, I contend, significant.
The precise objection is that capital punishment is (as killing) contrary to charity. We
89. STh II-II.123.4 and ad 1.
90. STh II-II.64.2 ad 3.
91. For more on the importance of Thomas’ literary form, see Pieper, Guide to
Thomas Aquinas, 75–88. Insofar as the dialogue form is rooted in Plato, it would be
interesting to compare and contrast Thomas’ understanding of the purpose of this form
with Plato’s own, as the latter is analyzed in Rhodes, Eros, Wisdom, and Silence, with a
brief summary/conclusion on p. 542.
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should consider than an act can seem at least minimally reasonable—in accordance with
justice, for instance—and yet be contrary to charity, and hence, from Aquinas’
perspective, still morally evil. I suggest that when Aquinas replies to the objection with
his argument about sin and human dignity, he is presupposing that capital punishment is,
as punishment, just, and going on to explain that it can also be compatible with charity,
since one must have charity for society as a whole, and since allowing an offender to live
might sometimes endanger society if the offender has set herself apparently irrevocably
against the social good.
One can substantiate this reading—which in any event is in keeping with the
assumption that Aquinas chooses his words (such as “charity”) with care and precision
(so that, in this case, “charity” means something more than the love that we have by our
natural powers alone and that entails giving others what is minimally due to them)—by
comparing this argument with some parallel passages elsewhere in the Secunda Secundae
and also in two of Aquinas’ other works. The first such passage in the Summa Theologiae
is in the treatise on charity. In the body of the article,92 Aquinas argues that “we ought to
love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature” as having “a capacity for
happiness” (but not in respect of their guilt). Several of the Grisezans have noted this
article and suggested that it contradicts what Aquinas says about capital punishment, as
previously discussed. But the second objection in the article observes that we (rightly) put
sinners to death, and that this appears to be a work of hate, rather than charity. And in
reply, Aquinas says that this is done “not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love
of charity, by reason of which [the judge] prefers the public good to the life of the
92. STh II-II.25.6.
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individual.” Here, then, Aquinas specifically and explicitly connects the effects of vice or
sin on the dignity of the person as a member of society, to the question of whether capital
punishment is in keeping with the virtue of charity.
The other relevant passage in the Secunda Secundae is the article, “Whether
vengeance is lawful?”93 Here again, Aquinas refers to charity. He argues that if the
avenger’s “intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes
vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful ...” So, even if an act
of vengeance is objectively proportionate to the evil done, this is not enough to make the
vengeance morally licit. Something more is required. Why? Aquinas continues: “...
because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men.” Specifically because of the distinctive
requirements of charity, then, vengeance—punishment—must be more than just. And
what more is necessary for this to happen? Aquinas explains: “If, however, the avenger’s
intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of
the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may
be restrained94 and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored),
then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.” Concern,
then, that an act of punishment have something significant to do with—for example—
protecting society from future injury has to do with concern that punishment be not
merely just, but also charitable.

93. STh II-II.108.1.
94. The general point that I am discussing here, and especially Aquinas’ reference
to “restraint,” is missed by the reading of Aquinas in Long, “Evangelium Vitae,” 519–36.
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The point is further clarified elsewhere in Aquinas’ corpus. One key text on
punishment argues, “That it is lawful for judges to inflict punishments.”95 Aquinas begins
by referring punishment to the “order” of “justice.” Only then—as a further and distinct
(though related) point—does he speak of the conflict between “the life of certain
pestiferous men” and “the common good which is the concord of human society,” and
then of that “concord” as analogous to the health of a body and of the evil persons as
analogous to diseased organs of the body. These latter arguments, then, are not a
complete argument for the morality of capital punishment, an attempt to overcome as it
were from the beginning a concern that capital punishment is intrinsically evil; rather,
they presuppose the more basic point about justice as allowing the killing of those who
commit grave crimes.
A final, relevant text concerns love of enemies;96 the objection (like STh II-II.25.6
obj. 2) is that “we cannot lawfully kill one whom we are bound to love in charity,” but it
is lawful to kill evildoers: “Therefore we are not bound to love our enemies.” Aquinas
begins his reply by insisting “that he whose office prescribes it, may lawfully punish evildoers or even kill them while loving them out of charity.” He explains that there can be
several reasons or motives for causing “temporal evil for those whom we love in charity.”
These include the profit that will be obtained by, or the harm that will be avoided to,
others by the downfall of an enemy. They also include—distinctly (and, it would seem,
more fundamentally)—the “preserv[ation of] the order of divine justice.” In the Summa
Theologiae, then, when Aquinas speaks of the social benefit of punishment—including
95. SCG III.146.
96. Aquinas, On Charity 8 ad 10.
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capital punishment—as that which makes such punishment harmonious with charity, he is
presupposing, and adding to, an understanding that such punishment can be inherently
just, simply as fitting punishment for a crime.
Aquinas is, then, consistent in speaking both of human life as a good of the human
person, and of capital punishment as morally acceptable. In speaking of human life as
what Grisez et al. would call a ‘basic good,’ he does not mean to say that it is simply
inviolable. Rather, it can be taken when (and only when) both justice—and also, beyond
this, charity—permit doing so. In the case of someone who has committed a grave crime,
capital punishment, inflicted by those who have responsibility for the good of the
community, might be proportionate and hence just. And if the criminal seems to have set
herself irrevocably against the good of society, such that allowing her to live would
endanger that society—if she has, in this precise sense, willed and acted in such a way as
to compromise her dignity as a rational and therefore social being—then taking her life is,
furthermore, in keeping with charity, and, hence, being both just and in keeping with
charity, capital punishment in such a case is morally licit.
It is noteworthy that for Aquinas, it is precisely the concern for these distinctive
requirements of charity that places real limits on when capital punishment may be used.
This can be seen by considering his “excision of a member” analogy for the killing of an
evil member of a community in the context of what he says about actual bodily
mutilation, whether for punishment or for other reasons. Aquinas thinks that such
mutilation is sometimes morally licit. He takes up the objection that “the welfare of the
soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim
himself for the sake of the soul’s welfare: since the council of Nicea punished those who
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castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any
other reason to maim a person.” He begins his reply: 97 “A member should not be removed
for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to
further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one’s spiritual welfare
otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will: and
consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever.”
This seems to imply quite strongly that since capital punishment must be analogous to the
removal of a diseased member of society to be fully in keeping with charity and hence
licit, it must be necessary—or at least close to necessary—for the safeguarding of social
peace in order to be licit.
One can also see this, in fact, in what Aquinas says about capital punishment
itself: in conformity with and imitation of the divine order, “human justice ... puts to
death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who
sin without grievously harming others.”98 Likewise, he speaks of the infliction of capital
punishment on the “incurable.”99 Likewise, his defense of the execution of the evil has as
a premise that “the danger which threatens from their way of life is greater and more
certain than the good which may be expected from their improvement.”100 Again, these
restrictions are not arbitrary. Nor do they seem so different from the sorts of factors that
judges must take into account in deciding, for example, whether and for how long
97. STh II-II.65.1 ad 3.
98. STh II-II.64.2 ad 2.
99. STh II-II.25.6 ad 2.
100. SCG III.146.
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someone is to be imprisoned. Bradley himself writes that human persons are able to make
judgments about who, due to their criminal histories, will remain dangerous in the future,
and therefore ought to be sentenced to life imprisonment.101
Finally, Lawrence Dewan has responded102 to Finnis regarding the status of
political society in Aquinas, and has made the case that political society is in fact a ‘basic
human good.’ In Dewan’s account, there is nothing “dangerous” about this conception of
society. Dewan argues that Finnis downplays the role of virtue in a number of Thomistic
texts regarding the political community, that our natural social inclination requires the
virtues that are distinctive to this community, and that “any diminution in nobility that the
political as such suffers relative to the eye of our mind cannot fail to affect the way
politics is lived, and especially what we expect from our leaders. The Finnis focus on the
limitation of political jurisdiction moves us from a definitely moral conception of
political life to something much less obviously so.”103 This consequence of the Finnis
view seems, one might say, dangerous.
But how far does the part-whole analogy go? This seems important since capital
punishment alone seems an “absolute” severing of the bond between the community and
the individual; hence Aquinas’ emphasis on the analogy specifically when he is treating
capital punishment. The analogy would have to be a significant one in order to explain
why, in case of conflict, one may prefer charity for the community over charity for the
individual, even to the point of putting to death the individual who is sinfully dangerous
101. Cf. Bradley, “No Intentional Killing,” 164.
102. Dewan, “St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good.”
103. Dewan, “St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good,” 303.
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to the whole. Aquinas does not deny Aristotle’s statement that the good of the political
community is better and more perfect than that of the individual.104 He likewise seems to
accept that “as hands and feet cannot exist apart from a human being, so neither is a
human being self-sufficient for living apart from a political community.”105 As Brugger
notes, Aquinas qualifies the analogy, and Dewan gives a detailed and helpful account of
the basis for the qualification. But such is the individual person’s need, in order to be
fully herself, for the virtue that in turn develops only in the context of the political
community, that the analogy is still quite significant.106 This significant but non-absolute
part-whole analogy for the person-state relationship seems sufficient to ground Aquinas’
conclusion regarding the state’s authority to impose capital punishment.107

Rereading of John Paul II in Light of Aquinas

Aquinas’ conclusions regarding capital punishment and the limits on its morally
acceptable use may not go as far as does John Paul II’s teaching that capital punishment is
not to be used except in those cases in which is truly necessary for the defense of society,
such as “are very rare, if not practically non-existent.”108 Neither, however, is Aquinas’

104. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics I.30–31.
105. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics I.1.22.
106. Cf. Dewan, “St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good,” 300.
107. Dewan, “Thomas Aquinas, Gerard Bradley, and the Death Penalty,” 318–19.
See also Jensen, “Good and Evil Actions,” 167–79, for a response to Grisez and Brugger
on Aquinas that adds further detail to my treatment of Aquinas on justice, and that
complements Dewan’s treatment of the person-state relationship.
108. EV 56.
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full conclusion so different from John Paul’s practical conclusion as might initially be
thought.109 But is John Paul’s underlying reasoning significantly different from Aquinas’;
does he mean to rule out all intentional killing, and hence capital punishment insofar as it
is intentional killing? There are several reasons to think that this is not John Paul’s view.
First, he simply does not say the sorts of things about capital punishment that he says
about the killing of the innocent: that it is necessarily unjust, intrinsically evil, never
permissible.110 On the contrary, he indicates that capital punishment could, at least
hypothetically (though, at most, very rarely), be licit. Brugger is correct that capital
punishment could not, ever, reasonably be understood as praeter intentionem killing. It is
not clear why, if Bradley and Brugger are correct about John Paul’s argument, he would
not follow that argument to what Brugger correctly sees as its conclusion, rather than a
genuinely different one. This can be seen especially clearly, I think, by noting what John
Paul goes on to say immediately after his treatment of capital punishment: “If such great
care must be taken to respect every life, even that of criminals and unjust aggressors, the
commandment ‘You shall not kill’ has absolute value when it refers to the innocent
person.”111 It seems clear that he means somewhat to contrast (as well as to compare) the
“great care” with which the intentional killing of the guilty must be avoided, with the
“absolute value” of the commandment against the intentional killing of the innocent.
Pace Bradley and Brugger, there does not seem to be anything in John Paul’s
moral methodology that would compel the conclusion that capital punishment, qua
109. As e.g. by Long, “Evangelium Vitae.”
110. EV 57.
111. EV 57.
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intentional killing, is intrinsically evil. Like Aquinas, who grounds his rejection of the
killing of the innocent (the destruction of a good of the innocent person) in the rational
nature and consequent self-possession of the human person,112 John Paul consistently (in
pre-papal and papal writings) links the (general) inviolability of the goods of the person to
the dignity of the person as an end (or as capable of having ends) and not as a means; in
other words, to what he calls the requirement of “love for”—rather than “use of”—
persons,113 which John Paul refers to as the “primordial moral requirement.”114 The “love”
that is shown by respecting the person as more than a mere means, and hence by
respecting the goods of the person, is a moral virtue.115 It is a foundation for and hence
very closely related to, even in some sense the same as, the commandment to love, but the
two are “not, strictly speaking, identical.”116 It is closely related to the virtue of justice, as
it requires especially fairness to the other as a person, giving them their due, although
unlike justice, “love is concerned with persons directly and immediately; affirmation of
the value of the person as such is of its essence. ... [I]t would be quite untrue to assert that
love for a person consists merely in being just.”117 This “love” does not, however, seem to
be the theological virtue of charity in its fullness. And it is not clear why the requirement,
made known by reason, for this sort of love for persons as more than mere means to one’s
112. STh II-II.64.1 ad 2.
113. E.g., LR, esp. 41; VS 48, 50; EV 19.
114. VS 48.
115. LR 119–40.
116. LR 41.
117. LR 42.
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own ends, should be taken as entailing that it can never be in keeping with justice and
charity to punish a person who is guilty of a crime and dangerous to society in a way that
is at odds with the goods of the person. Aquinas clearly (if implicitly) denies this
implication, as has been discussed, and John Paul nowhere affirms it.
It is true that, as Bradley and Brugger note, John Paul’s treatment of capital
punishment is preceded by his explanation of legitimate defense, and is introduced by the
words, “This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty.”118 But it
does not follow that John Paul means to say that capital punishment could only be
morally licit if it involved praeter intentionem killing. Clearly, John Paul is teaching that
the circumstances in which capital punishment could be licit are similar to those required
for legitimate defense. It does not follow, however, that he is teaching that legitimate
capital punishment would need to have the same moral specification as does legitimate
defense. Indeed, he suggests otherwise. John Paul goes on to write: “The primary purpose
of the punishment which society inflicts is ‘to redress the disorder caused by the offence.’
Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on
the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to
regain the exercise of his or her freedom.” This seems remarkably similar to what
Aquinas says about justice, restitution, and punishment. When John Paul then indicates
the practical norm governing the use of capital punishment, he does not deny that this
“primary purpose” of punishment in general remains the “primary purpose” of capital
punishment specifically.

118. EV 56.
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In fact, having spoken of this purpose, and then of two secondary ones,
“defending public order and ensuring people’s safety, while at the same time offering the
offender an incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated,” he
says: “It is clear that, for these purposes [emphasis added] to be achieved, the nature and
extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go
to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.” Why ought capital
punishment not be used for most or all practical purposes? Not because it would have to
involve praeter intentionem killing to be licit, but because while having the same
purposes as do other punishments—as does punishment in general—it is not generally the
punishment that best fulfills those purposes.
It remains, then, more significant than Bradley and Brugger allow that when John
Paul solemnly formulates exceptionless moral norms against the killing of the innocent in
general, and against abortion in particular, he uses the word “innocent.”119 It is true that
he does not use this word when he similarly expresses a moral norm against euthanasia.
This norm, however, refers to “the deliberate and morally unacceptable killing of a
human person.”120 The words “morally unacceptable” here replace the word “innocent” in
the two norms that precede. While it would perhaps introduce unnecessary complexities
to use the word “innocent” in this case, since euthanasia is sometimes suicide, John Paul
seems to choose language that does not foreclose the possibility that some kinds of
“deliberate killing”—notably, capital punishment—might not be morally unacceptable.
119. EV 57, 62.
120. EV 65.
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What, then, of John Paul’s comment on God’s treatment of Cain, “Not even a
murderer loses his personal dignity,”121 which, as mentioned above, could certainly sound
like a disagreement with Aquinas? Remember that, for Aquinas, the argument about
human dignity presupposes that capital punishment is just, and then seeks to establish that
it is, in addition, in keeping with charity—when it is necessary for the defense of society.
It does not seek to establish that capital punishment would be the right thing to do any
time someone has committed a grave crime like murder. Aquinas does not say that
because someone is a murderer, it is automatically in keeping with full respect for human
dignity, with charity, to kill him. And note also that, in the biblical story on which John
Paul is commenting, Cain does not go on to commit further murders (and, presumably,
God knows that Cain will not). It is reasonable to take the point of John Paul’s comment
to be that a murderer does not lose his personal dignity in a way that would automatically
make it appropriate to kill him—regardless of social need. Thus, it is reasonable to take
John Paul’s point to be one that does not disagree sharply with Aquinas’ view.
In fact, we should pay attention to something else in the commentary on Cain and
Abel. Three times in one paragraph—twice in his own words, once in a quotation from
St. Ambrose—John Paul refers to God’s sparing of Cain’s life as “merciful” or as an act
of “mercy.”122 It is specifically charity or mercy123 that rules out the unnecessary use of
capital punishment. It is probably true that John Paul allows only a narrower sense of the
121. EV 9.
122. EV 9.
123. For John Paul on mercy as another term for distinctively divine love (charity)
for the sinner, see e.g. RH 9. Further details of John Paul’s theology of mercy will be the
subject of chap. 2.
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“necessity” that would permit capital punishment than Aquinas does. This is likely
because of John Paul’s more developed theology/doctrine of charity/mercy and its
importance for both person and society, which will be detailed in the subsequent chapters.
Finally, as Dewan argues, Bradley seems to misread what he takes to be a key text
in Veritatis Splendor. Dewan denies that the text about “privileges or exceptions”
regarding the prohibition of intrinsic evil has anything to do with the public/private
distinction, and contends that “[o]ne could say that capital punishment is a morally
virtuous act, an act of justice, but one that is licitly performable only by a person in the
appropriate public office,” while unjust homicide remains forbidden for all.124 Indeed,
John Paul quotes the relevant text in Evangelium Vitae, specifically in the context of a
statement of the absolute norm against taking “innocent” life.125
But even if this understanding of the public-private distinction, with the person as
in some significant sense a part of a larger public, more specifically political, whole,
might be philosophically cogent, as suggested above in the discussion of Aquinas on
politics and virtue, can it be reconciled with the Church’s developed teaching, or is Grisez
correct to contend, as noted above, that it cannot? On the one hand, there are indeed some
contemporary texts from the Church’s official magisterium that seem to downplay the
specifically moral character of the common good that the political community is to
pursue, in favor of an understanding that focuses more on the rights of the individual and

124. Dewan, “Thomas Aquinas, Gerard Bradley, and the Death Penalty,” 313.
125. EV 57.
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on social peace, with such moral virtues as justice perhaps only instrumental to these
goals rightly understood.126 There is similar language in Evangelium Vitae itself.127
On the other hand, however, the emphasis on rights and peace as goals and virtue
as an instrument is not necessarily a denial of the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of
the importance of virtue in itself as a goal for the political community. Furthermore, even
if the political community is to pursue virtue more as a means than as an end, this does
not necessarily mean that the virtue pursued as a means for the community is not as
essential to the perfection of its members as Aristotle and Aquinas think—or that the
further ends pursued by the political community are not also especially necessary for that
perfection. Hence the Catechism not only speaks of the political community as natural to
the human person,128 but also indicates regarding the common good, to which “the good
of each individual is necessarily related”: “it is in the political community that its most
complete realization is found.”129
Also, there is again the statement in Evangelium Vitae, precisely in the context of
the treatment of capital punishment: “The primary purpose of the punishment which
society inflicts is ‘to redress the disorder caused by the offense.’ Public authority must
redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an
adequate punishment.”130 This would seem to be a reference to the order of justice in
126. E.g., GS 74 (cited by Grisez); CA 47; CCC 1906–10.
127. EV 71.
128. CCC 1882.
129. CCC 1905, 1910.
130. EV 56.
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itself and to political authority as having responsibility for this order. Finally, there is at
least one recent official Church document that points quite explicitly in the direction of
including the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding. The Compendium of the Social
Doctrine of the Church teaches: “The common good ... can be understood as the social
and community dimension of the moral good.”131 While all persons and social groups
have responsibility for this common good, the political community has special
responsibility for it, since it “is the reason that the political authority exists”; “political
institutions” have as their “purpose ... to make available to persons the necessary material,
cultural, moral and spiritual goods.”132 The Compendium goes on to quote John XXIII’s
reference to the connection between the political community and the human conscience’s
revelation of and enjoining of obedience to “a moral and religious order,” apparently as
valuable in itself as well as for the “solution of problems” of individuals and of society.133

The Need for Study of John Paul on Mercy

I argue, then, that the Grisezan reading of Aquinas and of John Paul II is mistaken.
Aquinas’ defense of capital punishment as morally licit in certain cases is coherent,
decent, and plausible. John Paul II does not obviously contradict this defense, and is not
best understood as pointing toward a rejection of all capital punishment in principle. Yet I
have suggested in the introduction to this dissertation that his rejection of capital
punishment when not necessary to safeguard society from future attacks by someone who
131. CSD 164.
132. CSD 165–68.
133. CSD 384.
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has committed a grave crime is a matter of principle rather than merely a prudential
judgment (even if his statement that cases of such necessity are rare is a prudential
judgment). I have likewise suggested in this chapter that the principle at work is mercy. It
is necessary then to verify and explicate this claim by proceeding to a closer investigation
of John Paul’s understanding of the nature and importance of mercy.
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CHAPTER II
MERCY AND LIMITS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Evangelium Vitae, Human Dignity, and the Capacity for Conversion

As argued in chapter 1, John Paul II does not seem to state or imply that capital
punishment is intrinsically evil; yet he teaches that it ought not be used “except ... when it
would not be possible otherwise to defend society.” He introduces this teaching by
speaking of the importance of respect for human dignity. I shall now contend, as also
suggested briefly in the introduction and chapter 1, that John Paul’s understanding in
Evangelium Vitae of human dignity is very closely linked with his thought regarding
mercy. Hence a thorough explication of his theology of mercy will be necessary in order
to provide a full grasp of what he teaches, and why, regarding capital punishment.
John Paul prefaces his teaching regarding capital punishment1 by linking it with
defense, as has been noted and interpreted previously. To repeat, he then adds explicit
reference to human dignity: “This is the context in which to place the problem of the
death penalty. ... The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice
ever more in line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God’s plan for man and
society.” This is followed, in turn, by his statement of the primary and secondary
purposes of punishment:
The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the
disorder caused by the offence.” Public authority must redress the violation of
personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment
for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her
freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order

1. EV 56.
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and ensuring people’s safety, while at the same time offering the offender an
incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.
It is then that John Paul continues: “It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the
nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and
ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute
necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.”
The basic logic seems to be as follows. Punishment must be in keeping with
human dignity. In order for this to be so, all of the purposes of punishment—including the
secondary ones—including “offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or
her behavior and be rehabilitated”—must be achieved, insofar as this is possible (this is,
again, not to say that the primary purpose, justice, does not still supply the act with its
moral specification).2 In order for this condition, in turn, to be fulfilled, society must
refrain from the use of capital punishment, except when one of the other secondary
purposes (“defending public order and ensuring people’s safety”) absolutely requires it.
The importance of this reference to human dignity can be further substantiated by
noting again that there are also two other places in the text of Evangelium Vitae where
John Paul mentions either “human dignity” or something possibly equivalent, specifically
in the context of references to the problem of capital punishment. The first, which again
has been mentioned in my introduction and discussed in the previous chapter, is in John
Paul’s commentary on the story of Cain and Abel, and specifically of God’s protection of
Cain’s life: “Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to

2. Contra not only Bradley and Brugger, previously discussed, but also Long,
“Evangelium Vitae,” 538, 541, 549.
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guarantee this.”3 To repeat the conclusion of my interpretation of this statement, John
Paul is not disagreeing with Aquinas’ view that capital punishment might sometimes be
permissible; he is, however, emphasizing (again, in harmony with Aquinas) that the
justice of capital punishment for a particular kind of crime does not mean that its use in
the case of that crime is necessarily fully warranted—and this because capital punishment
as just retribution alone does not satisfy the requirements of human dignity.
The second such mention, noted in my introduction, is found in John Paul’s
discussion of what he sees as the biblical demand for “reverence and love for every
human life.”4 There he writes: “Of course we must recognize that in the Old Testament
this sense of the value of life, though already quite marked, does not yet reach the
refinement found in the Sermon on the Mount. This is apparent in some aspects of the
current penal legislation, which provided for severe forms of corporal punishment and
even the death penalty” (emphasis added). Again, for John Paul, a fully “refin[ed]” sense
of the value or dignity of human life places significant limits on the use of capital
punishment.5
What does John Paul mean by ‘human dignity’ and the like? As suggested by the
reference above to the Sermon on the Mount, John Paul emphasizes the theological, or
more specifically Christological, basis for and meaning of human dignity. This is in fact
the case beginning in his introduction to the encyclical. There he refers to “the wonderful
truth recalled by the Second Vatican Council: ‘By his incarnation the Son of God has
3. EV 9.
4. EV 39.
5. EV 40.
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united himself in some fashion with every human being.’ This saving event reveals to
humanity not only the boundless love of God ... but also the incomparable value of every
human person.”6 He adds: “The dignity of this life is linked not only to its beginning, to
the fact that it comes from God, but also to its final end, to its destiny of fellowship with
God in knowledge and love of him.”7 Now, the life and love of God revealed and
conferred by Christ is something to be received by being lived out. Through the prophets,
God promised to give human beings a “new heart,” which
will make it possible to appreciate and achieve the deepest and most authentic
meaning of life: namely, that of being a gift which is fully realized in the giving of
self. ... It is in the coming of Jesus of Nazareth that ... a new heart is given through
his Spirit. ... This is the New Law ... and its fundamental expression, following the
example of the Lord who gave his life for his friends ..., is the gift of self in love
for one’s brothers and sisters.8
Or, similarly: “Christ’s blood reveals to man that his greatness, and therefore his
vocation, consists in the sincere gift of self. ... Whoever in the Sacrament of the Eucharist
drinks this blood and abides in Jesus ... is drawn into the dynamism of his love and gift of
life, in order to bring to its fullness the original vocation to love which belongs to
everyone.”9 What these statements indicate, in short, is that human dignity involves our
capacity to receive through Christ a participation in God’s self-giving love.
Respect for human dignity—which respect is an essential element of living out
one’s own dignity—entails respect for this capacity in others and the will to promote it,

6. EV 2.
7. EV 38.
8. EV 49.
9. EV 25.
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including by helping the sinner return to communion with God. Accordingly, St.
Ambrose says in his commentary on God’s treatment of Cain, quoted by John Paul, that
“God ... preferred the correction rather than the death of a sinner.”10 This concern is seen
in the pope’s presentation of his norm concerning capital punishment, and specifically in
his use of words indicating that human dignity requires that society do what it can
(without failing to defend itself as really necessary) to help the offender be rehabilitated.
The nature of this call to help bring about conversion now requires closer examination.

The Possible Importance of Allowing Time for Conversion

It may be asked why one would need to “prefer” either “correction” or “death” (in
Ambrose’s words), that is, why non-capital punishment is more helpful for rehabilitation.
One possible answer is suggested by John Paul when he refers, as one of several
examples of signs of Christ’s victory and of hope in our culture, to “a growing public
opposition to the death penalty, even when such a penalty is seen as a kind of ‘legitimate
defense’ on the part of society.” He explains: “Modern society in fact has the means of
effectively suppressing crime by rendering criminals harmless without definitively
denying them the chance to reform.”11 This might mean that those given more time to
reform (in other words, more time to live) are more likely to do so. Aquinas writes that
“human justice ... allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming

10. EV 9.
11. EV 27.
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others,” and this in imitation of God.12 John Paul might have something like this in mind,
perhaps among other things that will be explained below.
Someone might, however, further object that imminent death is an especially
effective motive for conversion. Aquinas also writes that “the evil ... have at the critical
point of death the opportunity to be converted to God through repentance. And if they are
so stubborn that even at the point of death their heart does not draw back from evil, it is
possible to make a highly probable judgment that they would never come away from evil
to the right use of their powers.”13 One could respond that, as shown in the previous
chapter and also in the quotation just above, Aquinas is speaking of those who must be
executed for the safety of society. One could add that all people will die at some point,
and that many are likely to be aware for at least some time that death is approaching, and
that someone who is punished with something other than death might still, at some later
point in her life, have the awareness of imminent death as an incentive to reform if this
would really be helpful—as well as more time in the interim for other experiences that
might also be helpful incentives. Therefore, again, it is possible that one of the reasons
that John Paul sees avoiding the use of capital punishment as conducive to realizing the
rehabilitative end of punishment is that sparing the criminal’s life allows the criminal
more time for repentance and conversion, without thereby taking away (eventual) death as
a final motive for conversion.

12. STh II-II.64.2 ad 2.
13. SCG III.146.
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John Paul’s Call to Provide “Incentive” for Conversion

Granting all of this about the value of “time for repentance” (Aquinas) as an
important element of “the chance to reform” (John Paul), it seems that there is still more
to John Paul’s point about the conflict between respect for human dignity and the
unnecessary use of capital punishment. Again, he says that punishment has, as one of
several secondary purposes, “offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or
her behavior and be rehabilitated.”14 We have seen how, in Aquinas’ view, using capital
punishment, that is, imposing death, might sometimes offer an “incentive” for
conversion. We have likewise seen how withholding capital punishment and allowing the
offender to live might offer “help,” in the form of time and opportunities, in changing and
being rehabilitated. But how does withholding capital punishment offer what could be
called an “incentive” for this? John Paul’s words seem to imply that inflicting something
less than capital punishment does more than simply leave open future opportunities for
reform. He seems to imply that withholding capital punishment positively promotes
conversion and rehabilitation.
John Paul’s commentary on God’s treatment of Cain makes reference, as has been
noted briefly, not only to “human dignity” and to “correction rather than death,” but also
to “mercy,” which (with its adjective derivative) is used three times: “And yet God, who
is always merciful even when he punishes, ‘put a mark on Cain, lest any who came upon
him should kill him’ ... And it is precisely here that the paradoxical mystery of the
merciful justice of God is shown forth. As Saint Ambrose writes: ‘Once the crime is

14. EV 56.
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admitted at the very inception of this sinful act of parricide, then the divine law of God’s
mercy should be immediately extended.’”15 To understand how withholding just, but
unnecessary, use of capital punishment might promote conversion, it is now necessary to
examine the theology of mercy.

Contemporary Views of Mercy as Context for John Paul’s Teaching

It is perhaps somewhat well known among Catholics that John Paul was interested
in the topic of mercy, at least that of God’s own mercy. Even those who are unaware that
he dedicated his second papal encyclical, Dives in Misericordia (1980) to this topic,
might be familiar with his beatification (1993) and canonization (2000) of Faustina
Kowalska, the mystic who promoted the “Divine Mercy” devotion, and his designation,
in accordance with this devotion, of the Second Sunday of Easter as Divine Mercy
Sunday.16 Thus, near the end of his funeral homily for John Paul, Ratzinger reflects on
how the late pope “interpreted for us the paschal mystery as a mystery of divine mercy”;17
and the official prayer for the cause of his own canonization refers to his “[t]rusting fully
in [God’s] infinite mercy.”18
What exactly mercy is, and whether or when/how it ought to be used, is a matter
of debate within our culture, and the nature and significance of John Paul’s understanding
of mercy might stand out more clearly against the background of this debate. One might
15. EV 9.
16. HC 4.
17. Ratzinger, “Funeral Mass of the Roman Pontiff.”
18. Diocese of Rome, “Prayer for asking graces.”
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consider, first, the following excerpt from news coverage of an impending execution:
“‘Spisak killed three people, tried to kill at least one other and shot a fifth in his admitted
plan to kill as many African-Americans as possible and start a race war in Cleveland,’ the
[Ohio parole] board said in its report to [Gov.] Kasich. ‘A recommendation for mercy is
not warranted in this case.’”19 The understanding that seems to be implicit in this
statement is of mercy as something that is bestowed in response to a favorable balance of
mitigating vs. aggravating factors in a crime, apart from considerations of society’s ability
to prevent the criminal from posing a danger in the future. Some recent scholarly
treatments of the topic of mercy are similar, even when they disagree among themselves
regarding whether/when mercy, as they understand it, ought to be shown. David Scheffer,
on the one hand, argues that mercy, in the form of withholding less than the maximum
punishment, would be inappropriate in the case of what he calls “atrocity crimes” (those
that are of great magnitude and led by the socially powerful); victims, he says, need this
retribution, and so society must punish accordingly, even when individuals may choose to
forgive.20 In contrast, Ernie Lewis, focusing on racism and other abuses in the criminal
justice system and especially those found in capital cases, says that mercy, again
understood as refraining from using capital punishment, is the proper way of working
against these abuses21—in other words, that it ought to be used because those sentenced to
death are victims of these abuses rather than really deserving of capital punishment.

19. Guillen, “Nazi sympathizer Frank Spisak prepares for execution.”
20. Scheffer, “Why International Law Matters,” 105, 113–15.
21. Lewis, “Echoes of Grace,” 53–57.
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Those who seek to avoid conflating mercy and justice do not always agree that
mercy is appropriate. Albert Alschuler acknowledges that justice itself must take into
account circumstances of a crime and personal characteristics of a criminal and thus may
require or forbid mitigating punishment; mercy must involve mitigation beyond what
justice requires but within what justice allows. He adds that this must be a “grace” rather
than a “duty,” and is concerned that it leads to some inequality in treatment of criminals.
Is mercy then always at odds with justice? He sees mercy as acceptable especially in light
of the criminal justice system’s current focus on victims (though he questions whether the
focus ought not rather be on society), and especially on their desire for “closure” (which,
interestingly, he says, appears for the first time in 1989 in news reports regarding crime
victims and punishments). While some victims might want closure through capital
punishment for their victimizers, others might want to attain closure by showing mercy.
Alschuler would grant mercy in such cases, as long as the punishments requested by the
victims are not excessively lenient.22
David Little, in response to Scheffer, questions the claim that punishing less than
maximally entails failure to enforce accountability, and suggests that forgiveness could be
allowed to remit punishment to some degree.23 Kevin Jung also denies that mercy
undermines justice, noting that it would then be hard to understand how, if justice is a
moral requirement, mercy could be morally allowed even on the part of private
individuals. He adds that both justice and mercy presuppose and affirm human capacities,
for evil and for good respectively. One who uses mercy reminds herself that she, like the
22. Alschuler, “A Place for Mercy,” 92–99.
23. Little, “Critical Response to David Scheffer,” 119, 122–24.
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wrongdoer, still has the capacity for evil, and likewise affirms that the wrongdoer still has
the capacity for good.24
William Schweiker understands mercy as something that is shown despite the lack
of a justified claim, and that may or may not involve commutation of punishment or the
subjective identification with the wrongdoer that characterizes forgiveness. He
nevertheless connects mercy with human worth, something that, he says, justice cannot
create, or even entirely protect. Schweiker concludes that mercy is at odds with the use of
capital punishment.25 Also focusing on the positive component of mercy, Paris insists that
mercy requires justice, especially to protect society, but that criminals should still be
shown mercy to give them the chance to develop morally good habits.26
Finally, Matthew Boulton regards mercy as above all the provision of care and
reconciliation, with or without juridical leniency. He offers a commentary on the parable
of the Good Samaritan. He notes that in the framework of the parable, the fact that the
care for the victimized man was not provided by the Jewish leaders indicates that this care
was “extra-ordinary”—and yet, the point of the parable is that such care is nevertheless
mandatory. He adds that the text from Leviticus that Jesus is explicating in the parable,
the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself, contrasts love with vengeance; and that
the pericope in which Jesus tells the parable follows shortly after one in which he is
denied hospitality by Samaritans. Thus, in holding up the “Good Samaritan” as fulfilling
the commandment, Jesus himself is providing loving care rather than vengeance, with the
24. Jung, “Fallibility and Fragility,” 207, 209–12, 218–20.
25. Schweiker, “Criminal Justice,” 184–85, 198, 200.
26. Paris, “Justice and Mercy,” 227–28.
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possibility of reconciliation. Mercy and justice are not at odds, but rather contain each
other. Mercy, though, is primary; it is “humanizing” in its focus not on desert and
atonement but on human community. 27
As will become clear, John Paul’s understanding of mercy, grounded in Aquinas
and in later thought, including Faustina’s and also John Paul’s own, is closest to that of
Little, Schweiker, and Boulton. For John Paul, mercy goes beyond justice, and yet is, in
its own way, a duty. It is a necessary element of respect for human dignity. To understand
John Paul’s thought on capital punishment, it will be necessary to show the details of his
thought on mercy. The question, however, of whether mercy is at odds with the
requirements of justice in the case of the very most grave crimes, as Scheffer suggests,
deserves further brief examination at this point. Specifically in response to Evangelium
Vitae, Weigel and Long expresses similar concerns.28 On the other hand, Grisez has
rejected the sorts of reasoning that lead to demands for the use of capital punishment for
all or some murderers, or to the rejection of mercy on the grounds that it is unmerited.29
The Church does not seem to have taught that there are some crimes that require the use
of nothing less than capital punishment.30
One might add also a further argument in response to the claim that justice
sometimes demands capital punishment. There are punishments that are presumably
27. Boulton, “Samaritan Justice,” 130–44.
28. Weigel, “Evangelium Vitae on Capital Punishment,” 227–29; Long,
“Evangelium Vitae,” 526–31, 551–52.
29. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 363.
30. See again the reviews of the history of Catholic thought/teaching in, e.g.,
Megivern, The Death Penalty, chaps. 1–7; Brugger, Capital Punishment, chaps. 3–6.

73
worse than “mere” death, such as death that is either preceded or accompanied by the
intentional infliction of significant pain. Aquinas, as will be recalled, defends as morally
licit in some cases such presumably painful punishments as maiming31 and striking.32
Many societies, including Catholic ones, have taken this conclusion for granted. One
might wonder why, if some crimes demand death and nothing less as punishment, then
some still worse crimes—say, torture-murders—would not demand something worse than
death as punishment. Now, the Church has in fact since rejected torture, including as a
punishment,33 and has even apparently taught that it is intrinsically evil,34 and hence
unjust. So it might be argued that only the worst possible just punishment may be
inflicted for the worst crimes, not the worst possible imaginable punishment. But while I
think that the teaching that torture (but not “mere” capital punishment) is simply unjust is
defensible, I also think, in light of the approval of this punishment by such as Aquinas,
that the truth of this teaching should not be regarded as simply obvious35 (and hence,
defending it is far beyond my scope). At any rate, if there is a principled reason (justice)
to reject altogether the use of the worst imaginable punishments (even for the very worst
crimes), then it seems reasonable to be open to the possibility that there is a (different but
analogous) principled reason (mercy) to reject sometimes the use of the worst of just
punishments (even for the very worst crimes).
31. STh II-II.65.1.
32. STh II-II.65.2.
33. CCC 2297–98; EV 3; CSD 404.
34. VS 80.
35. Pace Long, “Evangelium Vitae,” 528.
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Aquinas as Background to John Paul on Mercy

With this range of views, and brief evaluation thereof, as contemporary context,
one might move in the direction of an examination of John Paul II’s position by looking
at its possible background in Aquinas, in general an important source for John Paul, as
noted in chapter 1. Aquinas treats mercy in a question within the “Treatise on Charity” in
the Secunda Secundae (qq. 23–46): Mercy is among the interior acts of charity. What then
are charity and, as Aquinas will say, its principal act? For Aquinas, charity is friendship
between humans and God, beginning with his communication of his happiness to us.36 It
has as its object the divine good, under its special aspect of an object of happiness.37
Strikingly, Aquinas holds that “if we make the impossible supposition that God were not
man’s good, He would not be man’s reason for loving.”38 It is extended to our neighbors
also, so that they may also be in God, in accordance with the capacity that they have in
common with us39 (but not to irrational creatures, who lack the capacity for this union
with God).40
As discussed in the previous chapter, Aquinas argues that we must have charity
for sinners, whose human nature also continues to have the capacity for happiness.41 In a

36. STh II-II.23.1.
37. STh II-II.23.4.
38. STh II-II.26.13 ad 3.
39. STh II-II.25.1.
40. STh II-II.25.3.
41. STh II-II.25.6.
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similar fashion, he holds that we are to have charity for our enemies, who share our
nature. More precisely, he holds that charity requires that “we should not exclude our
enemies from the love given to our neighbor in general,” “that we should be ready to love
our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur.” He adds: “That man should
actually do so, and love his enemy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for him to
do so, belongs to the perfection of charity” (something beyond its minimal
requirements).42
The meaning of the “necessity” of which Aquinas speaks here is clarified
somewhat when Aquinas considers whether we must show our enemies the outward signs
of love. First, “some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our neighbors in general
... and the [minimal] fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like
favors or signs of love towards our enemies.” Second,
there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows to certain persons in
particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like
favors and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance
to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according to Prov. xxv. 21: If thy
enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him ... drink. Outside cases of
urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of
charity.43
In other words, it seems, the minimal requirements of charity do not demand that we go
so far as to seek out opportunities to render less-than-urgent care to individual enemies
(although the perfection of charity does demand this). But we must be ready, if we
encounter an urgent case, to render such care. Such readiness would imply that we then

42. STh II-II.25.8.
43. STh II-II.25.9.
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actually render the care. One might further note that the type of “care” Aquinas describes
by way of example is the provision of some of the needs of bodily life, food and drink.
For Aquinas, the principle act of charity is to love. With what sort of love?
Aquinas has in mind a love that includes but is not limited to “goodwill,” “because [this
love] denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much
as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so
tends towards him.”44 It is above all a love of God for himself, at least with respect to the
final, formal, and efficient causes of that which we love; Aquinas does allow that with
regard to material cause—“that which disposed us to love” the object of our love—God
“can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in
His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive
from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.”45
Even aside from this latter distinction, what Aquinas says about love of God for himself
might at first seem to contradict what he says about love of God as object of happiness,
except that the happiness in question is not something distinct from God himself. So
much does this love for God constitute charity that Aquinas argues that, in a way, “it is
better to love one’s enemy than one’s friend, and this for two reasons”: “because ... God
is the only reason for loving one’s enemy,” and because love of enemies proves a stronger
love for God.46

44. STh II-II.27.2.
45. STh II-II.27.3.
46. STh II-II.27.7.
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What, then, is mercy? Mercy is motivated by “corruptive or distressing evils,”
especially, but not only, those that befall someone accidently or even undeservedly.47
Aquinas also addresses the objection: “It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not
the motive of mercy. For, as shown above [II-II.19.1; I-II.79.1 ad 4; I.48.6], fault is an evil
rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil
does not excite mercy.” Note that the objection takes for granted both that punishment—
which Aquinas has already called a good—motivates mercy, and that fault—an evil—
does not; if these presuppositions are correct, then apparently it is actually good rather
than evil that motivates mercy. Aquinas responds: “Since ... fault may be, in a way, a
punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner’s will,
it may, in this respect, call for mercy.”48 Aquinas’s response by no means denies that
punishment calls for mercy; rather, he distinguishes a sense in which punishment can be
considered evil, namely, by being against the will of the one punished. Nor does he deny
that fault provokes indignation; rather, he adds that it can also provoke mercy, by being
simultaneously punishment. This in fact is the conclusion at which Aquinas is ultimately
aiming when he agrees that punishment motivates mercy and explains that this is because
there is a sense in which punishment is evil. But the point regarding punishment as
motivating mercy also stands on its own in a way that would seem applicable to all kinds
of punishment—not only those that are intrinsic to a fault, but also those that are inflicted
in response to a fault.

47. STh II-II.30.1.
48. STh II-II.30.1 ad 1.
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Aquinas goes on to explain that mercy involves “look[ing] upon another’s distress
as one’s own,” either “through union of the affections, which is the effect of love,” or
“through real union, for instance when another’s evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us
from him,” even if only through people’s “realiz[ation] that the same may happen to
themselves.”49 It is a virtue, insofar as it is “a movement of the intellective appetite, in as
much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another,” a “movement ... ruled in accordance
with reason,” that is, quoting Augustine, “when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that
justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.”50 In fact, it
is the greatest virtue, and this in two ways. First: “On itself, mercy takes precedence of
other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to
succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence
mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be
chiefly manifested.” Second—with a qualification—“with regard to its subject.” Aquinas
explains that “as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God,
is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the
virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all
others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in
so far as the latter is deficient.”51 These references to mercy as shown by one who is

49. STh II-II.30.2.
50. STh II-II.30.3.
51. STh II-II.27.4.
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“higher and better,” however, need to be read in light of Aquinas’ statement elsewhere
that mercy rejects the appetite for subjection of others to oneself.52
Aquinas, then, in very brief summary, sees mercy as an act of charity, an act,
therefore, that reflects our common capacity for happiness in union with God, as well as
our common vulnerability to evil, even the evil of punishment; inasmuch as he sees acts
of charity for those who are sinners and/or one’s enemies as required when manifestly
urgent, and sees mercy as part of charity and as a very great virtue when ruled by reason
and not at odds with justice, it would seem that he sees mercy for sinners/enemies in
manifest and urgent danger from evils like punishment as somehow necessary; inasmuch
as he sees charity as having to do with our common capacity for union with God, it would
seem that he sees mercy as also having the positive goal of restoring this communion. We
may now turn to John Paul II’s theology of mercy, and see the ways in which it agrees
with Aquinas’, and also builds upon it with the help of John Paul’s other major source,
Faustina, and his own reflections on the meaning of fatherhood, especially with regard to
the relationship between mercy and conversion and the role of suffering in showing
mercy.

Faustina as Source for John Paul II

The main source for John Paul’s thought on the topic of mercy is his encyclical
Dives in Misericordia. Weigel suggests that the encyclical brings together two strands:
the understanding of mercy found in Faustina’s spiritual diaries, and also the interest in
52. Aquinas, Lectura super Matthaeum 5.2. This belongs to the authentic portion
of the commentary; for the issues regarding authorship, see Torrell, Saint Thomas
Aquinas, 1:56–57.
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the meaning and importance of fatherhood that John Paul had also developed prior to his
election as pope53—it will be noted that the encyclical begins, “It is ‘God, who is rich in
mercy’ whom Jesus Christ has revealed to us as Father.”54 We will consider each of these
in turn. In his own subsequent reflection, John Paul emphasizes Faustina as a source for
the encyclical. He writes in his final book: “[T]he reflections offered in Dives in
Misericordia were the fruit of my pastoral experience in Poland, especially in Kraków.
That is where Saint Faustina Kowalska is buried, she who was chosen by Christ to be a
particularly enlightened interpreter of the truth of Divine Mercy.” He adds a very brief
description of her life and the evil (Nazism, Communism) in her world, and a further
statement of his sense of her importance for the Church.55
This is not the first indication of a connection in John Paul’s mind between
Faustina and the encyclical. In his homily at the beatification of Faustina and several
others, he makes several mentions of mercy, in his introduction and conclusion as well as
in the section specifically on Faustina; in addition to the mentions of mercy in the
vernacular (the homily was delivered in several languages, including Italian and Polish),
he also, in each of the same three sections of the homily, used the Latin phrase, dives in
misericordia.56 His homily for Faustina’s canonization quotes and references the
encyclical.57
53. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 387.
54. DM 1.
55. MI, 5–6.
56. John Paul II, “Beatificazione” 1, 6, 8.
57. HC 2, 4.

81
Without mentioning Dives in Misericordia, John Paul also reflects elsewhere on
his interest in Faustina: “During the Second World War, ... I often visited the grave of
Sister Faustina ... Everything about her was extraordinary, impossible to foresee in such a
simple girl.” John Paul then lists several key points in her life and mentions the spread of
the devotion she promoted, and adds: “When I became archbishop of Kraków, I asked
Professor Father Ignacy Róóycki to examine her writings. At first he didn’t want to, but
later he agreed, and went on to make a thorough study of the available documents. Finally
he said, ‘She’s a wonderful mystic.’”58 Weigel elaborates, explaining that in 1965, when
Wojty»a was in Rome for Vatican II, Faustina’s “‘Divine Mercy’ devotion was spreading
throughout Poland even as her writings were coming under the theological suspicion of
certain Roman authorities. The Archdiocese of Kraków was eager to propose Sister
Faustina for beatification, and Wojty»a helped clear the doctrinal air with the Roman
Curia so that Sister Faustina’s cause could be introduced.”59
Raymond Gawronski offers a helpful summary and analysis of Faustina’s
experiences and message. Her life included long periods of suffering and brief
consolations. Her sufferings included her leaving home for religious life, the treatment
she received at times from other sisters, physical ailments including tuberculosis,
concealed stigmata, a painful death which was foretold to her when she entered religious
life, interior suffering and the “dark night of the soul.”60 According to her visions as she
recorded them, Jesus’ suffering was expiatory; his suffering and death purchase God’s
58. John Paul II, Rise, Let Us Be On Our Way, 194.
59. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 158.
60. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 820–24, 833, 838–39.
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mercy; God sees in sinners Jesus as the Lamb slain.61 His suffering can also be
understood as inflicted by sinners; he suffers when sinners refuse to accept his mercy, is
wounded by our sinfulness.62 Human suffering is also part of his plan to offer mercy to
sinners. Such suffering, united to Jesus’, restrains God’s wrath and purchases souls for
God.63 Faustina said of herself, “My name is sacrifice,” and held that sacrifice and
suffering are the first ways of spreading the message of God’s mercy.64 Above all,
meditation on Jesus’ own suffering helps save others, according to Faustina, but other
kinds of suffering in union with Jesus’ do so as well.65
More precisely, Faustina saw living for others, or loving others, as the most
important way in which to bring God’s mercy to them. Suffering, for Faustina, is part of
this “living for,” and love is greater than suffering. Suffering remains valuable and even
essential, however. It is an essential part of dying to self so as to live for others. In the
end, it is not the suffering itself that brings mercy, but rather the love that bears the
suffering—but true love does bear suffering.66 Faustina called for a love that identifies
oneself with sinners.67

61. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 824, 827, 829.
62. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 826, 828.
63. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 827–28, 833.
64. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 819, 826.
65. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 835.
66. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 831–33.
67. Gawronski, “My Name is Sacrifice,” 834–35.
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In his homilies for her beatification and canonization and then for Divine Mercy
Sunday the year after her canonization, John Paul highlights what he apparently sees as a
few of the most theologically significant aspects of Faustina’s life and message. In the
introduction and conclusion to the beatification homily, he links mercy with the gift of the
resurrection and with the mission of faith and forgiveness that the resurrected Jesus gives
to the Church.68 When he briefly speaks specifically of Faustina, he recalls, as in the other
reflections cited previously, some of the circumstances of her life. In particular, he refers
to her “short life full of suffering,” to the suffering in Europe and in the world during the
twentieth century, and to the message of Divine Mercy and its popularity as “a sign of the
times,” and as the light of hope in this suffering world.69
John Paul expands on this at her canonization. Again, he refers to the difficult
twentieth-century context of Faustina’s life and mission, adding that her message remains
relevant for the twenty-first and beyond.70 Again and at greater length than at her
beatification, he speaks of the gift of the Spirit—not only in the Upper Room after the
resurrection but also in the water that, together with blood, flowed from Jesus’ side on the
cross, as depicted in the image Faustina saw and popularized—and so of forgiveness and
peace.71 He identifies mercy with the love recognizes the value of the person; that takes
on the burdens of others, including by relieving material burdens; and that especially

68. John Paul II, “Beatificazione” 1, 8.
69. John Paul II, “Beatificazione” 6.
70. HC 2–6, 8.
71. HC 1–3.
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forgives sin and lifts the burden it imposes, and in these ways forms community.72 John
Paul emphasizes, quoting Faustina, that showing mercy entails accepting suffering.73 He
reminds us that we must practice mercy in order to receive it.74
The following year, 2001, John Paul gave his only Divine Mercy Sunday homily.
He refers to Faustina by name, as well as to Dives in Misericordia. His message is similar
to that at the canonization: mercy is an Easter gift; the Divine Mercy devotion is needed
in our time; mercy is love that identifies with and sacrifices for sinners and so lifts
burdens and brings peace, and that Christians are required to practice.75 As Faustina had
said that when God looks at sinners he sees in the Jesus as the Lamb slain for them, so, on
this occasion, John Paul adds reference to the now-victorious sacrificial Lamb: “In the
Messiah, crucified and risen, we recognize the features of the Lamb sacrificed on
Golgotha, who implores forgiveness for his torturers and opens the gates of heaven to
repentant sinners; we glimpse the face of the immortal King who now has ‘the keys of
Death and Hades.’”76 He also speaks, as he had in Dives in Misericordia (as we will see),
of our “‘mercy’ towards the Crucified One.”77 He does not elaborate on the meaning of
this. It seems plausible to see an echo of Faustina’s message about the importance of

72. HC 2–6.
73. HC 6.
74. HC 4.
75. John Paul II, “Divine Mercy Sunday Homily” 2–6.
76. John Paul II, “Divine Mercy Sunday Homily” 1.
77. John Paul II, “Divine Mercy Sunday Homily” 2.
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contemplation of Jesus’ suffering, as well as a reference to Jesus’ self-identification with
the “least,” with those most in need, as is made clear in the encyclical.
Finally, John Paul offers a further, dense reflection on Faustina and mercy in a
writing several years later, his last book. He refers to Christ as having made satisfaction
for our sins and as having risen in triumph over sin. He thus speaks of mercy, even more
than justice, as limiting the evil in the world, and of the value of this message for the
whole world.78 In summary, he regards Faustina’s message as of great importance for the
world of our time, beginning in the twentieth century and also beyond. He focuses
especially on mercy as involving suffering, primarily Christ’s but also our own in union
with Christ’s, in order to lift the burdens under which others are suffering, including the
burden of sin.

Mercy as Expression of Fatherhood in John Paul II

Weigel, as noted above, suggests that not only Faustina’s message, but also John
Paul’s own experiences and thoughts regarding the theology of fatherhood, enter into the
theology of mercy expressed in the encyclical Dives in Misericordia. He refers
specifically79 to Wojty»a’s brief poetic “Reflections on Fatherhood,” written in 1964.80
Kenneth Schmitz links the encyclical with the longer play, Radiation of Fatherhood,

78. MI, 54–55.
79. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 387.
80. For summary and discussion, see Buttiglione, Karol Wojty»a, 265–68.
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written in the same year (but not published until 1979).81 Schmitz also offers a substantial
summary of and commentary on the play, with some mentions of the related work
“Reflections” interwoven.82 The most important passages for our purposes are two
regarding the relationship between being a child and being a father. In the first of these,
the character Adam addresses God: “After a long time I came to understand that you do
not want me to be a father unless I become a child.”83 In the second, the character Mother
addresses Adam: “Adam, accept the radiation of fatherhood; Adam, become a child. ...
How does it happen that I see the father in you, even though you reject fatherhood? That I
see the child in you, even though you do not want to be one?”84 These passages indicate
that the transformation into fatherhood requires a transformation into childhood.
Furthermore, this transformation is meant to be understood as a radical and challenging
one, involving a death to one’s old self. Thus, Mother continues: “When a child is born,
you are born in it anew, and I rejoice in that birth. At the same time—Adam, Adam—I
desire you to die in it. I desire your death, and in that wish I find the very nucleus of life.
Because of that wish, you bear a grudge against me, and that is why you cannot
understand my love for you.”85

81. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 118. Weigel, Witness to Hope,
218, discusses the play briefly, but does not connect it with the encyclical.
82. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 19–29.
83. RF, 339.
84. RF, 362–63.
85. RF, 363.
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Before further consideration of the meaning of “fatherhood” here and its
importance for a variety of human relationships and hence for the theology of mercy in
the world, it seems appropriate to address the question that might naturally arise regarding
the role that “motherhood” might also play in John Paul’s thought. In the play, Mother
says to Adam, regarding the acceptance of fatherhood:86
Do not be afraid. This must hurt. It is a pain like the pain of birth. A woman
knows infinitely more about giving birth than a man. She knows it particularly
through the suffering that accompanies childbearing. Still, motherhood is an
expression of fatherhood. It must always go back to the father to take from him all
that it expresses. In this consists the radiation of fatherhood.
One returns to the father through the child. ... We return to the father
through the child.
There is then a kind of reciprocity, according to John Paul, between fatherhood and
motherhood; each is somehow learned from the other, even if not necessarily in the same
way, and even if in this text there is the suggestion of a kind of primacy of fatherhood.
This suggestion of primacy might reflect the fact that the play is at least as much about
the relationship between God and human parents (in which, as in any divine-human
relationship, the primacy will presumably be God’s) as about the relationship between the
human father and the human mother; the “fatherhood” of which motherhood is an
expression might be God’s. It is noteworthy in this connection that John Paul later writes
“that the man’s fatherhood always occurs through the woman’s motherhood, and, vice
versa, the woman’s motherhood through the man’s fatherhood.”87 Still more strikingly, he
eventually writes regarding the human father that “in many ways he has to learn his own

86. RF, 340–41.
87. Wojty»a, “Parenthood as a Community of Persons,” 330.
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‘fatherhood’ from the mother.”88 When John Paul is focusing on the human father-mother
relationship, he emphasizes the equality or even primacy of motherhood.
What is the importance of this understanding of fatherhood—and motherhood—
that is encapsulated in the statement that to become a father—or mother—one must
become a child of God? Weigel writes: “John Paul II had been thinking about fatherhood
for a long time. Life with his own father and with the unbroken prince, Cardinal Sapieha,
had given him a profound experience of both familial and spiritual paternity. He thought
of his own priesthood as a form of paternity.”89 The theme of spiritual paternity/maternity
becomes one to which he then returns occasionally. 90 For John Paul, all men and women,
whether or not they are physical (biological or adoptive) parents, are called to spiritual
parenthood.
One might suggest that the loving care for others that is shown in mercy is an
example of the practice of spiritual parenthood. John Paul writes, in fact: “The priest is
the witness and instrument of divine mercy! How important in his life is the ministry of
the confessional! It is in the confessional that his spiritual fatherhood is realized in the
fullest way. ... It is necessary, however, that every priest at the service of his brothers and
sisters in the confessional should experience this same divine mercy by going regularly to
confession himself.”91 It would seem that any time a human person extends mercy to
88. John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem 18.
89. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 387.
90. E.g., LR, 260–61; John Paul II, Familaris Consortio 16; idem, Mulieris
Dignitatem 21.
91. John Paul II, Gift and Mystery, 86. Cf. e.g. idem, “Letter to Priests 2002” 4, 9;
idem, “Letter to Priests 2001” 10–12.
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another, we have an exercise of spiritual parenthood—and one that presupposes that the
person exercising it has become a child of God. A key further conclusion that can now be
drawn from this examination of the relationship between mercy and fatherhood/
parenthood, further substantiating an aspect of Faustina’s message, is that human mercy,
mercy extended by a child of God (perhaps through suffering like Christ’s), is a reflection
or transmission or “radiation” of God’s own mercy, a making-present/active of that mercy
in and through oneself, and in the one to whom mercy is being extended. This seems to
build upon Aquinas’ understanding of mercy, as summarized above, by making explicit
some aspects of mercy that Aquinas perhaps does not make explicit.

John Paul’s Full Teaching on Mercy: The Encyclical Dives in Misericordia

The encyclical Dives in Misericordia92 was preceded a year and a half earlier by
Redemptor Hominis; several statements in the earlier document must be examined briefly
to complete our introduction to a reading of the later one. Redemptor Hominis takes as its
starting point the teaching that “[t]he Redeemer of man, Jesus Christ, is the center of the
universe and of history. ... Through the Incarnation God gave human life the dimension
that he intended man to have from his first beginning.”93 Later, in the chapter on “The
Mystery of the Redemption,” John Paul quotes the words of the Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes: “Rightly therefore does the Second
Vatican Council teach: ‘The truth is that only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does

92. For additional summary/commentary, see Nachef, Mystery of the Trinity, esp.
chaps. 3–6, passim; Beigel, Faith and Justice, chap. 3.
93. RH 1.
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the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a type of him who was to
come (Rom 5:14), Christ the Lord. Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the
mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his
most high calling.’”94 The next chapter of this dissertation will include further analysis of
the meaning and implications of this teaching, especially as it applies to the relationship
between mercy and justice. But it must be noted at this point that in Redemptor Hominis,
John Paul, having referred to the role that the Incarnation plays as the revelation of the
Father’s love, goes on to specify that Jesus reveals the Father’s love especially through
his redemptive suffering and death, and adds: “This revelation of love is also described as
mercy; and in man’s history this revelation of love and mercy has taken a form and a
name: that of Jesus Christ.”95
This, in turn, is the starting point for Dives in Misericordia; in Weigel’s words,
“Redemptor Hominis ‘grew’ into ... Dives in Misericordia.”96 This can be seen in the text
of the latter. As noted earlier, John Paul begins his second encyclical: “It is ‘God, who is
rich in mercy’ whom Jesus Christ has revealed to us as Father.” He then explains:
I devoted the encyclical Redemptor hominis to the truth about man, a truth that is
revealed to us in its fullness and depth in Christ. A no less important need in these
critical and difficult times impels me to draw attention once again in Christ to the
countenance of the “Father of mercies and God of all comfort.” We read in the
Constitution Gaudium et spes: “Christ the new Adam ... fully reveals man to
himself and brings to light his lofty calling,” and does it “in the very revelation of
the mystery of the Father and of his love.” ...

94. RH 8.
95. RH 9.
96. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 386.

91
For this reason it is now fitting to reflect on this mystery ...97
And he adds that “in Christ and through Christ, God also becomes especially visible in
His mercy ... [Christ] Himself, in a certain sense, is mercy. To the person who sees it in
Him—and finds it in Him—God becomes ‘visible’ in a particular way as the Father ‘who
is rich in mercy.’”98 “[M]ercy is an indispensable dimension of love; it is as it were love’s
second name and, at the same time, the specific manner in which love is revealed and
effected vis-a-vis the reality of the evil that is in the world, ... insinuating itself even into
his heart and capable of causing him to ‘perish in Gehenna.’”99 These emphases on
Christ’s suffering/redemptive love as mercy, and the Father as the Father of mercy, are
initial illustrations of the roles that Faustina’s message regarding suffering love and John
Paul’s own theology of fatherhood will play in the encyclical on mercy.
As Dives in Misericordia continues, John Paul speaks of the scriptural witness to
God’s mercy. Among other things: “In the preaching of the prophets, mercy signifies a
special power of love, which prevails over the sin and infidelity of the chosen people.”100
Similarly, in the New Testament it is made known that mercy “is an especially creative
proof of the love which does not allow itself to be ‘conquered by evil,’ but overcomes
‘evil with good.’”101 “[T]he Son of God ... reveals himself as the inexhaustible source of

97. DM 1.
98. DM 2.
99. DM 7.
100. DM 4.
101. DM 6.
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mercy ... that ... is to be everlastingly confirmed as more powerful than sin.”102 We see
Faustina’s understanding of the power of mercy.
How does mercy overcome evil? This is explained by a consideration of what
exactly mercy is. Already in the Old Testament, mercy “does not pertain only to the
notion of God but is something that characterizes the life of the whole people of Israel
and each of its sons and daughters: mercy is the content of intimacy with their Lord.”103 In
a later reflection, John Paul likewise speaks of mercy as overcoming sin by restoring our
love of God.104 Mercy, John Paul writes in the encyclical, is “a participation in the very
life of God.” From this it follows that mercy “includes the call to man to share in the
divine life by giving himself.”105 Hence, “Christ, in revealing the love-mercy of God, at
the same time demanded from people that they should also be guided in their lives by
love and mercy.”106 Indeed, “God ... invites man to have ‘mercy’ on His only Son, the
crucified one. ... [I]s not this the position of Christ with regard to man when He says: ‘As
you did it to one of the least of these ... you did it to me’? Do not the words ... ‘Blessed
are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy,’ constitute, in a certain sense, a synthesis of

102. DM 8.
103. DM 4.
104. MI, 7, 15. Cf. also Wojty»a, Sign of Contradiction, passim, for further
indications of John Paul’s interest in the Augustinian amor Dei/amor sui contrast.
105. DM 7.
106. DM 3.
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the whole of the Good News, of the whole of the ‘wonderful exchange’... contained
therein?”107
The three connections, between fatherhood and mercy, between divine mercy and
mercy shown by human persons, and between mercy received and mercy given,
themselves all come together in the most pronounced way in John Paul’s reflection on the
parable of the Prodigal Son. John Paul writes regarding the parable: “Although the word
‘mercy’ does not appear, it nevertheless expresses the essence of the divine mercy in a
particularly clear way.”108 And, “There is no doubt that in this simple but penetrating
analogy, the figure of the Father reveals to us God as Father.”109 In the parable, the son
has above all lost his dignity precisely as a son, and comes to realize this.110 The father,
however, is faithful to himself as father, and so also to his son, and restores the son to his
position. A “good ... has been achieved thanks to a mysterious radiation of truth and love”
(radiation of fatherhood). This in turn brings joy to the Father.111
John Paul comments:112
At times it happens that ... we see in mercy above all a relationship of inequality
between the one offering it and the one receiving it. And, in consequence, we are
quick to deduce that mercy belittles the receiver, that it offends the dignity of man.
The parable of the prodigal son shows that the reality is different: the relationship

107. DM 8.
108. DM 5.
109. DM 6.
110. DM 5.
111. DM 6.
112. DM 6; cf. also 14.
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of mercy is based on the common experience of that good which is man, on the
common experience of the dignity that is proper to him.
This emphasis on the mutuality of mercy might seem a denial or at least a qualification of
Aquinas’ treatment, noted above, of why mercy is in multiple ways the greatest virtue.
But we have also noted that Aquinas sees mercy as at odds with the appetite for a position
of superiority over others. It seems clear, furthermore, that John Paul agrees that mercy is
and must be initiated by one of the two people—by the father. In view of these
considerations, Aquinas’ position seems to remain intact. We may continue to see John
Paul’s theology of mercy as building upon (rather than rejecting) Aquinas’.
The additional specific and practical point John Paul wishes to make, regarding
the way in which mercy overcomes evil, is as follows: “The parable of the prodigal son
expresses in a simple but profound way the reality of conversion. Conversion is the most
concrete expression of the working of love and of the presence of mercy in the human
world.”113 He repeats later in the encyclical: “Conversion to God always consists in
discovering His mercy ... Conversion to God is always the fruit of the ‘rediscovery’ of the
Father, who is rich in mercy.”114 Though it will likely seem reasonable to recognize that
God’s mercy is the cause of, rather than reward earned by, conversion, it might also seem
unclear how the parable of the Prodigal Son demonstrates this. Does not the son have to
recognize the evil he has done and figure out how that evil requires him to approach his
father, before he can return and then experience the father’s mercy? But this objection
would, first of all, beg the question: How—in what light—is the Son to recognize what he
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has done to his relationship with his father? As John Paul suggests, this has not yet
happened when the son focuses only on his physical poverty and hunger. But when the
son decides to return and say to his father, “I have sinned ... I am no longer worthy to be
called your son. Treat me as one of your hired servants,” John Paul says that “the sense of
lost dignity had matured ... the sense of that dignity that springs from the relationship of
the son with the father.”115 It is the son’s awareness of his earlier experiences of his father
and his father’s love that leads him to the conclusion that he cannot, in justice, ask to be
treated as a son, but only as a servant. He has already begun to turn from evil to justice, to
good.
Second, John Paul adds that the son “had ... hurt and offended his father by his
whole conduct. ... And yet, after all, it was his own son who was involved, and such a
relationship could never be altered or destroyed by any sort of behavior. The prodigal son
is aware of this and it is precisely this awareness that shows him clearly the dignity which
he has lost and which makes him honestly evaluate the position that he could still expect
in his father’s house.”116 Almost paradoxically, in other words, the son’s awareness that
the father-son relationship cannot simply be destroyed leads in turn to an awareness of the
dignity that belongs to such a relationship and that he has therefore lost by offending his
father. It is in light of the father’s love, which initiates the relationship, that the son
appreciates fully what he has done. Also, “this awareness” regarding the nature of the
relationship “makes him honestly evaluate the position that he could still expect.” This is
not likely to be a repetition of the point that the son realizes that he cannot, in justice, ask
115. DM 5.
116. DM 5.
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to be treated as he was before he sinned. The point, rather, is that, even while knowing
that he cannot deserve or ask to be treated as a son, he can expect to get more than he
deserves and so asks for. He may not expect the details—the embrace, the ring and shoes,
the banquet—but he has an expectation or hope of receiving, again, his father’s love.
Further evidence for this interpretation is provided by John Paul’s briefer treatment of the
same parable in his Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, which refers to the son’s—to every
(sinful) human being’s—“desire to return to communion with his Father.”117 The son has
some real desire for this, some real hope of attaining it. One can also compare John Paul’s
still later reflection on Psalm 51. He writes that the human person “accuses himself
before God because he knows that sin contradicts the holiness of his Creator. At the same
time, sinful man knows that God is infinite mercy, always ready to forgive and to restore
the sinner to righteousness.”118
In John Paul’s theology of mercy, then, in Dives in Misericordia considered both
in relation to itself and to its sources and to subsequent related texts, we see the use of
mercy as intrinsic to our relationship with God, as a radiation of God’s mercy, as
potentially involving suffering, and as overcoming the sin of others. This takes us back to
the references to human dignity and to mercy in Evangelium Vitae as keys to the
understanding of the latter encyclical’s treatment of capital punishment.

117. John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia 5.
118. MI, 54.
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Application to Problem of Capital Punishment

It is especially because human dignity requires giving/receiving help in
undergoing conversion, and because God’s mercy brings about conversion, and because
human mercy manifests God’s, that John Paul calls for the use of mercy in punishing.
This does not generate a norm absolutely forbidding the use of capital punishment. Again,
mercy is a component of charity, and the political community must show charity to all of
its members, and this requires protecting those members from the actions of someone
whose past crimes provide evidence of future danger. John Paul therefore says that capital
punishment ought not be used unless such protection of society requires it, not that it
ought never be used. Furthermore, he makes the prudential judgment that such cases of
necessity are “very rare, if not practically non-existent,”119 but he does not claim that they
are necessarily totally nonexistent. His statement earlier in the encyclical, “Modern
society in fact has the means of effectively suppressing crime by rendering criminals
harmless without definitively denying them the chance to reform,”120 seems stronger, but
two points should be kept in mind in interpreting it (in addition to the fact that it is an
empirical/prudential judgment, not a theological one). First, he speaks of “modern
society,” which may not refer to the conditions obtaining in absolutely every place and
situation in today’s world. Second, he makes this statement in the context of his
indication of approval of growing opposition to the death penalty. It is possible that he
would see an essential link between the movement to abolish the death penalty, and the
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movement to continue to create the conditions in which such abolition would not
endanger the public. In any case, John Paul would seem to allow the use of the death
penalty in cases of real necessity, whether these are purely hypothetical or whether they
remain real, if rare, in today’s world. One thinks, for example, of situations that might
arise for a time during war or other types of social breakdown.121
It is possible that—even when there is no real question of threat to public safety
from future crimes by a convicted murderer, so that John Paul would require that society
refrain from the use of capital punishment—this use of mercy will impose some cost on
society. There may be financial cost. In fact, it is often pointed out that a capital case,
through execution, costs more than a case culminating in life imprisonment. Whether
fairness to the defendant/convict requires this,122 and whether this will remain the case for
the foreseeable future, is an open question. But even if the opposite became the case—
even if secure life imprisonment became more expensive than execution, perhaps at least
partly because sufficiently secure imprisonment would require spending more money on
prison construction and guards—the proper theological conclusion would seem to be that
society, together, ought to choose to bear the cost of mercy. Refraining from the use of
capital punishment might also impose emotional costs on some people. Regardless of the
security of the prison system—more specifically, the security of the life-imprisonment
system relative to that of the capital-punishment system (people on trial for their lives and
people already on death row have been known to escape; the relevant question for
121. For more detail regarding the sorts of situations that might meet the criteria,
see Langan, “Situating the Teaching,” 220–21.
122. See, e.g., on the one hand McAdams, “Wisconsin Should Adopt the Death
Penalty,” 707–8; on the other, Dow, Executed on a Technicality.
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criminological or penological study would seem to be not whether life imprisonment
protects absolutely but whether it does so at least as well as capital punishment does)—
some people might understandably, if unnecessarily, worry about threats to public safety.
Loved ones of murder victims might understandably be pained that the killers still live.
Again, in light of John Paul’s teaching, the proper conclusion would be that we as a
society ought to make the decision that we, together and as individuals, will bear these
costs. Society might also choose to spend money to help victims’ loved ones with their
emotional and spiritual distress. Such costs are the costs of merciful and therefore full
regard for human dignity, as the nature and importance of human dignity and of mercy
have been articulated by John Paul II.
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CHAPTER III
MERCY AS INTRINSIC TO THE REALIZATION OF JUSTICE

Justice and the Need for Mercy

John Paul II’s explication of the meaning and value of mercy in itself, as this has
been analyzed in chapter 2, seems to point in the direction of the applications to the issue
of capital punishment that he suggests in Evangelium Vitae and that I have sketched out at
the end of the last chapter. The discussion thus far, however, still leaves open some
possible, and interrelated, questions regarding the state’s obligation to use mercy in
punishing, questions that must be answered in order to complete the theological
explanation of John Paul’s apparently categorical rejection of capital punishment when
not needed for public safety. One question concerns the social, and more specifically
political, applicability of the teaching regarding mercy, and/or its applicability to the case
of punishment. Opinions on the part of those whose theology is sympathetic to or
otherwise close to that of John Paul differ regarding this question. On the one hand, Hans
Urs von Balthasar (writing prior to John Paul’s pontificate) proposes: “The ‘Golden Rule’
... in the mouth of Christ and in the context of the Sermon on the Mount can only be
described as summing up the law.” He develops the point: “In Matthew and (even more
explicitly) in Luke, the ‘Golden Rule’ is situated in the context of the Beatitudes, the
renunciation of retributive justice, the love of one’s enemies, and the command to be
‘perfect’ and ‘merciful’ like the Father in heaven.”1 He thus relates the “law” to God’s
merciful gift and our proportionate response to God through our treatment of other

1. Balthasar, “Nine Propositions,” 85.
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people, and continues: “In Christian terms, no personal or social ethics can be envisaged
apart from God’s effectual and bountiful invitation to man.”2 Balthasar, then, seems to
relate the Beatitudes, as the fulfillment of the moral law, and especially “Blessed are the
merciful ...,” both to the question of retributive justice, that is, punishment, and to social
morality.
Grisez, although he sees capital punishment as immoral even prior to any
consideration of mercy, and hence does not see mercy as particularly relevant to the issue
of capital punishment, nevertheless presents an understanding of mercy that in many ways
draws explicitly from or otherwise echoes John Paul’s (though Grisez places that
understanding within the framework of his own moral theory).3 He frequently relates
mercy to forgiveness, and likewise speaks often of the “social” importance of mercy.
While he does not say explicitly that society itself—as distinguished from individuals or
voluntary associations within society—must be merciful in its actions, he speaks of the
necessity of mercy for Christians in apparently categorical terms—most pointedly, he
says, “Mercy is the justice of Jesus’ kingdom,”4 and repeats multiple times that “mercy is
the justice of the kingdom”5—and he also says that “Christians today can fulfill [the
responsibility to do works of mercy] as they should only by cooperation organized on a
larger scale.” Finally, Weigel’s brief discussion of Dives in Misericordia includes the

2. Balthasar, “Nine Propositions,” 86.
3. See, e.g., Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:213–14, 644–46, 670–71; 2:99, 189,
218–19, 310–13, 360–71, 456–58, 484–85.
4. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:365.
5. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 2:443, 762; 3:345, 878 n. 463.
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recognition: “Mercy also has a corporate or social dimension. ... One path beyond modern
‘unease’ lies in building societies in which justice is opened to love and mercy.”6
On the other hand, however, Weigel’s writings7 frequently propose an
“Augustinian” social ethics, one emphasizing the reality of evil in this world, and the
need for justice and the limits of love/mercy beyond justice as responses to this evil.
Thus, he makes a point of endorsing a denial “that morality is identical with the Sermon
on the Mount,” referring to the Sermon as a statement of “the ethics of personal probity
and interpersonal relationships,” but not of “issues of statecraft.”8 Weigel is especially
concerned with defending “just war,”9 but the objection would presumably apply with
regard to just capital punishment as well, especially in light of his interpretation of and
reservations concerning John Paul’s teaching on capital punishment, noted earlier.
Another question concerns whether, and why, mercy is really the only way of
bringing about conversion, as John Paul seems to suggest in his use of the word “always”:
“Conversion to God always consists in discovering His mercy ... Conversion to God is
always the fruit of the ‘rediscovery’ of the Father, who is rich in mercy.”10 As has also
been noted, Aquinas suggests that facing death is especially likely to bring about
conversion. Furthermore, as an extension of this point, it might be suggested that the
prospect of facing capital punishment might encourage would-be murderers to undergo
6. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 388.
7. Including his biography of John Paul: Weigel, Witness to Hope, 623.
8. Weigel, “Moral Clarity in a Time of War,” 21.
9. See Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis.
10. DM 13; cf. 14.
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conversion prior to the actual act of murder—in other words, might deter. The question of
whether capital punishment does in fact deter crime would seem to be an empirical one,
and is in fact a somewhat complex social-scientific question, one that cannot easily be
assumed settled in favor of the view that there is no deterrent effect.11
Indeed, it might be argued, even if there is no actual conflict between justice and
mercy—even if justice does not demand that which mercy forbids—nevertheless, justice
does allow certain things, like capital punishment for murderers. If it is does not manifest
the fullest possible respect for human dignity, justice at least seems to manifest minimal
respect for human dignity, and furthermore to highlight the evil of crimes like murder,
which manifest no respect for human dignity. Is it then coherent to speak of mercy as
anything but supererogatory? And might justice not provide the lesson in human dignity
most needed by would-be offenders and by convicted offenders alike?12 And would not
the obligation of the political community to protect all its members then allow, or even
require, the use of capital punishment when just; would merciful refraining from its use
not be optional at best, or forbidden at worst?
John Paul’s statement about mercy and conversion does not, however, seem to
leave room for the view that what he is saying is not relevant to the case of punishment by
the state. If protection of the people from future crimes by a particular offender does not
require her execution, then mercy must be shown, since only mercy can bring about
11. The evidence is reviewed and discussed by McAdams, “Wisconsin Should
Adopt the Death Penalty,” 708–15.
12. See e.g. Berns, For Capital Punishment, chaps. 4–5; Weigel, “Evangelium
Vitae on Capital Punishment,” 229, both of whom emphasize this positive lesson (rather
than fear) as a benefit provided by the use of (just) capital punishment; also Long,
“Evangelium Vitae,” 526–31.
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conversion, and since due respect for human dignity requires taking this into account.
Why, however, is conversion “always” the fruit of mercy?
John Paul makes it still clearer that he is insisting on the use of mercy—not only
justice—and by the political community—not only by individuals or groups such as
voluntary associations—when he heads a section of his encyclical with the question, “Is
Justice Enough”? His answer is, in a word, no—mercy is necessary not only for those to
whom it is shown, but also those who show it; attempting to show justice without mercy
leads to something less than justice. He says explicitly that he is referring to, among other
things, the actions of “states” themselves. And he writes that
it would be difficult not to notice that very often programs which start from the
idea of justice and which ought to assist its fulfillment ... in practice suffer from
distortions. Although they continue to appeal to the idea of justice, nevertheless
experience shows that other negative forces have gained the upper hand over
justice, such as spite, hatred and even cruelty. ... Not in vain did Christ challenge
His listeners, faithful to the doctrine of the Old Testament, for their attitude which
was manifested in the words: “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” This was
the form of distortion of justice at that time; and today’s forms continue to be
modeled on it. ... The experience of the past and of our own time demonstrates
that justice alone is not enough, that it can even lead to the negation and
destruction of itself, if that deeper power, which is love, is not allowed to shape
human life in its various dimensions. It has been precisely historical experience
that, among other things, has led to the formulation of the saying: summum ius,
summa iniuria. This statement does not detract from the value of justice and does
not minimize the significance of the order that is based upon it; it only indicates,
under another aspect, the need to draw from the powers of the spirit which
condition the very order of justice, powers which are still more profound.13
One should note John Paul’s apparent rejection here of the view that justice demands a
maximally proportionate punishment for a crime, and hence that mercy is necessarily at
odds with justice. More broadly, there is an echo here of a gloss on the Beatitude

13. DM 12; cf. 14.
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“Blessed are the merciful ...,” recorded by Aquinas: “justice without mercy is cruelty.”14
But why is this true, and is it always true? John Paul’s wording might suggest at first
glance that his point is an empirical and therefore possibly limited one: “it would be
difficult not to notice”; “experience shows”; “The experience of the past and of our own
time”; “historical experience.” However, he goes on to speak also of “that deeper power,
which is love,” and of “powers which are still more profound than justice.” These sound
like statements of moral principle, giving rise in turn to some empirical evidence. How
exactly can they be explained?
One possible answer is that they simply reflect necessary aspects of our fallen
condition. Grisez’s interpretation seems to be along this line. He notes that John Paul
writes later in the encyclical, in connection with similar statements about the need for
mercy along with justice: “A world from which forgiveness was eliminated would be
nothing but a world of cold and unfeeling justice, in the name of which each person
would claim his or her own rights vis-à-vis others; the various kinds of selfishness latent
in man would transform life and human society into a system of oppression of the weak
by the strong, or into an arena of permanent strife between one group and another.”15
Grisez comments: “This is so because in any society, there will be a large body of persons
unwilling to act fairly or in error about what fairness demands; hence, a general balance
can be achieved only if some substantial group of persons is willing to make voluntary
compensation to rectify unfairness.”16
14. Aquinas, Catena Aurea in Matthaeum 5:7.
15. DM 14.
16. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:646.
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It is certainly true that, apart from the fall, there would be no evil, no selfishness,
and hence there would be no need for mercy as a remedy for the effects of selfishness,
others’ and one’s own. It is presumably also true that, apart from the fall, the question of
justice without charity in any form would not arise, since all would live in accordance
with the perfection of charity. But is it the case that the need to rectify the evils brought
about by the fall is the only, or even the deepest, explanation for the need for charity
(including mercy) in order to achieve justice? Grisez’s explanation of John Paul’s broad
statement about justice’s need for mercy solely in terms of his more specific statement
about the reality of selfishness seems to have implications for one’s understanding of the
practical implications of the former. To what extent does John Paul’s statement about
justice’s need for mercy contribute to an understanding of the moral necessity of a
constant will to be merciful when possible? If Grisez’s explanation of John Paul’s
statement is a complete explanation, then the integrity of justice would require that one
will to show mercy at least sometimes, perhaps even often. But it is not clear that the
integrity of justice would then require that each person will to show mercy whenever
possible. For one thing, any given evil might be remedied by someone else’s mercy
instead of one’s own. For another, it is not clear how mercy expressed specifically in the
form of the infliction of a less-than-maximally-just punishment on criminals contributes
to the remediation of the effects of unjust selfishness.

De Lubac as Background for John Paul II’s Moral Thought

For John Paul II, there is in fact a deeper reason to think that, as a matter of
principle, justice requires charity, and, hence, in our fallen world, mercy—specifically, a
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constant will to show mercy, by individuals and by societies, including political society;
and including the sort of mercy that tempers just punishment for criminals. This reason
begins as Dives in Misericordia begins: with the teaching that Christ, by revealing the
Father and the Father’s love, fully reveals us human persons to ourselves. This teaching,
again, is found in Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution. Five years later, Wojty»a singles it
out as “a key point in the Council’s thought.”17 Another six years later, he preaches on it
in his Lenten retreat for Paul VI.18 As we have seen, it then serves as a keynote for both of
John Paul’s first two encyclicals. It must now be added, however, that very similar
wording can be found in theologian Henri de Lubac’s first book, Catholicism, originally
published in 1938: “By revealing the Father and by being revealed by him, Christ
completes the revelation of man to himself.”19 It is necessary to investigate what de Lubac
means by this, in the context of his broader theological anthropology; whether his
position is correct, or at least plausible—more specifically, within the limited scope of
this dissertation, whether brief but effective responses can be made to the most important
recent objections to de Lubac’s reading of Aquinas and understanding of the nature-grace
relationship; whether John Paul II’s thought ought to be interpreted in light of de Lubac’s
thought; and how doing so might help explain John Paul’s understanding of the
relationship between mercy and justice, and his position regarding capital punishment in
particular. We may proceed first to the description of de Lubac’s anthropology and the

17. Wojty»a, Sources of Renewal, 75.
18. Wojty»a, Sign of Contradiction, 101–8, 117–18, 127, 137, 145.
19. Cath., 339.
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interpretation of his statement about Christ’s revelation of human persons to themselves
in this context.
In summary, as will be elaborated, de Lubac holds that human persons have by
our spiritual nature,20 the nature that comes from being in the image of God, a capacity,
and so a (negative, one might say) kind of desire (one that may not know its object, but
that nonetheless precludes complete fulfillment of the person without that object) for—
but not anything that could be considered already an actual beginning of—that graced
supernatural relationship with God that culminates in the beatific vision. De Lubac’s
thought on this point of theological anthropology begins especially with his 1946
Surnaturel and several earlier articles that were incorporated into that book. What does
not seem to be recognized by commentators is that the key aspects of this same
anthropology can already be found in Catholicism. This is perhaps not especially
surprising, since when de Lubac completed Catholicism, he was already long at work on
some of the material that would make up Surnaturel.21 Catholicism is subtitled, in the
original French, les aspects sociaux du dogme. De Lubac argues, in short, that neither
Catholicism properly understood, nor human society of any sort that contributes to the
fulfillment rather than the annihilation of the individual person, is possible without the
other. It would seem then that de Lubac’s focus in his first book is on a different point of
theological anthropology than that concerning the nature-grace relationship. However,
upon close examination of Catholicism, de Lubac’s contentions regarding the essentially

20. For the meaning of “spirit” in de Lubac’s anthropology, see esp. de Lubac,
“Tripartite Anthropology.”
21. Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie, 26 n. 114.
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(for both Church and society) social nature of Catholicism turn out to be grounded in the
understanding of the nature-grace relationship that becomes prominent and developed in
other writings.
De Lubac begins Catholicism with a chapter on the human person as created in
the image of God. He refers to this as the “principle ... on which rests the natural dignity
of man.” Being made in God’s image, then, is part of our human nature. He then speaks
of this imaging as a “mysterious participation in God.”22 What sort of participation? First,
one that enables us to have God—more so than Adam—as the Father of our human
race.23 Second, a participation such that sin, being “infidelity” to the image, constitutes
therefore a “breach with God” (as well as “a disruption of human unity”).24 Later in the
same chapter, de Lubac resumes his analysis of the image of God by speaking of “the
‘new man’ that every Christian must ‘put on’ as he puts on Christ.” De Lubac continues:
“Sufficient attention has not been paid to the fact that mention of this ‘new man’ who is
ever ‘renewed’ is, in the Epistle to the Colossians, coupled with a reference to the unique
Image, ‘the image of him that created him,’ and to ‘Christ ... all, and in all.’”25 Taken
together, these statements seem to indicate that for de Lubac, being—by nature—in the
image of God means having—by nature—the capacity for the (renewing) union with God
through Christ that makes us God’s sons and daughters and that is disrupted by sin. This
would seem to be the graced, supernatural union with God.
22. Cath., 29.
23. Cath., 31.
24. Cath., 33.
25. Cath., 45.
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In his next chapter, on the Church, de Lubac quotes Pascal: “People think that you
can play on a man as you play on an organ. An organ he is in truth, but a strange and fitful
one. He who can play only on an ordinary organ will produce no chords from this one.”
De Lubac comments: “But the Church can play on this organ because, like Christ, she
‘knows what is in man,’ because there is an intimate relationship between the dogma to
which she adheres in all its mystery and human nature, infinitely mysterious in its turn.”26
Human nature is “infinitely mysterious”; it goes, one might say, to depths than can never
be fully plumbed. But Christ, and the Church’s dogma concerning Christ, match these
depths. This statement concerning the correspondence between the Church and human
nature is further elucidated in light of de Lubac’s insistence, later in the chapter on the
Church, on the Church as not simply an organized society, but also, and most deeply, the
sacrament of Christ, the body of Christ, that which communicates a share in the life of
Christ. If there is a correspondence between the Church, thus understood, and the mystery
of human nature, then, it seems, this must be because the mystery of human nature
consists in openness to union with Christ—to the supernatural.
In later chapters of Catholicism, de Lubac takes up the relationship between
human unity in Christ, and the human person understood as more than a mere part of a
larger whole. In his explanation of how unity in Christ, and no other kind of unity,
respects persons, rather than destroying them by making them nothing more than parts, de
Lubac refers again to the basic theological anthropology proposed in his first chapters. He
begins by speaking of the relationship between the social-unitary (one body) and
personalistic aspects of Catholicism as a paradox. He explains however: “This is not the
26. Cath., 49.
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only case in which revelation presents us with two assertions which seem at first
unconnected or even contradictory: ...” Among the series of other such assertions he then
lists is this: “the vision of God is a free gift, and yet the desire of it is at the very root of
every soul.”27
De Lubac argues: “Man no more loses himself or disintegrates by becoming an
integral part of that spiritual Body of which he must be a member than he does by
submitting himself to God and uniting himself with him.”28 That one does not lose
oneself by submitting to union with God, then, functions as the premise in de Lubac’s
argument that one does not lose oneself by entering into union with others in God. What
is the justification for the premise? I suggest that at least part of the justification is what
de Lubac has said in earlier chapters of Catholicism regarding the meaning of the image
of God and regarding the human person as infinitely mysterious, and what he has said just
pages earlier regarding the desire for God in the soul. For de Lubac, if—and only if—
there is a natural capacity for graced supernatural union with God, then accepting this
union does not cause the loss of the person. This supposition is confirmed by de Lubac’s
treatment of what he regards as the intrinsic relationship between nature and finality in
his later work The Mystery of the Supernatural,29 which will be discussed further below.
For de Lubac, to alter a being’s finality is to alter that being’s nature, that is, to cause the
loss of that being.

27. Cath., 327.
28. Cath., 330.
29. MS, chap. 4.
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Shortly after de Lubac’s statement about union with God and with others in God,
he writes the words that are quoted nearly verbatim in Gaudium et Spes: “By revealing
the Father and by being revealed by him, Christ completes the revelation of man to
himself.” In light of what has preceded, it is most sensible to take this as a further
statement about the human person’s natural capacity and desire for that supernatural
union with God that comes through Christ. The revelation of Christ and the Father reveals
us to ourselves because only in light of that revelation do we know that we have this
capacity; only in light of that revelation do we know what alone will fully satisfy our
desire. This seems to be further confirmed by what de Lubac says next: “By ... penetrating
to the very depths of his being Christ makes man go deep down within himself, there to
discover in a flash regions hitherto unsuspected.”30 There are already “regions” deep
within the human person that Christ can enter, but that the person is unaware of until
Christ has made this known to us. In this context, de Lubac resumes the theme of the
image of God, referring to “[t]hat image of God, the image of the Word, which the
incarnate Word restores and gives back to its glory.” As in his chapter 1, de Lubac here
again connects image of God (hence nature) with the (re)union that Christ accomplishes
in us by grace.
De Lubac’s first major work focusing explicitly on the nature-grace relationship is
Surnaturel. As previously noted, the components of this book had been developed by de
Lubac over a period of years. Balthasar writes regarding the book and the controversy that
famously followed its publication: “With Surnaturel ..., a young David comes onto the
field against the Goliath of the modern rationalization and reduction to logic of the
30. Cath., 339.
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Christian mystery. The sling deals a death blow, but the acolytes of the giant seize upon
the champion and reduce him to silence for a long time. Not entirely without justification.
The work, pieced together from many disparate preparatory studies, is not completely
rounded out.”31 De Lubac thought it necessary to prepare “a little book” with further
material on the nature-grace topic. He wrote the article “The Mystery of the
Supernatural,” a “complement” to Surnaturel, as the second part, and planned for the first
part “a series of precise responses ... to the objections made to Surnaturel.” The first part
of the book was never written as such at the time.32 The article “The Mystery of the
Supernatural” was, however, eventually expanded into the book of the same title,
published in 1965 with a companion volume, Augustinianism and Modern Theology,
together enlarging part of Surnaturel, on the history of the nature-grace problem.33 These
volumes together are the key source for de Lubac’s developed theological anthropology.
Several points from these volumes and other writings by de Lubac need explicit
mention in order to fill out what is found in Catholicism and to prepare for some response
to key recent criticisms of de Lubac’s anthropology. First, again, the natural desire for
God of which de Lubac speaks is more a negative than a positive kind of desire. De
Lubac does not hold that the human person knowingly desires graced supernatural union
with God. He holds, rather, that apart from this union, the human person will always
experience the “restless heart” of which Augustine speaks, but often without knowing

31. Balthasar, Theology of Henri de Lubac, 63.
32. ASC, 62.
33. ASC, 123.
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what (or who)—if anything (or anyone)—could provide rest.34 De Lubac comments,
closely echoing what he had written in Catholicism: “By revealing himself to us, Bérulle
used to say, God ‘has revealed us to ourselves.’”35
Second, for de Lubac, the natural desire is not any sort of positive ordering or
movement toward God, or in any other way a beginning of supernatural life. There is an
incommensurability, a disproportion, between nature (with its desire) and grace.36 Hans
Boersma recognizes how emphatic de Lubac is on this point, and quoting de Lubac’s
image of “two floors with no connection between them,” comments: “This is exactly the
sort of construct that de Lubac had been opposing and would continue to oppose
throughout his life.”37 The possible suggestion of an internal contradiction is dubious. De
Lubac’s rejection of the idea of nature as complete on its own terms and of the
supernatural as something merely superadded does not entail a rejection of every possible
sort of use of the two-floor image. Boersma is however entirely correct regarding de
Lubac’s position concerning the very significant limitations of the natural desire.
Third, de Lubac regards Aquinas as a key source for understanding of the naturegrace relationship. De Lubac’s work on this topic was motivated especially by a concern
about whether Aquinas had been accurately represented by commentators.38 His

34. MS, chaps. 7–9, 11.
35. MS, 214.
36. MS, 82–86.
37. Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie, 97 n. 42.
38. See e.g. ASC, 35.
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arguments draw very heavily from Aquinas.39 In particular de Lubac does not fail to
recognize explicitly that Aquinas uses the language of “obediential potency” to refer to
nature’s capacity for grace.40 De Lubac’s point rather is that for Aquinas—unlike, de
Lubac thinks, for some of Aquinas’ commentators—the expression “obediential potency”
applies in this context only in an appropriately qualified sense, and not in such a way as to
suggest that any sort of desire for grace is itself already the work of grace, rather than
something natural.41 Fourth, de Lubac does not deny that we human persons have what
can be called ends that are proportionate to our natural powers. He argues, rather, that
these cannot be correctly regarded as truly final ends for the human person. In the purely
hypothetical case of a human nature not called and ordered by grace to supernatural union
with God culminating in the vision of God, there would remain an unfulfilled if unknown
desire, a “restless heart.” Therefore (and one might say a fortiori) in the real case of a
human nature thus called and ordered, attainment of purely natural ends does not fully
satisfy. De Lubac argues that when Aquinas speaks of a purely natural beatitude, he
consistently has in mind a purely temporal and this-worldly beatitude, not something that
could be considered a final end for the human person.42
Fifth and finally, de Lubac insists that he is not rejecting the category of ‘nature’
in general or of ‘human nature’ in particular, at least as these were, in his reading,
understood by Aquinas, in holding that we have a desire for something disproportionate
39. See AMT and MS, passim.
40. AMT, 201, 203.
41. MS, 139 n. 36, 224–29.
42. De Lubac, “Duplex Hominis Beatitudo.”
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to our own power. He holds instead that for Aquinas, human nature is, as spiritual, a
special case. It is truly a nature, even while open to something wholly transcendent.43 De
Lubac saw the need to reiterate this in one of his last works, even while continuing to
maintain also the natural desire for God as he had always understood it.44

Response to Recent Criticism of de Lubac’s Theological Anthropology

As has been noted, when de Lubac clearly advanced his thesis regarding nature
and grace in Surnaturel, controversy followed. This controversy has not ceased; de Lubac
continues to be criticized from multiple philosophical/theological perspectives. Most
recently, there has been renewed and significant criticism from a neo-Scholastic
perspective, defending against de Lubac either the very reading of Aquinas that was
eventually developed by the Dominican commentatorial tradition—the reading to which
de Lubac was especially responding, the reading that holds that the desire for God is
elicited by grace—or at least a correction of this reading that is much less radical than de
Lubac’s. Some of this criticism has expressed some qualified appreciation for elements of
de Lubac’s anthropology. Henry Donneaud writes that “de Lubac ... has aided the
reinvigoration of a formative principle of Christian, and therefore Thomist, anthropology,
that of a human nature capax Dei, ontologically oriented toward the beatific vision. In this
way ... he has contributed to drawing Thomism closer to its authentic sources,” while also
concluding that “his reading of St. Thomas, reduced to the univocity of this sole thesis,
manifested a partiality not in conformity with the texts and doctrinal balance of St.
43. MS, chaps. 6, 8.
44. De Lubac, Brief Catechesis, 11–20, 24–25, 34–40.
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Thomas.”45 Others are more deeply critical. Long has published a series of essays, and
most recently a monograph incorporating and adding to the last of those essays,
attempting to rehabilitate a more traditional reading of Aquinas on nature-grace.46
Lawrence Feingold’s major contribution has occasioned considerable commentary
(including by Long in his most recent work on the topic).47
De Lubac has also had his implicit or explicit defenders, including recent ones.
Jean-Pierre Torrell’s account of Aquinas on the desire for God is substantially the same
as de Lubac’s: the vision of God is the human person’s only proper fulfillment and final
beatitude; the desire for this vision is natural and indeed innate, even though it is not
explicit in every person.48 Nicholas Healy explicitly summarizes and responds to a
number of recent criticisms, including Feingold’s book and Long’s essay on it.49 Long’s
subsequent monograph in turn includes a lengthy note responding to Healy.50 Because the
most recent works of Long and other critics generally seem intended as glosses on

45. Donneaud, “Surnaturel through the Fine-Tooth Comb,” 57. See also the other
essays in this volume, Bonino, ed., Surnaturel: A Controversy.
46. Beginning apparently with Long, “Obediential Potency”; also, e.g., idem,
“Nicholas Lobkowicz,” 68–72; idem, “Possibility of a Purely Natural End”; idem, “On
the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature”; most recently, idem, Natura Pura.
47. Feingold, Natural Desire. See also, e.g., the several other essays on the naturegrace topic, and occasioned by Feingold’s book, that were published together with Long’s
“Obediential Potency” in the same issue of Nova et Vetera (5, no. 1 [2007]).
48. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2:342–48; cf. idem, “Nature and Grace,” esp.
185.
49. Healy, “de Lubac on Nature and Grace.”
50. Long, Natura Pura, 241–43 n. 64.
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Feingold’s “magisterial” treatment,51 this limited response will focus on several of
Feingold’s key concerns.
Again, although de Lubac sees it as necessary to read Aquinas in the context of his
predecessors and near-contemporaries, and hence draws heavily from writers of the
patristic era and from several others of the scholastic era, he is explicitly concerned
especially with rehabilitating what he sees as the correct reading of Aquinas himself (in
other words, he wants to accomplish a resourcement of the ancient and medieval
tradition, but especially of Aquinas himself, with the resourcement of the patristic sources
partly a means to that end). Feingold, in turn, wishes to show that the commentatorial
tradition that developed after Aquinas did not get Aquinas nearly so wrong as de Lubac
thinks, both because that tradition does not always read Aquinas as de Lubac thought it
did—as seeing in nature nothing more than a mere “non-repugnance” to grace—and
because (again, in Feingold’s view) the (nuanced) reading proposed by many in the
commentatorial tradition is a more accurate reading than de Lubac’s. This brief response
to Feingold will prescind from the question of whether de Lubac has misread the
Dominican commentators, since Feingold still sees a difference between their view,
rightly understood, and de Lubac’s. This response will likewise leave aside the question,
raised by some of the critics, of whether attempting to read Aquinas in abstraction from
that tradition amounts to a “historicism” that is problematic insofar as it fails to join in the
“sapiential” or “speculative” project that Aquinas himself meant to further, and/or to

51. See e.g. Long, Natura Pura, vii, 3, 10, etc.
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recognize the intrinsically normative position of the commentators as those who received
Aquinas’ thought on behalf of the Church.52
A key series of Thomistic texts for de Lubac is the treatment of the end and
felicity of the intellectual creature in the Summa Contra Gentiles III.53 It is here that
Aquinas seems to argue especially clearly and explicitly for a natural desire for the vision
of God. Feingold argues that de Lubac’s reading of these texts misses some important
nuances in them. Feingold begins with III.25, “That to understand God is the end of every
intellectual substance.” He agrees that “[t]he argument based on the natural desire to see
God ... receives ... its most extensive development” in the section of the Summa Contra
Gentiles III that begins with chapter 25. He further prefaces his commentary: “This article
does not yet specify the modality by which God must be known, but simply that
knowledge of God in some form must comprise man’s final end and beatitude.”54 He then
proceeds to examine nos. 11–13 of the chapter, and makes a case that Aquinas is
speaking here of a desire that is natural in the sense that our natural knowledge of
creatures and then our natural recognition that they are effects of a cause leads, again
naturally, to the desire to know that cause. The desire, then, is “elicited” rather than

52. See e.g. Long, “Nicholas Lobkowicz”; White, review of Natural Desire,
465–67; Kromholtz, review of Nouvelle Théologie, 475.
53. See e.g. AMT, 125 n. 98, 187 n. 16, 189 n. 21; MS, 9 n. 43, 56 n. 7, 58 n. 13,
etc.
54. Feingold, Natural Desire, 85.

120
“innate.”55 Feingold argues that the natural desire spoken of by Aquinas in later chapters
is likewise elicited.56
Now, de Lubac expresses both sympathy with and reservations concerning the
development of the “elicited” vs. “innate” distinction to express the sort of natural desire
that we have for God, and generally resists the language of “elicited desire.”57 The
reservations may reflect de Lubac’s understanding of the affirmation of God as essential
to the mind,58 and in turn the influence on de Lubac of such thinkers as Blondel and
Rousselot, whom de Lubac cites quite frequently. 59 Certainly, it is possible that de Lubac
and his more proximate sources misread Aquinas on this point; of course, it is also
possible that, even if they misread Aquinas, they are nonetheless correct about the reality
under consideration. But even if the desire for God is naturally—but not supernaturally—
elicited, this does not seem to require major correction of de Lubac. The elicited natural
desire is nonetheless natural, and it would still correspond to an innate natural capacity.
The distinction between “desire ... as a metaphysical and ontological appetite” (or as an
“ontological[] orient[ation]”) on the one hand, and as a “conscious and deliberate act” on

55. Feingold, Natural Desire, 86, 88, 89, 90.
56. See esp. Feingold, Natural Desire, 92–95, on SCG III.50.5 (to which Feingold
refers as no. 4).
57. E.g., AMT, 124–25.
58. E.g., de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 40–41, 105–8.
59. On Blondel, see also e.g. Bernardi, “Maurice Blondel and the Renewal”;
Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie, 52–62. On Rousselot, McCool, From Unity to Pluralism,
chaps. 2–3; Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie, 67–83.
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the other,60 may also be helpful here (as it will likewise be helpful in another context
below). De Lubac, as has been noted, speaks of the natural desire as sometimes an
unknown desire. An unknown or unconscious ontological desire might be innate, even if
a conscious desire is only elicited.
More important here is Feingold’s claim that Summa Contra Gentiles III.25 “does
not yet specify the modality by which God must be known,” in other words, that it need
not be taken to refer to a desire for supernatural knowledge of God, for the vision of God.
This seems extremely difficult to reconcile with what Aquinas goes on to say in the
chapter:
Now, the ultimate end of man, and of every intellectual substance, is called
felicity or happiness, because this is what every intellectual substance desires as
an ultimate end, and for its owns sake alone. Therefore, the ultimate happiness
and felicity of every intellectual substance is to know God.
And so, it is said in Matthew (5:8), “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they
shall see God”; and in John (17:3): “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee,
the only true God.”61
Here Aquinas seems clearly to be connecting the natural desire for the existence of which
he has argued, with the supernatural vision and knowledge of God, thereby indicating that
he has in mind a natural desire (even if only an elicited one) for this supernatural
knowledge, rather than one that would be fulfilled by a purely natural knowledge of God.
Feingold, however, thinks that there are other Thomistic texts that would
contradict this reading.62 He cites, for example, Summa Theologiae I-II.5.5 sc (“final

60. Donneaud, Surnatural through the Fine Tooth Comb, 55, 57.
61. SCG III.25.14–15.
62. Feingold, Natural Desire, 109–10.
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Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will”), I-II.5.8 and ad 2 (“we
may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which it consists.
And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general
notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it”;
happiness “can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the
operation itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and
thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity”), I-II.10.1 ad 3 (“under good in general
are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined”) I-II.62.3
(the intellect and will “fall short of the order of supernatural happiness”), I-II.114.2
(“everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its
knowledge and desire”). To these texts and the others Feingold cites we might add one
from the Summa Contra Gentiles itself, in which Aquinas argues that grace causes faith
and hope and thereby enables the human person to desire union with God.63
What needs to be recalled is that de Lubac has in mind a desire that, prior to grace,
is present but unknown, not a conscious desire of the will. Again, for de Lubac, the point
is more a negative than a positive one: apart from the vision of God, the human person
would remain somehow unsatisfied, but would not know why. If a conscious willing to be
united with God requires grace in order to exist (as well as, obviously, in order to be
efficacious), this does not necessarily imply that human nature apart from grace would be
truly satisfied. It seems at least plausible to take Aquinas’ arguments for the natural
desire, even if they refer primarily to an explicit (and perhaps naturally elicited rather than
innate) desire of the intellect and will, to be compatible with and even presuppose the
63. SCG III.153.
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existence of the (perhaps innate) unknown (in Donneaud’s terms, ontological) desire of
which de Lubac speaks. This seems in fact a most plausible harmonization of, on the one
hand, the affirmations of the natural desire for supernatural knowledge of God as the
human person’s final end and happiness, especially the very strong affirmation that
“every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance”;64 and, on the other
hand, the statements that created nature cannot of itself consciously will (even
inefficaciously) to obtain this knowledge and that therefore not all persons desire it
specifically.
Feingold denies that this could be the case, but he does so based on an
identification of “desire” with “appetite” or “inclination.” He then points out that any sort
of innate natural appetite for or inclination to the vision of God would be incompatible
with various texts and principles in Aquinas.65 However, first, de Lubac consistently
speaks of “desire.” Feingold points to one passage which he characterizes as follows: “De
Lubac has suggested that St. Thomas indeed affirms a natural inclination or innate
appetite for the vision of God, but not a sufficient appetite”;66 Feingold, again, rejects this
as incoherent. But the passage (which Feingold quotes in a footnote) reads as follows: “If
therefore the desire is truly a ‘natural inclination,’ it is not by that fact a ‘sufficient’ or
‘proportionate’ inclination ...”67 It might be suggested that on the most fair reading of this
text, what de Lubac suggests is not so much that there is a natural inclination, but that “if”
64. SCG III.57.
65. Feingold, Natural Desire, 636.
66. Feingold, Natural Desire, 640.
67. MS, 86.
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there is one, then it is an inclination only in a significantly qualified sense of that term. At
any rate, it is possible that de Lubac uses the term “appetite” in a broader sense than
Aquinas does. And second, Aquinas, for his part, clearly distinguishes among desire,
inclination, and appetite: “the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person
desirous of a thing towards that thing.”68 In other words, one might say, appetite equals
desire plus inclination. Assuming that this is not meant as a tautology, appetite, desire,
and inclination must then be distinct realities. And one can then further assume that it is
possible for there to be desire without inclination or appetite. One cannot, then, point to
problems that Aquinas would see in the notions of natural appetite for or inclination to
God, in order to refute de Lubac’s claim that Aquinas holds that there is a natural desire
for God.
This takes us to what Feingold identifies as “[t]he great difficulty with [de
Lubac’s] position,” namely, reconciling it with the gratuity of grace and the supernatural
order.69 Feingold seems in fact to find several ways in which de Lubac’s understanding
compromises this gratuity. First, he argues that for Aquinas, having a natural “appetite”
for the vision of God would entail being naturally “ordered” to that vision.70 In view of de
Lubac’s strongly consistent use of “desire” rather than “appetite,” and Aquinas’
distinction between the two, as well as de Lubac’s insistence that there is no natural
ordering to the supernatural, this argument seems irrelevant. But Feingold finds another
inconsistency in de Lubac on the question of whether the natural desire is a natural
68. STh I-II.8.1.
69. Feingold, Natural Desire, 26.
70. Feingold, Natural Desire, 641.
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ordering, stemming from de Lubac’s use of the term “finality.” Feingold asserts: “Being
ordered to an end according to one’s nature, and having a finality imprinted on one’s
nature seem to be equivalent notions.”71 He adds: “The term ‘finality’ is not found in St.
Thomas, but it seems that two close equivalents in the terminology of St. Thomas are the
notions of being ‘ordered’ to an end and having a natural inclination or appetite for an
end.”72 He refers to Aquinas’ use of such expressions as “ordained towards an end.”73 But
supposing that every object of an ordering or ordination is an end or finality, it does not
follow that every finality is the object of such an ordering. In particular, the sort of finality
that de Lubac has in mind—an openness, the fulfillment of which would alone fully
satisfy the human person—is not an ordering. Feingold therefore does not substantiate the
equivalence he claims.
Second, Feingold holds that if our nature includes an intrinsic supernatural
finality, then “our nature would itself be in some sense supernatural, in virtue of St.
Thomas’s axiom that everything is ordered to its end in virtue of its form, as well as the
principle invoked by de Lubac that ‘finality is something intrinsic, affecting the depths of
the being.’”74 Here, Feingold again misses the distinction between finality and ordering.
He also seems to miss part of the significance of a Thomistic text that he (implicitly) and

71. Feingold, Natural Desire, 523.
72. Feingold, Natural Desire, 524.
73. STh I.25.2 ad 2.
74. Feingold, Natural Desire, 527–29.
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Long (explicitly) attempt to deploy against de Lubac.75 Aquinas responds to the objection
“that the [human] soul is of the same species as an angel” because “each thing is ordained
to its proper end by the nature of its species,” and the soul and the angel both have the
same end, “eternal happiness.” His response: “This argument [regarding the connection
between end and species] proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness
is the ultimate and supernatural end.”76 We have an end that is proximate (not ultimate,
and hence distinct from anything that could be called eternal happiness) and that is
natural, in the sense that it can be obtained by our natural powers, as well as an end that is
ultimate and supernatural, in the sense that it can only be received as grace. De Lubac
nowhere denies this; as noted above, he affirms it, when read in proper context. Precisely
because we have an end proportionate to our nature—albeit not a fully satisfying nor
therefore an ultimate and eternal one, nor, as de Lubac also insists, one that fully defines
our nature—we have a nature or species that is distinct from the divine nature. Our
natural openness to and desire for a further, supernatural end does not make our nature
supernatural. Put differently, our finality is not to be divine simply, but rather to
participate as human persons (with our proximate end that distinguishes us from the
angels) in the divine nature.
Third and finally, Feingold takes issue with an element of de Lubac’s defense of
the compatibility between his understanding of the natural finality/desire and the gratuity
of the supernatural order, namely, de Lubac’s rejection of the view that God could owe

75. Feingold, Natural Desire, 525–26; Long, Natura Pura, 235 n. 36, 242–43 n.
64.
76. STh I.75.7 ad 1.
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anything to a creature.77 Feingold cites and discusses Aquinas’ treatment of God’s justice
to his creatures, his giving to them what is their due. Feingold summarizes the point that
requires further consideration here: “That which is due to the creature is nothing more
than that the order of God (expressed in the notion of nature and the natural order) be
realized in it.”78 He adds the comment: “For de Lubac, ... the vision of God stands to
human nature in much the same way as those things which St. Thomas says are due to
human nature, since it is spoken of as our ‘essential finality,’ and the desire for it is said
to ‘constitute’ our nature.”79 Is Feingold correct in positing this equivalence? Here are the
relevant words from Aquinas: “It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what
is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve
him.”80 Even if we were naturally ordered to the supernatural, it is not entirely clear that
this would mean that it “is ordered” to us. And if, as de Lubac consistently and cogently
maintains, we are not naturally ordered to the supernatural, despite naturally being open
to and having a kind of desire for it, then it seems far from obvious that the supernatural
is part of “what is ordered to” us, in the way in which having hands or being served by
other animals is ordered to us. De Lubac’s statements about God not being in debt to us
need, I suggest, to be read in the context of de Lubac’s insistence that the natural desire
for the supernatural order is not itself any kind of ordering to or beginning of the
supernatural.
77. E.g., MS, 236–37.
78. Feingold, Natural Desire, 610–11.
79. Feingold, Natural Desire, 613.
80. STh I.21.1 ad 3.
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De Lubac’s Influence on John Paul II

If de Lubac’s statement in Catholicism that Christ reveals us human persons to
ourselves can be taken as a summary of his theological anthropology and especially of his
position regarding the nature-grace relationship, and if this position is a plausible one at
least as a reading of Aquinas (the question of whether Aquinas himself was correct
regarding the human end will be further noted very briefly below), then this position
might potentially be used in turn as part of an explanation of the meaning and theological
plausibility of John Paul’s thought. But when John Paul quotes Vatican II’s near-verbatim
use of de Lubac’s statement, does John Paul mean to be taken as embracing de Lubac’s
anthropology? Consideration of this question can begin by asking in turn whether the
Council’s Pastoral Constitution can reasonably be read in light of de Lubac’s thought.81 In
1960, de Lubac was named a consulter to the Preparatory Theological Commission for
the Council; this work continued until 1962, and de Lubac was then made a peritus.82 In
that capacity, he was involved in developing the schema that became the Pastoral
Constitution. Furthermore, among the bishops with whom de Lubac worked on this
project was Wojty»a. Several authors refer to their presence and work together.83
81. Regarding GS’s history and its theological anthropology, see, in addition to
the other studies cited herein, Alberigo and Komonchak, eds., History of Vatican II, esp.
vols. 1, 4, 5; Erhueh, Vatican II: Image of God; Ladaria, “Humanity in the Light of
Christ”; Rulla, Imoda, and Ridick, “Anthropology of the Christian Vocation”; Kasper,
“The Theological Anthropology of Gaudium et Spes”; MacNeil, A Study of Gaudium et
Spes 19–22.
82. ASC, 116–18.
83. For brief accounts and analyses of Wojty»a’s involvement, including mention
of de Lubac, see Weigel, Witness to Hope, 166–69; Buttiglione, Karol Wojty»a, 193–99.
See also the references in Moeller, “History of the Constitution,” to Wojty»a, at 38, 40,
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De Lubac and John Paul themselves speak of each other in their respective
memoirs on this period. De Lubac writes: “We worked side by side at the time of the
arduous birth of the famous Schema 13, which ... became the Constitution Gaudium et
Spes. ... He knew my works, and we were soon on good terms.”84 Weigel explains that
Wojty»a may have become acquainted with some of de Lubac’s thought while living at
the Belgian College in Rome from 1946–48, and that he also read de Lubac in translation
in two Polish Catholic periodicals in the subsequent years.85 De Lubac continues with a
brief description of their continuing communication as “friends” during the years after the
Council;86 Weigel refers to some moments in this communication.87 John Paul himself, in
one of his long responses to a journalist’s questions that were published as a book, says
regarding his time working on the schema, “I am particularly indebted to Father Yves
Congar and to Father Henri De Lubac. I still remember today the words with which the
latter encouraged me to persevere in the line of thought that I had taken up during the
discussion. ... From that moment on I enjoyed a special friendship with Father De
Lubac.”88 A decade later, he writes similarly: “Another Frenchman with whom I
established a close friendship was the theologian Henri de Lubac, S.J., whom I myself,
years later, made a cardinal. ... When ... I spoke on personalism, Father de Lubac came to
44, 50, 63, and to de Lubac, at 63; and in Ratzinger, “Part I, Chapter 1,” to de Lubac, 145.
84. ASC, 171.
85. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 82, 110.
86. ASC, 171–72.
87. Weigel, Witness to Hope, 143, 173–74, 227, 241, 334.
88. John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, 159.
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me and said, encouragingly: ‘Yes, yes, yes, that’s the way forward,’ and this meant a great
deal to me, as I was still relatively young.”89
De Lubac’s involvement as a peritus, and the intellectual kinship and broader
friendship that quickly developed between him and one of the bishops working on the
same schema, do not constitute conclusive proof that the near-quotation from de Lubac in
the Pastoral Constitution must be understood as an affirmation or incorporation of de
Lubac’s anthropology by the Council. A number of interpreters, however, have read
Gaudium et Spes in light of de Lubac’s thought on the human person. Yves Congar refers
to de Lubac’s theology of nature and grace as a “very important” within “the basis of
what Gaudium et Spes has to say on man’s integral vocation.”90 Rocco Buttiglione thinks
that Wojty»a, at least, among his contributions in the conciliar debate, “takes a position in
favor of the ‘nouvelle theologie.’ In other words, he sets himself against the position
which distinguishes an order of pure nature ... from an order of grace.”91 He adds: “It
seems to me that I can show here a strict analogy between the position of Wojty»a and
that of those postconciliar theologians, particularly Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von
Balthasar, who have developed similarly the theme of the nature-grace relation.”92 Others
disagree, from various perspectives. Grisez does not contest de Lubac’s reading of
Aquinas, but contends that the Pastoral Constitution teaches a very different view of the

89. RLU, 165.
90. Congar, “Part I, Chapter IV,” 212.
91. Buttiglione, Karol Wojty»a, 195.
92. Buttiglione, Karol Wojty»a, 198.
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human end, and that it is correct and Aquinas is wrong. 93 Peter Ryan, from a Grisezan
perspective, and at greater length, pursues the argument against a reading of the Council’s
anthropology in light of de Lubac.94 Robert Gotcher has in turn argued at length in favor
of a reading of Gaudium et Spes in light of de Lubac, including a response to Ryan.95 He
includes a summary of de Lubac’s own commentary on Gaudium et Spes, from the
largely untranslated Athéisme et sens de l'homme: Une double requête de Gaudium et
Spes.96
Still more recently, Guy Mansini has rehearsed some of the arguments against de
Lubac’s anthropology, ending with a discussion of several reasons why de Lubac’s
position nonetheless “remains,” the last of which is Gaudium et Spes 22. Mansini asserts:
“Gaudium et spes does not commit itself to any technical, ontological theses on the
natural desire nor on the relation of nature to grace. The text asserts ... no more than a
narrative unity between nature and grace. ... De Lubac, by contrast, in his theology, makes
the connection metaphysical, ontological.”97 Gotcher’s careful study of the history and
content of the text of the Pastoral Constitution includes a caution along lines similar to
those suggested in Mansini’s reservation: “GS never explicitly confirmed a direct link to

93. See e.g. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:38 n. 29, 809; more recently, idem,
“The True Ultimate End.”
94. Ryan, “Moral Action,” chap. 5.
95. Gotcher, “Henri de Lubac and Communio,” esp. 214–35, and chap. 6.
96. Gotcher, “Henri de Lubac and Communio,” chap. 4. As noted by Gotcher,
chap. 2, sect. 1 had been translated as de Lubac, “Total Meaning of Man”; more recently,
chap. 2, sects. 1–4 have been (re)translated as de Lubac, “Total Meaning of God.”
97. Mansini, “Abiding Significance,” 618.
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de Lubac's theology of the supernatural, limiting itself to an assertion of the de facto
supernatural vocation of man.”98 Gotcher, however, suggests a compatibility between de
Lubac and Gaudium et Spes, rather than a contrast—indeed, a closer compatibility than
between other theological anthropologies and the Council’s. If the history and the text, in
its entirety, with (among other things) its strong and repeated emphasis on the world’s
need for Christ and the Gospel even in order to attain also its natural ends, of the Pastoral
Constitution do not absolutely demand a reading in light of de Lubac’s anthropology, they
nevertheless best support such a reading.
There is still stronger reason to think that John Paul II has interpreted Gaudium et
Spes as incorporating de Lubac’s understanding of the nature-grace relationship. We have
already seen that Wojty»a was involved in the composition of the document, that he was
already familiar with de Lubac’s thought, and that he was working and forming a personal
relationship with de Lubac during the composition of the Pastoral Constitution. It might
now be added that there is some indication that Wojty»a had already, years before the
Council, formed a favorable disposition toward what he knew of de Lubac’s
anthropology. As Weigel notes, Wojty»a pursued his doctorate at the Angelicum in Rome,
with Garrigou-Lagrange as his director. As is well known, Garrigou-Lagrange was among
the foremost neo-Scholastic opponents of de Lubac’s anthropology. Garrigou-Lagrange
denied any sort of innate natural desire for the supernatural,99 and famously wrote that the
“new theology,” explicitly including de Lubac’s Surnaturel, returns to “modernism.”100
98. Gotcher, “Henri de Lubac and Communio,” 260.
99. See e.g. Garrigou-Lagrange, Beatitude, 101–7.
100. Garrigou-Lagrange, “La nouvelle théologie où va-t-elle?”
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Weigel reports: “In his review of the dissertation, Garrigou criticized Wojty»a for not
using the phrase ‘divine object’ of God. One assumes ... that Garrigou did not persuade
Wojty»a of his point. ... [I]n his insistence on not treating God as a divine ‘object,’ even
by way of analogy, Wojty»a was moving beyond the vocabulary, formulas, and
intellectual categories that dominated the Angelicum during his two years there.”
It would seem that this intellectual conflict between Garrigou and Wojty»a mirrors
that between Garrigou and de Lubac. The reluctance to treat God as an “object” may
reflect a conviction that the human person is by nature open to a relationship with God
that, since God does in fact offer the grace of that relationship, can be accepted or
rejected, but before which one cannot stand neutral as before an “object.” We may recall
in this context that Wojty»a would already at this point have been becoming familiar with
de Lubac’s thought, from conversations taking place at the Belgian College, where
Wojty»a was living. Now, Weigel’s “assum[ption] ... that Garrigou did not persuade
Wojty»a” requires some further examination. It turns out that Wojty»a’s dissertation does
use the expression “divine object,” and also the expression “obediential potency.”
However, the manner in which he uses these expressions is noteworthy. He writes: “The
intellect has a certain passive or ‘obediential’ potency in relation to the supernatural, but
it is only through the reception of a supernatural power that the natural cognitive power is
supernaturally activated.”101 Wojty»a’s choice of words here seems careful. He states that
one cannot actually attain the supernatural by one’s natural power. In this sense, one has
an “‘obediential’ potency.” He does not, however, state that the reception of a
supernatural power is also necessary to bring about a desire for the supernatural. He thus
101. Wojty»a, Faith According to St. John of the Cross, 72.
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does not contradict de Lubac’s position, according to which the expression “obediential
potency” is legitimate but must not be taken to exclude the natural desire.
Wojty»a also writes that faith has God as its “object,” and in this context speaks of
“the divine object.”102 Here “object” seems to be used in a restricted sense, as distinct
from “subject.” One might compare Wojty»a’s later words: “For a man is not only the
subject, but can also be the object of an action.”103 Furthermore, Wojty»a adds another
reference to “divine object” in his dissertation that makes this restricted sense clear. He
speaks of “the part of the soul that is orientated to God and is capable of communicating
with divinity as such, to the point of participating in the divine nature and life.
Consequently, as a spiritual faculty the intellect has a capacity for the infinite ... Indeed, it
cannot be satisfied and find rest in anything less than the infinite. Hence its natural desire
for the divine object—to possess the divine essence in an intentional mode.”104 Here, the
use of “divine object” is linked very closely with an affirmation of the natural desire to
know God in his essence. Garrigou-Lagrange may, then, have persuaded Wojty»a to use
the expression “divine object,” but Wojty»a clearly indicates an openness, at minimum, to
de Lubac’s anthropology, and qualifies the expression “divine object” accordingly.
Following the Council, in his 1976 retreat for Paul VI, Wojty»a speaks of “[t]he
tragedy of atheistic humanism—so brilliantly analysed by Père De Lubac,” and footnotes
de Lubac’s book on Gaudium et Spes.105 David Schindler contends that, in his papal
102. Wojty»a, Faith According to St. John of the Cross, 241–42.
103. LR, 24.
104. Wojty»a, Faith According to St. John of the Cross, 242.
105. Wojty»a, Sign of Contradiction,16, 17 n. 3.
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works, John Paul then propounds an interpretation of the Pastoral Constitution in which
“image of God” is understood in accordance with de Lubac’s thought.106 Schindler
proceeds to analyze in further depth a number of John Paul’s writings, including some of
his major writings on issues of socioeconomic morality,107 and also including Evangelium
Vitae,108 as reflecting (among such other influences or interpretive keys as, most notably,
Balthasar) de Lubac’s anthropology. Welch, similarly, argues that a reading of the
Pastoral Constitution in keeping with de Lubac’s thought is advanced by John Paul in
Veritatis Splendor.109
A close look at some especially key passages in Redemptor Hominis and
Evangelium Vitae will help support these claims. John Paul’s first encyclical quotes
Gaudium et Spes 22 at length.110 John Paul’s comments prefacing the quotation include
the following: “In Jesus Christ the visible world which God created for man—the world
that, when sin entered, ‘was subjected to futility’—recovers again its original link with
the divine source of Wisdom and Love.” This supernatural relationship with God that is
restored by Christ is part of God’s “original” plan. And outside of this plan, there is but
“futility.” John Paul’s comments continue: “[T]he Second Vatican Council reached that
most important point of the visible world that is man, by penetrating like Christ the depth
106. Schindler, “Christology and the Imago Dei.”
107. Schindler, Heart of the World, chaps. 2–3.
108. Schindler, “Christological Aesthetics.” For a somewhat different proposal
regarding the importance of de Lubac’s anthropology for Christian moral/social thought,
see Milbank, Theology and Social Theory.
109. Welch, “Synthesis of Veritatis Splendor.”
110. RH 8.
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of human consciousness and by making contact with the inward mystery of man, which in
Biblical and non-Biblical language is expressed by the word ‘heart.’ Christ, the Redeemer
of the world, is the one who penetrated in a unique unrepeatable way into the mystery of
man and entered his ‘heart.’” The quotation from the Council follows immediately. John
Paul refers to “the inward mystery of man,” which seems to echo de Lubac’s reference to
the human person as a mystery that only Christ can enter and reveal. The references to
“heart” seem to suggest that this mystery is an openness within our nature itself.
John Paul proceeds to reflect on the divine love revealed by Christ, and refers to
this love also as mercy, thus setting up the clear connection between this and his next
encyclical, as noted in the previous chapter.111 He then returns to the conciliar text and
quotes it again, more briefly. This time the context is as follows: “Man cannot live
without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is
senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not
experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it. This, as has
already been said, is why Christ the Redeemer ‘fully reveals man to himself.’”112 The
statement that man is simply “incomprehensible” apart from the revelation of and
participation in, specifically, the divine love embodied by Christ and uniting us, through
him, to the Father, is particularly strong. Despite the lack of technical terminology such as
“nature,” when one considers this statement both in itself and in the context of John
Paul’s explicit openness to and appreciation of de Lubac’s thought, it seems likely that it
can reasonably be understood in light of de Lubac’s anthropology.
111. RH 9.
112. RH 10.
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We have already begun, in the previous chapter, to look at the anthropology of
Evangelium Vitae, and specifically at what John Paul says there about human dignity as
reflecting the human person’s openness to share in God’s love through Christ. We may
obtain a fuller and deeper picture of Evangelium Vitae’s anthropology by examining the
section headed “Called ... to be conformed to the image of his Son.”113 In the first two of
the three numbers of this section, John Paul reflects on the Genesis 1 and 2 creation
narratives respectively. Genesis 1, of course, refers to the creation of human persons “in
the image of God.” John Paul comments: “The life which God offers to man is a gift by
which God shares something of himself with his creature.” He refers to “this particular
bond between man and God.” This concerns our “spiritual faculties,” and not only insofar
as they can attain truth by their own natural powers. The human person is (quoting
Gaudium et Spes 12 on “image of God”) “capable of knowing and loving his creator.”
And the person is made for “much more than mere existence in time”; life “is a drive
towards fullness of life; it is the seed of an existence which transcends the very limits of
time”; the person is made for “eternity.”114 John Paul, then, interprets “image of God” as
having to do with a bond whereby God gives something of himself to us, bringing about
knowledge and love of him in eternity. He offers a similar interpretation elsewhere as
well, in which “image of God” is linked with “covenant” and with “unique, exclusive,
and unrepeatable relationship with God himself.”115 It is not absolutely impossible that
the text could be read as referring here simply to naturally obtainable knowledge and love
113. EV 34–36.
114. EV 34.
115. TOB, 151.
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of God, beginning here and continuing after bodily death. But the references to “gift” and
“bond,” and to “fullness” in “eternity” (compare, for example, the references to “eternal
life” in what John Paul explicitly terms “supernatural” relationship with God in the
opening sections of the encyclical)116 seem to make this reading unlikely. What we have
seen concerning John Paul’s appreciation of de Lubac’s thought seem to add to this sense
that it is more likely that John Paul is relating “image of God” to natural desire for God.
With regard to Genesis 2, John Paul focuses on the metaphor of “a divine breath
which is breathed into man so that he may come to life.” He comments (seemingly using
“imprint” to relate this passage to the one about the “image”): “The divine origin of this
spirit of life explains the perennial dissatisfaction which man feels throughout his days on
earth. Because he is made by God and bears within himself an indelible imprint of God,
man is naturally drawn to God. When he heeds the deepest yearnings of the heart, every
man must make his own the words of truth expressed by Saint Augustine: ‘You have
made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.’”117 Again,
it seems most likely that the combination of “man is naturally drawn to God” and the
famous words of Augustine—which are important to de Lubac also—indicate that John
Paul has in mind here a natural desire for a supernatural relationship with God. Here, too,
we may find a similar text elsewhere in John Paul’s corpus, in which Augustine’s
“restless heart” language is used to reconcile the proposition that human persons exist for
their own sake, and the view that they are made to share in God’s life.118 This is exactly
116. EV 1, 2.
117. EV 35.
118. John Paul II, Letter to Families 9.
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de Lubac’s point also regarding the importance of the natural desire as making union with
God something that fulfills rather than destroying us.
John Paul turns in the final number of this section of the encyclical to the
historical reality of sin and redemption. He says that in sin, the human being “deforms the
image of God in his own person,” and adds: “In the life of man, God’s image shines forth
anew and is again revealed in all its fullness at the coming of the Son of God in human
flesh. ‘Christ is the image of the invisible God’ (Col 1:15) ... He is the perfect image of
the Father.”119 John Paul’s use of the Colossians reference to Christ as image of God
echoes Gaudium et Spes 22, but his connecting of the Genesis and Colossians references
to image of God is also very much reminiscent of de Lubac’s similar argument in
Catholicism, part of the basis for his understanding of our creation in the image of God as
conferring upon us a natural openness to and desire for a supernatural relationship with
God through Christ.

De Lubac’s Anthropology and John Paul’s Ethics of Capital Punishment

I suggest, then, that the weight of the evidence points toward the conclusion that
John Paul’s anthropology can most reasonably be interpreted in light of de Lubac’s.
What, however, does this have to do with the explication of John Paul’s contentions that
mercy is necessary to bring about the conversion of the sinner, and that attempting to
show justice without mercy will result in something less than justice? The answer may
first be stated in summary form. If nothing less than a graced supernatural relationship
with God, culminating in the vision of God, will fully satisfy the human person, then any
119. EV 36.
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attempt to live in other than real openness to that relationship will not fully satisfy, and
the “restless” person will not adequately appreciate the value of whatever good she was,
at first, still willing to do. But real openness to accepting and living out that supernatural
relationship entails the practice of charity, which in turn includes mercy. Therefore,
attempting to live justly but not mercifully entails attempting to live in other than such
openness. Therefore, even justice will not seem adequately comprehensible, meaningful,
and valuable. Therefore, the person is likely, eventually, to discard justice in favor of
mere self-gratification in its various forms.
This need for the practice of supernatural love is in fact suggested by de Lubac
himself and in turn by John Paul in various places. As has already been noted, de Lubac’s
Catholicism concerns the relationship between Catholicism—the relationship with God
through Christ that we have, according to de Lubac’s understanding, in the Church—and
human society. In various places in the book, de Lubac links our openness to a
supernatural relationship with God, with our openness to relationships with other people
as part of that relationship with God.120 So, for instance, when de Lubac writes, “By
revealing the Father and by being revealed by him, Christ completes the revelation of man
to himself,” he does so in the context of an explanation that part of what is revealed to us
is our openness to a relationship with others: “The whole human race can find room in
[one’s] heart” (quoting Bonnet). And this relationship is one of “service.”121 De Lubac
goes on to argue that the only way in which real and lasting human unity, with

120. Rourke, “The Death Penalty,” points especially to this aspect of de Lubac’s
thought in suggesting an interpretation of Evangelium Vitae similar to mine.
121. Cath., 340.
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relationships of service, can be brought about, is in Christ. Any attempt to bring about
unity in any other way will fail altogether; either the attempt at unification will “dissolve”
and destroy the person (de Lubac refers to totalitarian ideologies), or individuals will live
simply for themselves.122 In Mystery of the Supernatural, de Lubac explicitly refers to the
desire for God as the desire to enter into love.123
The Pastoral Constitution’s partial rephrasing of de Lubac develops this point.
Where de Lubac spoke of Christ’s revealing of the Father and being revealed by him,
Gaudium et Spes speaks of Christ’s revelation of the Father and of the Father’s love. The
Council thus adds an explicit reference to divine love. The supernatural relationship with
God that alone makes human persons fully known to themselves is a relationship of both
knowledge and love. John Paul’s focus on love in Redemptor Hominis, and then on mercy
in Dives in Misericordia, further develops this point. His later papal writings on moral
(and often social) issues, including and especially Evangelium Vitae, in turn pick up this
point. Evangelium Vitae frames its treatment of such particular moral issues as abortion,
euthanasia, and capital punishment within an analysis of what has gone wrong in a
“culture of death,”124 and of what needs to be put in its place. For John Paul, the opposite
of a culture of death is sometimes termed simply a “culture of life,”125 but he uses other
expressions also as synonyms. These include “civilization of truth and love,”126
122. Cath., 353–61.
123. MS, chap. 12.
124. EV 12, 19, 21, 24, 26, 28, 50, 64, 87, 95, 100.
125. EV passim.
126. EV 6, 105.
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“civilization of love and life” or “of life and love,”127 “culture of life and love,”128 and
“culture of love and solidarity.”129 Other references in the encyclical to “love” for the
human person and human life are very frequent and numerous.
What kind of love does John Paul have in mind? We may begin to see the answer
when we examine his treatment of what he considers the roots of the culture of death. He
begins the first chapter of the encyclical with the reflection on the story of Cain and Abel
that has been previously mentioned. When John Paul comments on Cain’s killing of
Abel, he highlights and interprets one element of the story as follows: “God ... does not
interrupt his dialogue with Cain. He admonishes him ... Envy and anger have the upper
hand over the Lord’s warning.”130 John Paul thus suggests that God is, so to speak,
reaching out to Cain, continuing to offer a relationship of “dialogue” with himself. Cain,
in turning to his brother and killing him, is in this very same action turning away from
this offer by God of a relationship with himself. The love that is rejected at the beginning
of a culture of death, the love that may need to be restored in order to build something
other than a culture of death, is perhaps the supernatural love with which God speaks to
us and offers us a relationship with himself. John Paul mentions Cain again when he is
discussing “the heart of the tragedy being experienced by modern man: the eclipse of the
sense of God and of man.” Here John Paul refers to God as “Creator,” but not only as
Creator. He tells us that Cain is able to confess his fault only “because he is conscious of
127. EV 27, 100.
128. EV 100.
129. EV 101.
130. EV 8.
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being in the presence of God and before God’s just judgment,” and because the result of
that judgment is that he will now “have to ‘hide his face’ from God.131 This seems to
indicate again that the evil of what Cain has done only comes fully to light when
considered in connection with God’s offer of a relationship with himself in which we are
in his presence and see his face.
There are also positive indications in Evangelium Vitae that John Paul thinks that
the only alternative to a culture of death is a culture of supernatural love. We have noted
in the previous chapter, in the discussion of Evangelium Vitae on human dignity, John
Paul’s reference to Christ’s gift to us of a “new heart” able to love as he loves. What must
now be added is that the context for this reference is John Paul’s caution that “it is so
hard to remain faithful to the commandment ‘You shall not kill’ when the other ‘words of
life’ (cf. Acts 7:38) with which this commandment is bound up are not observed.
Detached from this wider framework, the commandment is destined to become nothing
more than an obligation imposed from without, and very soon we begin to look for its
limits and try to find mitigating factors and exceptions.” Is John Paul referring simply or
primarily to the remainder of the Decalogue? He clarifies: “Only when people are open to
the fullness of the truth about God, man, and history will the words ‘You shall not kill’
shine forth once more as a good for man in himself and in his relations with others.”132
Undoubtedly, for John Paul this “fullness of the truth” includes the truth revealed by
Christ about our call to supernatural life and love, of which John Paul then goes on to
speak. All of this, in turn, is the context for John Paul’s call for mercy as an essential
131. EV 21.
132. EV 48.
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aspect of charity. John Paul makes a point in Evangelium Vitae of mentioning that
Christ’s love “implores mercy.”133 This in turn includes mercy when possible for those
who have committed such crimes as murder—when such mercy is consistent with the
protection of society from future additional crimes by the murderer.
John Paul’s anthropological principles and their moral implications explain not
only why people as individuals and as society will fail even to be just unless they have a
constant will to be merciful as possible (and therefore unless they are in fact merciful as
possible), but also why mercy “always” needs to be experienced in order to bring about
conversion. Conversion is the choice to cease doing evil and instead to do good. This
choice presupposes apprehension of the value of doing good. This, in turn, presupposes
seeing moral goodness as an element of the supernatural relationship with God that alone
fully satisfies the human person. This, in turn, presupposes being aware of the real offer
of such a relationship. This awareness is brought about by the experience of God’s lovemercy. Now, it is true that mercy can take other forms besides the partial mitigation of
just punishment. One might perhaps experience God’s mercy as part of God’s direct
movement of the human spirit. One might experience that mercy through other kinds of
actions by other people. But it would be, one might say, presumptuous for those who
determine punishments to assume that criminals will be provided with these other kinds
of experiences of mercy. Therefore, both so that they themselves will remain fully in the
relationship with God that alone fully satisfies and coheres, and so that they will be fully
respecting the dignity of others by acting in a way that takes into account the continued

133. EV 25.
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openness of those others to conversion and renewal, those who determine punishments
must, as possible, act mercifully.134
This theological-anthropological explanation of the need for mercy can, finally, be
briefly restated in another way, one that begins with reference to human freedom.
Balthasar summarizes the point. The human person is free. Christianity especially makes
known to us God’s call to a share in his own infinite freedom.135 If morality ceases to be
fully Christian, specifically by our seeing the requirements of purely finite nature as its
only starting point and refusing to practice a self-giving love that goes beyond these, then
the eventual result is Nietzsche.136 Why so? Because it is only by allowing God’s
supernatural self-gift to be the starting point for morality that we in turn allow morality to
be something that is as much as possible freeing rather than enslaving and thus
destructive.
The question of why freedom should be seen as compatible with the concern for
others that morality is generally taken to dictate seems to be a reasonable one. It has at
any rate remained an unavoidable one at least since Nietzsche,137 who may in turn have
been building upon developments that had been taking place over a period of centuries.138
134. See also Portier, “Are We Really Serious,” who argues that John Paul’s
acceptance of de Lubac’s anthropology is similarly at work in his teachings regarding the
limits of morally acceptable use of military force.
135. For summary of Balthasar on obedience and freedom—divine (Trinitarian)
and human—see Steck, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 39–43, and chap. 3.
136. Balthasar, “Nine Propositions,” 101–2.
137. See e.g. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Preface, nos. 3, 5–6; I, nos. 7–10,
13. For de Lubac on Nietzsche, see The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 42–129.
138. See Pinckaers, “Sources of Christian Ethics,” 327–456.
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John Paul has consistently criticized the view that morality and freedom, each rightly
understood, are at odds with each other.139 How is his position, that freedom and morality
are harmonious, to be defended? One possible defense points out that to act morally is to
rise above passions and other impulses.140 If this is the only answer, however, it might be
accused of begging the question of why one is less free when one really chooses to act in
accord with those impulses, especially those that might be regarded by an ancient pagan
or a Nietzsche as noble. Another defense would make reference to Aquinas’ argument
that our moral reasoning is a participation in God’s reason; in this way, morality brings
about union with God, who is also the source of all freedom.141 But, it might be asked in
response, what sort of union is this submission of our reason to God’s? Is it one that,
precisely as submission, even when in some sense freely chosen, actually destroys us and
our freedom? De Lubac seems to suggest that this was also a concern for Nietzsche; it is,
according to de Lubac, not so much that Nietzsche did not recognize the intelligibility of
the world, including forms and ends, and therefore disbelieved in God, as that he saw
God’s creation of these realities as enslaving, and therefore willed the death of God and
with him of these realities.142
A final possibility, the one suggested by de Lubac, is that God offers us a graced
supernatural union with himself that corresponds to an openness and desire in our nature.
This is a union that, more obviously than any other kind of union with God, completes
139. E.g., LR, 115–17, 135–36; VS 17–18, 31–53, 84–87; EV 18–20.
140. VS 42.
141. STh I-II.91.2 and ad 3; VS 38–41.
142. De Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 62–63.
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rather than destroying us. As it is more authentically interior, it is more attractive as well
as more demanding. 143 John Paul also suggests that it is in light of this desire and offer
that freedom and morality are most obviously reconciled. Thus, he speaks of Christ’s
invitation to “follow me,” and comments: “This is not a matter only of disposing oneself
to hear a teaching and obediently accepting a commandment. More radically, it involves
holding fast to the very person of Jesus, partaking of his life and his destiny, sharing in
his free and loving obedience to the will of the Father. ... And ... thus to imitate the Son,
‘the image of the invisible God’ (Col 1:15), means to imitate the Father.”144 Likewise:
“The Crucified Christ ... calls his disciples to share in his freedom.”145 Likewise, in
Evangelium Vitae: the law of love that comes with the gift of a new heart, the gift that
restores the relationship with God which we desired from the beginning, is “the law of
freedom.”146 This law of freedom/charity, including mercy, is, according to John Paul, the
law that must be followed by society and modeled to those in need of conversion in order
to build something other than a culture of death.
None of this means that natural-law reasoning is in the end invalid as a way of
deriving moral norms. Nor is this to deny that acting virtuously, that is, according to
reason, is, precisely as such, humanly fulfilling. The point, rather, is that what our
unaided reason can grasp about moral or other truths is not perfectly fulfilling; it does not
have the character of a truly final end. Natural-law reasoning needs to be done in the
143. De Lubac, “A Meditation on the Principle of the Moral Life,” 419–20.
144. VS 19.
145. VS 85.
146. EV 49.
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context of a recognition of the law of supernatural love and as a way of trying to
understand some of the requirements of that love. But there may be requirements of that
law that go beyond what reason alone can make fully known, while not contradicting
reason. I am suggesting that the need for mercy, and consequent rejection of capital
punishment when not necessary, is an example of such a requirement.
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CHAPTER IV
MERCY, FAITH AND REASON, AND POLITICS

Catholic Social Teaching and Evangelization

We have seen that John Paul both analyzes the nature and importance of mercy in
light of Christian revelation as a participation in the supernatural love of God, and calls
for the exercise of mercy by the political community. This, then, raises the question of
whether John Paul is calling upon the political community to act in accordance with a
norm that, while not contradicting reason, is nevertheless not knowable by reason alone,
but only with the help of revelation. The point is not that the political community might
be asked to enforce the Christian faith on its individual members; the point, rather, is that
it might be asked to act together in a distinctively Christian way. But this seems like an
urgent question regarding the nature and content of Catholic teaching about the political
community. This concluding chapter will suggest that in John Paul’s plausible
understanding, mercy is something to the value of which unaided moral reasoning can
point, even though revelation is necessary for a full grasp of the meaning and necessity of
mercy.
It is clear that John Paul repeatedly and insistently called for the evangelization of
persons and of societies. He is perhaps especially well known for his call for a “new
evangelization” as a response to dechristianization, as well as evangelization of those
who have never been Christian and continued pastoral care of those who are already
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evangelized and are living as faithful Christians.1 I suggest that John Paul’s use of the title
Evangelium Vitae for his encyclical on respect for human life needs to be understood in
this context. The distinctively theological message of the encyclical regarding the human
person and morality, including but by no means limited to the call for mercy, is a message
that can only be proclaimed as part of a broader program of evangelization. John Paul
begins Evangelium Vitae with references to Jesus as revealing the meaning and value of
life, as noted previously. 2 The encyclical’s final chapter, on building a culture of life, is
organized around a threefold call to “proclaim,” “celebrate,” and “serve” the Gospel of
life. When John Paul treats the theme of “proclaiming the Gospel of life,” he begins by
emphasizing the necessity of “proclaim[ing] Jesus.” He adds that making known the
Gospel of life “involves above all proclaiming the core of this Gospel. It is the
proclamation of a living God who is close to us, who calls us to profound communion
with himself and awakens in us the certain hope of eternal life. ... It is the proclamation
that Jesus has a unique relationship with every person.” This seems to be the sort of
proclamation that is taking place in the encyclical itself, from its first sections. It is only
then that he adds: “It also involves making clear all the consequences of this Gospel” for
morality. He speaks of this evangelization as something that must take place in catechesis
and preaching, among other contexts.3

1. See esp. John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio; also, e.g., idem, Ecclesia in
America, chap. 6; idem, Novo Millennio Ineunte 40–41. For discussion, see Schindler,
“Reorienting the Church.”
2. EV 1–2.
3. EV 80–82.
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This is not the only text in which John Paul suggests a close relationship between
Christian evangelization and moral teaching, including teaching regarding social
morality. In the concluding chapter of one of his major documents on socioeconomic
morality, John Paul states that “the Church’s social teaching is itself a valid instrument of
evangelization.” All authentic moral truths are in some sense part of the Gospel, of
course, and hence teaching them contributes to the teaching of the Gospel. But John Paul
means more than this; he draws his conclusion regarding social teaching and
evangelization from the premise that “a person’s true identity is only revealed to him
through faith, and it is precisely from faith that the Church’s social teaching begins.
While drawing upon all the contributions made by the sciences and philosophy, her social
teaching is aimed at helping everyone on the path of salvation.” And after the statement
regarding social teaching and evangelization, he continues: “As such, [Catholic social
teaching] proclaims God and his mystery of salvation in Christ to every human being, and
for that very reason reveals man to himself. In this light, and only in this light, does it
concern itself with everything else.”4 He adds further: “The Church receives ‘the meaning
of the person’ from Divine Revelation.”5
One finds a similar message in John Paul’s encyclical on issues in fundamental
moral theology. The middle chapter of Veritatis Splendor, which deals in detail with
contemporary technical controversies, is framed by chapters focusing constantly and
explicitly on Christ. John Paul teaches that evangelization involves moral teaching, not
only because the Gospel is incomplete without morality, but also because morality is
4. CA 54.
5. CA 55.
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incomplete and obscure without the Gospel.6 He seems to have in mind social and even
“political,” as well as individual, morality.7 None of this should seem altogether
surprising in light of my explanation in chapter 3 of John Paul’s understanding of the
human person and morality. But it again raises the question of whether the political
community is, as such, to be expected to act on the basis of distinctively Christian moral
norms.

Catholic Social Teaching and Human Moral Reasoning

John Paul does seem to hold that the full meaning and importance of the moral
norms that can be developed by natural-law moral reasoning, such as the injustice and
hence intrinsic evil of intentional killing of innocent human persons, cannot be
appreciated except in the light of Christ’s revelation of human persons to themselves, and
that, therefore, moral teaching must be accompanied by evangelization. Thus there is a
necessary and intrinsic link between Catholic social (and other moral) teaching and the
call for Christian evangelization of peoples. He does, further, seem to hold that there are
some specific moral norms, such as the need for mercy, that are made fully known only
by Christ, but that must be lived in order to accept that union with Christ that gives
meaning to morality as a whole.8 But he does not necessarily hold that reason can do
6. VS 106–7.
7. VS 98–99.
8. On the broad question of what Christianity might contribute to morality, see the
essays in Curran and McCormick, eds., The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics. For
further review of the question and another proposed answer, see Melina, “Christ and the
Dynamism of Action.” For considerable further development, see idem, Sharing in
Christ’s Virtues and The Epiphany of Love.
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nothing whatsoever to point us in the direction of a recognition of these latter norms, even
if reason cannot make it fully known that they are essential (rather than good but
supererogatory), or make us aware of their full significance for human flourishing.
John Paul has defended at length the validity and importance of natural-law moral
reasoning.9 He has appealed briefly to such reasoning in Evangelium Vitae when stating
moral norms against the intentional killing of the innocent in general and against abortion
and euthanasia in particular.10 More broadly, at the beginning of John Paul’s second
chapter, on “The Christian message concerning life,” after he writes, “In Christ, the
Gospel of life is definitely proclaimed and fully given,” he adds: “This is the Gospel
which, ... indeed written in the heart of every man and woman, has echoed in every
conscience ‘from the beginning,’ from the time of creation itself, in such a way that ... it
can also be known in its essential traits by human reason.”11 He does not say whether or
not these “essential traits” include the call to a love that goes beyond justice for the
innocent and that includes mercy for the guilty. But the possibility that they do include
this call needs to be explored.
John Paul offers what may be a hint that they do when he calls the movement
against capital punishment a sign of hope.12 Many of those who are involved in this
movement obviously do have a distinctively Judeo-Christian motivation for their
opposition to capital punishment, but not all of them do. Although the point cannot be
9. VS 42–53.
10. EV 57, 62, 65.
11. EV 29.
12. EV 27.
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demonstrated conclusively, it would seem at least somewhat likely that if John Paul
commends this movement, he does so not only because he thinks that its practical
conclusion, that the death penalty ought not be used, happens to be correct, but also
because he thinks that its members are in a position to have in some measure, even if only
a partial one, a grasp of the truth about the human person that underlies this conclusion.
But he is also surely aware that some of these members lack a distinctively JudeoChristian faith perspective. It would seem perhaps to follow that John Paul thinks that
even those who are operating without the help of this faith, who are operating solely with
unaided human reason, are nevertheless able to grasp some of the truth about why the
death penalty ought to be rejected when not strictly necessary to protect against further
crimes by the convict.
One might also consider the possible place that John Paul’s successor, Pope
Benedict XVI, might occupy as an authentic interpreter of Catholic social teaching and of
John Paul’s in particular. Benedict has made some explicit statements about the
respective roles of reason and faith in Catholic moral and social teaching. Already in his
pre-papal thought, he mentions the needs for the “basic insights of human reason”
concerning morality to be “purified, deepened and broadened through contact with the
way of faith.”13 As pope, referring more specifically to political morality, he writes: “The
State must ... face the ... question: what is justice? The problem is one of practical reason;
but if reason is to be exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification, since it can
never be completely free of the danger of a certain ethical blindness caused by the
dazzling effect of power and special interests.” Does this mean, however, that moral
13. Ratzinger, “The Church’s Teaching Authority,” 72.
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norms that reason cannot in principle derive should govern the action of the political
community?
Benedict clarifies as he adds: “Here politics and faith meet. Faith ... is ... a
purifying force for reason itself. ... This is where Catholic social doctrine has its place: it
has no intention of giving the Church power over the State. Even less is it an attempt to
impose on those who do not share the faith ways of thinking and modes of conduct proper
to faith. Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to the
acknowledgment and attainment of what is just.” And finally: “The Church’s social
teaching argues on the basis of reason and natural law, namely, on the basis of what is in
accord with the nature of every human being.”14 He repeats the point, referring to “the
world of politics” as “the sphere of the autonomous use of reason,” albeit a sphere that
needs to be open to faith’s help in “the purification of reason.” He does say, still further,
that “it still remains true that charity must animate the entire lives of the lay faithful and
therefore also their political activity, lived as ‘social charity,’”15 but this needs to be read
in the context of his statements just prior about faith (the beginning of charity) as helping
the political community in the attainment of justice, and justice as discerned by
autonomous reason once it has been purified with the help of faith. It would seem, then,
that despite his sense of the de facto importance of faith for moral reasoning in a fallen
world, Benedict is teaching that, at least as far as moral reasoning in the political context
is concerned, such reasoning is, considered in itself, autonomous human reasoning. He is

14. DCE 28.
15. DCE 29.
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teaching that the Church does not call upon the political community to act in accordance
with moral norms that human reason cannot, at least in principle, demonstrate.
Benedict’s thoughts in a later encyclical are similar: “Reason always stands in
need of being purified by faith: this also holds true for political reason, which must not
consider itself omnipotent.”16 Again, it seems that Benedict’s view is that Catholic social
teaching does not add to the content of morality, as this can be known by reason, but
rather brings faith to bear on reason so as to purify it. If he is correct about the role of
faith in Catholic social teaching, and in particular if what he says is applicable to John
Paul’s teaching on capital punishment in particular, then we have reason to expect to find
some basis in human moral reasoning for what John Paul seems to present primarily as a
conclusion from Christian faith regarding the person and mission of Christ.

The Need for Love: Moral Reasoning in a Fallen World

I would like to attempt to outline how natural-law reasoning might point toward
the goodness of at least some kind of generous love that goes beyond the minimal
requirements of justice, and therefore perhaps even to the goodness of mercy. I think that
this can in fact be done in at least two converging ways. The first of these ways refers
again to the point that Grisez makes, as noted in the previous chapter, in his interpretation
of John Paul’s statement in Dives in Misericordia that attempting to have justice without
mercy leads to something less than justice.17 Grisez, again, appeals to a passage later in

16. CV 56.
17. DM 12.
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the encyclical,18 and notes that in a fallen world, any given person will often fail to render
to another what justice requires.19 The only way in which the other will then receive her
just due is if a third person, who does not owe the second a debt of strict justice, will
nevertheless generously provide her with what the first person failed to provide.
This argument is in fact echoed by Benedict XVI in his papal writings on love. He
writes in his encyclical on God and love: “There will always be suffering which cries out
for consolation and help. There will always be loneliness. There will always be situations
of material need where help in the form of concrete love of neighbour is indispensable.” It
would seem that many of these are situations resulting at least remotely from various
kinds of injustice. But, he proposes, they are situations that can only be remedied by
love.20 One argument for generous love, drawing from Grisez, John Paul, and Benedict, is
then as follows. Reason tells us that in order to live in accordance with our own human
dignity, we must respect the dignity of others by showing them justice. But we observe
that people do not always do this; there are situations of injustice created by others that,
de facto, will be remedied only by our own efforts to practice a generous love that goes
beyond justice. Therefore, since the establishment of justice itself requires the practice of
generous love, generous love is a moral requirement.
This would seem to be a form of natural-law argumentation that Aquinas would
recognize as valid. One might compare what he says in the article “Whether the natural

18. DM 14.
19. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, 1:646.
20. DCE 28.
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law is the same in all men?”21 He distinguishes there between general principles and
proper conclusions of practical reason, and he holds that the latter may vary in some
cases. He gives as an example the principle that we must act according to reason, and the
conclusion “that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner.” He says
that “this [conclusion] is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular
case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust.”
He adds that “the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways
in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not restore.” In other
words, when natural-law reasoning is considering how we ought to act in particular cases,
it needs to take account of the relevant details of those cases, including such details as
exist only because we are fallen (as in the case in which “goods held in trust ... are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one’s country”). I suggest that to argue that the
concrete situations that arise in a fallen world need to be taken into account when
considering whether we sometimes need to do more than strict justice alone would
require, is to make an analogous type of argument.
As I indicated when considering Grisez’s reading of Dives in Misericordia,
however, I think that this argument, though valid, is somewhat limited in what it can
show regarding the need for love/mercy (and hence not a complete exegesis of John
Paul’s statement regarding that need). It shows that there are cases in which, in fact,
“someone” will need to go beyond justice in order for justice to be done; it does not
necessarily suffice as a strict demonstration of “my” need to be that “someone” in any
particular case, as long as there is the possibility that “someone else” will attend to the
21. STh I-II.94.4.
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need. Nor does it seem to show why one must go beyond justice in dealing with someone
else who has already received all that is due her as a matter of justice, as seems to be the
case in the proposal that mercy be taken into account to reduce a punishment that is in
keeping with justice. Perhaps the argument could be strengthened somewhat, at least with
regard to the first of these limitations (the “Why me?” problem), by adding the following
further considerations. It will be more likely that someone will attend to needs for love
beyond justice, if a number of people exist who have the disposition to practice such love.
But this would seem to be the sort of disposition that is developed by practice and that
diminishes in the absence of continued practice.22 Therefore, it is important that at least
some people practice such love whenever possible, even in cases in which their failure to
do so might perhaps be made up for by others. Only in this way will there likely be
enough people disposed to practice such love so that it will in fact be practiced by
someone when necessary. Furthermore, there could arise some cases in which I am the
only one available to help someone in need of love. In order for me to be so disposed as
to be ready to help in such cases, I myself need to practice love even when someone else
might be available to do so.
This sort of reasoning might also help respond to the other limit of the Grisez
argument, namely, that the argument does not seem to demonstrate conclusively that one
needs to show love beyond justice in cases in which justice is being done. This sort of
love beyond justice may not be simply identical to the sort that is practiced to remedy a
situation of injustice. But there does seem to be an analogy between the two cases; they
are not simply different. If we practice love beyond justice even when justice is already
22. See e.g. STh I-II.51.2, 53.3.
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being done, then we are probably more likely to practice love beyond justice when doing
so is the only way to bring about justice. So if it is important to develop the disposition to
practice love when justice requires it, then it is also important, as a kind of means to this
end, that we develop the disposition to practice love when justice does not require it in a
specific case.

The Need for Love: Moral Reasoning and Creation as Gift

Another way of showing, perhaps more deeply, the need for love beyond justice
does not require, as its starting point, appeal to the reality of a fallen world and
consequent situations of injustice. This way begins instead by considering that justice, by
its nature, presupposes unmerited gift. The point is summarized by Josef Pieper. At the
end of his essay on justice, he refers to the fact that “injustice is the prevailing condition
in our world,” and makes, in brief form, the argument described above.23 Before this,
however, he also writes: “[I]n order to keep the world going, we must be prepared to give
what is not in the strictest sense obligatory.” He traces this need ultimately to the
“realiz[ation] that [one’s] very being is a gift,” adding that the one who fully realizes this
“is also the man willing to give where there is no strict obligation.”24 In his later essay on
love, he takes the position that human love, properly understood, is an affirmation that “is
by its nature and must inevitably be always an imitation and a kind of repetition of this
perfected and, in the exact sense of the word, creative love of God.” Indeed, “in human
love something more takes place than mere echo, mere repetition and imitation. What
23. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 112.
24. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 110–11.
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takes place is a continuation and in a certain sense even a perfecting of what was begun in
the course of creation.”25 Thus, the giving beyond the obligatory, reflecting the realization
of being as gift, is precisely love.
Pieper likely sees this realization of the gift character of creation as rooted in
Aquinas’ thought.26 With regard to the consequent need to give beyond what justice
requires, he refers explicitly to Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues of “liberality, affabilitas,
kindness, ... friendliness.”27 As Pieper notes, in Aquinas’ treatment of “affability,” he says
that this sort of “friendliness” “falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks the full
aspect of debt”; yet he nonetheless holds that “it regards ... a certain debt of equity,
namely, that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell” (unless there is a
reason making it necessary not to do so). This is because we “could not live in society ...
without joy.”28 But, as was indicated in the discussion of Aquinas on justice in chapter 1,
Aquinas thinks that human fulfillment requires participation in (virtue-promoting)
society. Therefore, one might add, human fulfillment requires mutual affability among
people.

25. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 171–72. With regard to the possible importance of
Pieper’s thought on love for an understanding of contemporary papal—John Paul II’s, and
also, as we have begun to see, Benedict XVI’s—teaching, one might note Ratzinger’s
mention (Milestones, 43) of his appreciation of Pieper, and then the similarities between
Pieper’s (Faith, Hope, Love, 207–45) and Benedict’s (DCE 3–8) treatments of the
relationship between eros and agape.
26. E.g., STh I.44.1-2; 45.1, 3.
27. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 111.
28. STh II-II.114.2 and ad 1.
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Aquinas does not argue explicitly here that it is the gift character of creation that
grounds the need for affability. But a case could be made that it is something like this gift
character that lies in the background of what Aquinas says about this virtue. Why do we
need the “joy” that comes from friendly relations with others? It might be suggested that
when we express friendliness toward others, this is one way of expressing the
“affirmation” that is love and that is a participation in God’s creative giving. As part of
our total dependence upon God, we depend upon this love. And also as part of our
dependence upon God, it is in our nature not to live only for ourselves, but also to give
ourselves back to God and to those others whom he has loved by the gift of creation,
including by showing them the love that they need.
When Aquinas treats the virtue of “liberality,” the connection with the doctrine of
creation and the recognition of creation as gift is perhaps even clearer. Liberality is a
virtue because virtue uses things well, and liberality uses “the things of this world that are
granted to us for our livelihood” well. It does so not by neglecting one’s own needs but by
recognizing the limits of those needs and thus spending more on others.29 But why should
we use money for the needs of others rather than our own desires? Aquinas argues that
“the use of money consists in parting with it.” But we do this with “greater ... force
(virtus),” by “giving it to others ... than when we spend it on ourselves.”30 Why, then, is
money meant to be parted with (as perfectly as possible)? Perhaps, at bottom, because it
is something “granted to us,” as Aquinas says. But we ourselves are also “granted” to

29. STh II-II.117.1 and ad 1.
30. STh II-II.117.4.
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ourselves in God’s act of creation. So perhaps we are meant to give ourselves, as
perfectly as possible, and therefore in a way that goes beyond justice, to others.
This possible extension of the argument about liberality is further substantiated by
an examination of what Aquinas says when he treats the same virtue in his commentary
on Aristotle, specifically on the latter’s statement that “it is easier [hence less virtuous]
not to take from another than to give.” Aquinas says that “a person giving what is his cuts
himself away, so to speak, from what was a part of him.”31 If “the things of this world that
are granted to us for our livelihood” are meant to be used, especially for others, even
though once they become one’s property they thereby become, “so to speak, ... a part of”
oneself, then it seems all the more likely that we are meant to give our very selves as gifts
to others.
The force of this sort of argument can perhaps be made still more evident by
considering some recent developments in natural-law theory. I alluded very briefly in
chapter 1 to one of the current debates among natural-law theorists, namely, that about the
normative status of speculative knowledge of “nature” (and so also of a natural hierarchy
of goods). Grisez32 and those of his school, and also Rhonheimer,33 have denied that there
is any such normative status. While maintaining that the precepts of natural law direct us
toward the perfection of our nature, that is, while affirming the metaphysical connection
between nature and morality, and while also recognizing that practical knowledge of
31. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics IV.663.
32. E.g., Grisez, “First Principle of Practical Reason,” 194; idem, Way of the Lord
Jesus, 1:103–5.
33. E.g., Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, chap. 1; idem,
Perspective of the Acting Person, passim.
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human goods requires experience of those goods, they have denied that it is
epistemologically valid to move from “is” to “ought.” Various others have been critical of
the “new” theories that reject this move, leading to the debate. For example, Russell
Hittinger’s monograph34 was in turn critically reviewed by Grisez;35 Hittinger responded
briefly.36 Gahl, while defending Grisez against Hittinger to some extent, nevertheless
questions the absolute “is/ought” distinction.37 A second debate, overlapping with the first
one, concerns the role that references to God and religion need to play in natural-law
reasoning. Put differently, it concerns whether natural law can (and ought to be)
approached as a purely philosophical category, or whether, and, if so, how, it ought to be
discussed in a theological context.38

34. Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory.
35. Grisez, “A Critique of Russell Hittinger’s Book.”
36. Hittinger, “Response to Professor Grisez’s Critique.”
37. Gahl, “Practical Reason,” 16–20, 80–97.
38. See e.g. several essays collected together under the heading “Revelation and
Natural Law”: Fuchs, “The Natural Law in the Testimony of the Church”; Hughes, “The
Authority of Christian Tradition and of Natural Law”; Hauerwas, “Nature, Reason, and
the Task of Theological Ethics”; Schüller, “A Contribution to the Theological Discussion
of Natural Law.” Also, Bexell, “Is Grisez’s Moral Theology Rationalistic?”; Black, “Is
the New Natural Law Theory Christian?”; Biggar, “Karl Barth and Germain Grisez.”
Also, May, “Germain Grisez on Moral Principles and Moral Norms”; and, in response,
Ashley, “The Scriptural Basis of Grisez’s Revision of Moral Theology.” Also, Novak,
“Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law”; Yaffe, “Natural Law in Maimonides?”;
Goyette, “Natural Law and the Metaphysics of Creation”; Cessario, “Why Aquinas
Locates Natural Law within the Sacra Doctrina”; Fastiggi, “Natural Reason in the
Service of Faith”; Muller, “The Christological Foundation of Natural Law.” Also,
Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition, esp. 136–48. Also, for longer studies,
Black, Christian Moral Realism; Hittinger, The First Grace; Porter, Natural and Divine
Law; idem, Nature as Reason; Grabill, Rediscovering the Natural Law.
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Some of the most recent interventions in these debates have, I suggest, added to
our understanding of the reality and moral significance of nature as God’s gift, and
therefore also to our understanding of the problems with the Grisez/Rhonheimer rejection
of nature as epistemologically normative. First, Fulvio Di Blasi has offered a new
response to the Grisez school, examining closely Aquinas’ treatment of morality in both
the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles. Di Blasi argues, to summarize
the elements of his analysis that are most relevant for the purposes of this discussion of
creation and love, that for Aquinas, the notion of natural law is intrinsically linked with
that of knowledge of God as Creator, and, precisely as such, as present in created things,
with their natures in accordance with his creative will. Hence, there is also an intrinsic
link between love of God above all things, to which we are naturally inclined, and
treatment of created things in ways that harmonize with their natures.39 Second, Matthew
Levering has studied the relationship between biblical and natural-law ethics. He
responds to Rhonheimer, making an argument similar to Di Blasi’s. Levering points to
the importance of natural law “as a ‘participation’ in the eternal law,”40 and elaborates
upon this point, referring to “the non-competitive relationship between God and
creatures, a relationship in which creatures are finite created modes of participating in the
Creator God,”41 and to the naturalness of love for God.42

39. Di Blasi, God and the Natural Law, chap. 2.
40. Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 187.
41. Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 201.
42. Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 207.
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Pace Levering’s introductory claims,43 awareness of this natural ordering to God
does not suffice as a response to concerns about the necessity of the further ordering that
is conferred by grace. As I argued in the previous chapter, living only in accordance with
this natural ordering and nothing higher does not quiet the “restlessness” of the human
intellect and will; hence, attempting to live in this way leads, as Balthasar says, eventually
to Nietzsche. This natural ordering must be seen as nothing less than one of the ways in
which nature is so made that the further gift of grace and supernatural life is fitting for
nature. But the natural ordering does exist, and does enable us to begin to understand how
love for God, and respect for the natures he creates, might be fulfilling. Most deeply, and
most notably for our purposes, this ordering enables us to begin to see, using our human
reason, how living as gifts to others, even beyond justice, might be fulfilling. If our very
existence is a gift from God of constant presence of and participation in his being, then it
seems reasonable to conclude that we are most fully ourselves when we live lives of
grateful self-gift to God in return and to those others he has also created, as well as doing
what is in harmony with our nature in other more specific ways.

John Paul II, Natural Law, and “Gift”

Examination of John Paul’s pre-papal and papal writings indicates that, unlike the
Grisezans and Rhonheimer, he understands speculative knowledge of nature to have a
place in natural-law moral reasoning. The pre-papal text most indicative of this is an
essay in which he writes that “every being—or, more precisely, the essence, or nature, of
every being—can serve as the basis of an ethical norm and of the positing of norms. A
43. Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 6–11.
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being’s essence, or nature, determines how free we are to behave with respect to that
being, how we should or ought to behave when that being is an object of our activity.”44
There is a text in John Paul’s papal encyclical on fundamental moral theology, Veritatis
Splendor, that taken in isolation might be read as compatible with the understanding that
all that is “natural” about natural law is the role that our natural faculty of reason plays in
it, and that speculative knowledge of nature is without normative significance.45
Elsewhere in the same encyclical, however, John Paul criticizes the view that the
functions of (embodied) human nature “would not be able to constitute reference points
for moral decisions.”46 Furthermore, in the same number of Veritatis Splendor, John Paul
writes: “The person, by the light of reason and the support of virtue, discovers in the body
the anticipatory signs, the expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity
with the wise plan of the Creator.”47 For John Paul, both the basic fact of our createdness,
and also the more specific aspects of our bodily nature, indicate that we are fully
ourselves when we give ourselves. This text in Veritatis Splendor, with its teaching that
we can know that we ought to make gifts of ourselves, is not the first such passage in
John Paul’s writings.
If the text from Gaudium et Spes 22 teaching that Christ reveals human persons to
themselves is perhaps John Paul’s favorite passage from the Pastoral Constitution, it is
nevertheless not the only one that he quotes with some frequency. Already in his pre44. Wojty»a, “Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics,” 287.
45. VS 42.
46. VS 48.
47. VS 48.

168
papal writings, he also makes reference to the teaching “that man, who is the only
creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a
sincere gift of himself.” The Council indicates that this is made known to us by Christ’s
prayer for human unity that is like the unity of the Trinity, that is, by revelation.48 In a
commentary, Wojty»a writes, accordingly: “The document of the last Council seems in
these words to sum up the age-old traditions and inquiries of Christian anthropology, for
which divine revelation became a liberating light.” Continuing his commentary, however,
he says that “in the experience of self-determination the human person stands revealed
before us as a distinctive structure of self-possession and self-governance.” Here (taking
these words in themselves and in the context of the essay as a whole) he seems to be
speaking of what we can know of ourselves by natural reason. And he continues further,
arguing that “both self-possession and self-governance imply a special disposition to
make a ‘gift of oneself.’” Thus a “‘law of the gift’ ... is inscribed deep within the dynamic
structure of the person.” He reiterates: “The text of Vatican II certainly draws its
inspiration from revelation ... This relational portrait of the person, however, necessarily
presupposes the immanent ... portrait that unfolds before us from an analysis of the
personal structure of self-determination”—that is, from a philosophical analysis.49

48. GS 24.
49. Wojty»a, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” 193–94. See also
the references to this essay as a work of “philosophy”: ibid., 187–88, 189, 195. Wojty»a
also mentions: “My point of departure here will be a discussion that arose following the
publication of my book The Acting Person” (ibid., 187; cf. 194); thus, see also idem, The
Acting Person, and for considerable discussion (including of problems with the published
English translation), Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, chap. 3. For references
to GS 24 on “gift” in papal writings, see, e.g., John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem 7; CA
41; VS 86; EV 96.
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John Paul’s papal lectures on the “Theology of the Body” contain an extended
reflection on gift. He speaks there of the importance of the words “Creator” and “created”
as leading to a “hermeneutics of the gift” that must be applied in an interpretation of the
human person and human relationships.50 He continues by suggesting that human persons
are gifts to one another.51 He then moves into his treatment of what he calls “the ‘spousal’
meaning of the body.”52 He defines this as “the power to express love: precisely that love
in which the human person bcomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the very
meaning of his being and existence.”53 Schindler has commented on the significance of
such “Theology of the Body” passages as these regarding creation, the body as gift, and
the body as able to express love, for a response to the charge that morality is something
imposed upon our nature.54 In similar fashion, he has studied the “gift” passage in
Veritatis Splendor, in itself and in relation to the “Theology of the Body” passages, and
has suggested that they bear relevance not only for sexual ethics, but also for social and
political morality.55 This can be further verified56 by considering John Paul’s reference to
Creator/creation and to gift in Evangelium Vitae. For example, as briefly noted in the

50. TOB, 179–80.
51. TOB, 180–83.
52. TOB, 183–91.
53. TOB 185–86.
54. Schindler, “Is Truth Ugly?,” 702–3, 707.
55. Schindler, “Significance of World and Culture,” 138–39.
56. On the connections between these areas of Catholic moral thought/teaching,
cf. also, e.g., CA 38–39.
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previous chapter, John Paul refers to God as creator in the context of his reference to the
cultural problem of “the eclipse of the sense of God and of man.”57 Specifically, he quotes
Gaudium et Spes: “Without the Creator the creature would disappear. ... But when God is
forgotten the creature itself grows unintelligible.” He comments that one then “no longer
considers life as a splendid gift of God.”58 He refers in particular to the negative
implications of this forgetting of God for our understanding of our body as a place of
gift.59 He later calls for the fostering of “a contemplative outlook,” explaining that this “is
the outlook of those who do not presume to take possession of reality but instead accept it
as a gift, discovering in all things the reflection of the Creator.”60
This “contemplative outlook,” employing the “hermeneutics of the gift” in its
interpretation of human bodily life and indeed of all of creation, is, in John Paul’s view,
not only philosophically valid, but also, it would seem, necessary for the development of
a culture of life. John Paul’s successor Benedict XVI has likewise incorporated the theme
of “gift” into his contribution to Catholic social teaching, specifically his encyclical on
human development. He speaks several times of the need for gift and gratuitousness in
social life.61 It seems that sometimes when he does so, he has in mind the gift of
supernatural charity, given in the context of the “fraternity” that only comes from our

57. EV 21.
58. EV 22.
59. EV 23.
60. EV 83.
61. CV 34, 36–37, 39, 48, 50, 68.
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relationship with God in Christ by grace.62 But this not always so. Thus he speaks of
“both the light of reason and the light of faith, through which the intellect attains to the
natural and supernatural truth of charity: it grasps its meaning as gift, acceptance, and
communion.”63 Apparently the charity that he has in mind also has a natural component.
Likewise he speaks of the environment and nature (including but not limited to human
nature) as (natural) gifts to be treated as such.64 And he refers to “natural and supernatural
fraternity”;65 it would seem, then, that, like charity, fraternity has a natural component,
even if Benedict does not see it as something that can be obtained by our natural power
alone.
The theme of (human) nature as, normatively as well as speculatively speaking, a
gift, has, then, become a significant component of both some of the most recent
contributions to the discussion of natural-law theory within Catholic thought, and of
recent official Catholic social teaching. To repeat once again, this does not contradict the
argument that love/mercy in particular and morality in general are only fully appreciated
as fulfilling in the context of the revelation of God’s call to us to a graced supernatural
relationship with himself. This is true because mercy is especially an aspect of such a
relationship, and also because we have a natural desire for and are left “restless” apart
from such a relationship. But some recent theology and official Church teaching seem to

62. CV 19. See also as background his pre-papal work, Ratzinger, The Meaning of
Christian Brotherhood.
63. CV 3.
64. CV 48, 50–51.
65. CV 73.
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agree that there is also a basis in natural human moral reasoning for beginning to see the
value of love that goes beyond justice, and indeed that this is one way to see nature as
open to and fittingly perfected by grace.
Again, I would be hesitant to claim that this fully establishes a conclusive
argument for mercy in punishing that should convince every single person of good will.
But I would venture to speculate that it is likely that many such people can and will, even
apart from Christian revelation, at least begin to see valid reasons to regard withholding
unnecessary use of capital punishment as a good choice. And I would add again the point
that I made at the end of the earlier section on the fallen world in this chapter. One is
most likely to practice generous love if one has become disposed to do so; one becomes
so disposed through practice, including, and perhaps especially, through the practice of
the most radically generous love, such as merciful love in cases in which the alternative is
really just, rather than the development of a situation of injustice. Some failures to love—
for instance, failures to practice what Aquinas calls affability—might (if repeated often
enough) lead fairly directly and predictably to social breakdown in some measure, and
hence to injustice. Others—like failures to temper criminal justice with mercy—might
not. But I think that it is reasonable to expect that they might eventually do so indirectly,
by creating cultures not sufficiently disposed to practice the love that is most obviously
necessary for social life.
Indeed, one might underscore that something like love/gift is a principle or norm
that seems to unify much of contemporary Catholic moral/social teaching, regarding
sexuality, marriage, and family; socioeconomic matters; and respect for human life. The
point is not simply that the theme of love/gift arises in papal teaching regarding all of
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these areas of social life. The point, furthermore, is that failure to live generous love in
one area will so affect us, individually and together, that we will more likely fail
eventually to live such love in other areas also. Failure to practice generous love in one
area of respect for life, as by practicing mercy rather than making unnecessary use of
capital punishment, will undermine our readiness to practice such love when the lives of
the innocent, such as the unborn, are at stake. And failure to practice generous love in the
area of respect for life in general, or in the area of sexuality, marriage, and family, or in
the economic sphere, will undermine our readiness to practice it in the other areas.
Finally, if we do not practice generous love in these areas, we will fail to achieve justice.

Conclusion

This dissertation has been a study of John Paul’s teaching in the encyclical
Evangelium Vitae that capital punishment ought not be used unless it is the only way to
defend society from further aggression by someone who has already committed a grave
crime. My introduction makes a preliminary argument, based especially on a close
reading of the relevant portions of the encyclical, that this entire teaching (though not the
further judgment that such cases are today very rare at best) should be understood as
grounded in moral principle regarding what will always be necessary for a healthy
society, not merely as a prudential judgment regarding what will be necessary in the
circumstances of a morally unhealthy society. The immediate context of John Paul’s
reference to the movement against capital punishment as a “sign of hope”—his
explanation of what “sign of hope” means, and the nature of the other such “signs of
hope” he includes in the same list—constitutes especially strong evidence in favor of my
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interpretation, though it must be further substantiated by identification and analysis of the
principle in question.
Chapter 1 responds to the attempt by members of the Grisezan school of moral
theology to identify the principle as an absolute norm against the intentional (as end or
means) taking of human life, a ‘basic good’ of the human person, and to understand
Evangelium Vitae as pointing in the direction of a teaching that capital punishment is
therefore intrinsically evil. I argue that this is not correct. John Paul’s exact ways of
speaking about capital punishment and about the killing of the innocent suggest instead
that he sees them as different cases, and capital punishment as permissible in rare types of
situations. While he does not make anything like an explicit argument for capital
punishment, Aquinas does, and the Grisezan reading of Aquinas’ argument as
unsuccessful does not take sufficient account of key presuppositions and details of that
argument, such as the role of virtues like justice as human goods, the similarities (as well
as differences) between capital punishment and other kinds of just punishment like
imprisonment, and the importance of the political community for human fulfillment, such
that charity would allow the just killing of a criminal who remains dangerous to that
community. Statements by John Paul that may appear at first to contradict key elements
of Aquinas’ argument turn out, upon careful analysis, not to.
Chapter 2 begins to elaborate the argument that John Paul’s reason for rejecting
most use of capital punishment is rooted in his understanding of the nature and
importance of mercy. For John Paul, full respect for human dignity requires doing what is
possible to help bring about the conversion of the sinner, and this in turn requires mercy.
In contrast to some of the diverse opinions about mercy in our contemporary society, John
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Paul sees mercy as neither something that is only sensible when there are mitigating
factors in a case, nor something supererogatory. Like Aquinas, he understands
supernatural charity as essential to Christian morality, and mercy as essential to charity.
Drawing from Faustina’s spiritual diaries and from his own reflections on fatherhood,
John Paul builds upon Aquinas’ understanding by adding certain emphases, especially the
nature of mercy as a participation in the “radiation” of God’s fatherhood, the role of
sacrifice in showing mercy, and the ability of mercy to bring about conversion. He
concludes that it is necessary to show mercy in punishing. Since mercy is a component of
charity, and charity requires protection of the lives of all the members of the community,
the necessity for mercy does not generate an absolute norm against the use of capital
punishment; it is not a violation of the ‘right to life’; as John Paul says, it might be
necessary and licit in some very rare cases. But it is still not otherwise morally licit. Such
costs as the community might incur by refraining from using capital punishment, costs in
the form of money for secure prisons, for counseling for murder victims’ loved ones who
are concerned about “closure,” and the like—costs other than actual continuing danger to
the lives of the innocent in the community—must be accepted as examples of the
sacrifice that is intrinsic to mercy.
Chapter 3 continues the analysis of mercy by focusing on John Paul’s
understanding of the relationship between mercy and justice. Specifically, John Paul
teaches that attempting to have justice without mercy will result in something less than
justice. Thus it is not simply that justice does not require punishing murderers with death,
and that mercy is beneficial or even commanded by God; it is that insisting on doing all
that justice allows (but does not require), rather than using mercy when possible, leads to
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a failure to attain even a just society. This teaching is rooted, I argue, in John Paul’s
acceptance of Henri de Lubac’s understanding of the human person as having a natural
desire for a graced supernatural relationship with God leading to the vision of God. There
has been significant criticism of de Lubac’s theological anthropology, but one can offer
plausible defenses of that anthropology against key criticisms. Consideration of the
personal relationship between de Lubac and Wojty»a/John Paul II, and of the latter’s own
writings, makes likewise plausible the conclusion that he understands the Second Vatican
Council’s anthropology, especially its statement that by revealing the Father and his love,
Christ reveals human persons to themselves, in accordance with de Lubac’s thought. And
this anthropology is the starting point for John Paul’s teaching regarding mercy. In fact,
from the existence of the natural desire for God, it can be concluded that attempting to
live in a way that rejects key elements of full supernatural communion with God, like
mercy, will lead to continued “restlessness” and will not be sustainable. Likewise,
attempting to bring about conversion of criminals without showing the mercy that invites
conversion to the life of supernatural charity will be less likely to be successful.
Chapter 4 has considered whether this teaching further implies that the political
community ought to make decisions about how to act based on truths accessible only
through supernatural faith. On the one hand, in the self-understanding of official
contemporary Catholic social teaching, there seems to be an intrinsic relationship
between the call to evangelize society and that social teaching. This is in keeping with the
points made in the previous chapters, about mercy as above all a supernatural and
revealed reality, and about the broader meaning of morality as a whole, at least insofar as
morality is to be seen as leading to real peace rather than leaving us “restless,” as likewise
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a revealed reality. On the other hand, there are reasons to think that the Church’s social
teaching, including the call for love/mercy, is to some extent comprehensible on the basis
of natural-law moral reasoning, especially insofar as the latter can and ought to take into
account our status as creatures and therefore as gift, to live for others in more than a
minimalistic way (giving them their just due and nothing more). So while the complete
“implementation” of Catholic social teaching does presuppose evangelization, one can
also appeal to human moral reasoning to provide at least the beginning of an explanation
of its more specific norms, even the norm against unnecessary use of capital punishment.
This norm does not, then, call upon the political community to do something that is
simply incomprehensible apart from faith.
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